Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and was sentenced to death. Appellant subsequently filed numerous post-conviction motions. This appeal involved the denial of Appellant's fourth post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and sentence. Appellant's counsel sought to file a substitution of counsel motion under seal. The motion was filed under seal. The State opposed the motion and moved to unseal it. Appellant responded by filing a motion to seal the State's opposition. The Supreme Court denied the State's motion and granted Appellant's motion. The State filed a motion for reconsideration of that order. Appellant then filed a motion to seal the reconsideration motion and any pleadings related to the substitution. Later, Appellant filed a motion to strike the motion for reconsideration and to direct the State's conduct respecting the various pleadings filed regarding the substitution motion. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for reconsideration and denied Appellant's competing motions, holding that the documents Appellant sought to have sealed did not meet the requirements for sealing. View "Howard v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary, grand larceny, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, first-degree kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred by dismissing a prospective juror before conducting a Batson hearing, and whether sufficient evidence supported the kidnapping conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) because Defendant asserted a Batson violation, it was a structural error to dismiss the challenged juror prior to conducting the Batson hearing because it showed the district court predetermined the challenge before actually hearing it; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the kidnapping conviction. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit a felony under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The State later filed a motion requesting that the justice court grant Respondent immunity in exchange for her testimony against another defendant, Gary Taylor, which was granted. Prior to sentencing in her own case, Respondent involuntarily testified at Taylor's preliminary hearing. Respondent then filed motions to dismiss the criminal complaint filed against her and to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that because the justice court granted her transactional immunity, the State could no longer prosecute her for any actions discussed in her testimony. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nevada's immunity statutes do confer transactional immunity where a defendant is forced to testify; and (2) the grant of transactional immunity to a defendant in exchange for testimony, even after entering a guilty plea, immunizes a defendant from further prosecution, including sentencing. View "State v. Tricas" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals presented specific applications of the question of whether a defendant can, in a single trial, be prosecuted and punished cumulatively for a single act that violates more than one criminal statute. Specifically, these appeals presented the following questions: When the elements of both crimes are met, can a defendant who shoots and hits but fails to kill his victim be convicted of and punished for both attempted murder and battery? Also, if the defendant shoots and misses, can he be convicted of and punished for both attempted murder and assault? The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction in both appeals after repeating the rule that if each statute contains an element that the other does not, then the offenses are different. The Court held that, in this case, Defendants' multiple convictions and punishments for attempted murder, assault, and battery in this case were statutorily authorized and further, did not offend the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, which licenses multiple punishments unless, analyzed in terms of their elements, one charged offense is the same or a lesser-included offense of the other. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a district court's discretion when resolving a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.0931(3), the statutory provision governing such petitions, provides that a district court "shall grant a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision" if certain requirements are met. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that the district court has discretion to determine whether a petitioner has met the statutory requirements but lacks discretion to deny a petition for release from lifetime supervision if that court finds the statutory requirements were met. In this case, the district court denied the petition based on victim impact testimony and made no findings as to whether Appellant had complied with the statutory requirements. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded. View "Goudge v. State" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a county's code of ordinance provisions establishing coroner's inquests into an officer-involved death. Appellants, five highway patrol officers, contended that the inquest procedures and provisions violated their due process rights and that the county board of county commissioners unconstitutionally impinged on the Legislature's authority to establish the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that Appellants' due process arguments failed; but (2) determined that the code provision requiring that a justice of the peace serve as a presiding officer in coroner's inquest proceedings regarding officer-involved deaths intrudes on the Legislature's exclusive authority over the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Because the code made no provision for anyone other than a justice of the peace to serve as presiding officer in such proceedings, the Court concluded that the offending provision could not be severed, which required the entire inquest scheme regarding officer-involved deaths to be struck down. View "Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron" on Justia Law

Respondent was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state facility. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor. The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(f), a felony. Citing relevant statutes and Robinson v. State, which broadly holds that "prisoner" as used in section 200.481(2)(f) was meant to only apply in the criminal setting, the district court dismissed the charge, holding that because Respondent's detention was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom section 200.481(2)(f) could apply. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detained for delinquency in a state facility is not a "prisoner" for purposes of section 200.481(2)(f). View "State v. Javier C." on Justia Law

Respondent was in custody in county jail when officers discovered a cell phone hidden in a box beneath his bed. The State charged Respondent under Nev. Rev. Stat. 212.093(1), which, in pertinent part, prohibits prisoners, including county jail inmates, from possessing "any key, picklock, bolt cutters, wire cutters, saw, digging tool, rope, ladder, hook or any other tool or item adapted, designed or commonly used for the purpose of escaping" from custody. After being bound over to the district court, Respondent filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 212.093(1) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that, by its terms, the statute does not prohibit the possession of cell phones. The district court agreed with Respondent and dismissed the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by its plain and unambiguous language, section 212.093(1) does not prohibit county jail inmates from possessing cell phones. View "Pershing County Sheriff v. Andrews" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Inc. (ACORN) hired voter registration canvassers in Las Vegas. Under an incentive program, ACORN paid canvassers $5 a bonus if the canvasser returned twenty-one or more voter registration applications. The State subsequently charged ACORN and the supervisor of ACORN's field director for Nevada with several counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 293.805, which prohibits providing compensation to voter registration canvassers based upon the total number of voters a canvasser registers. The supervisor entered an Alford plea to two counts of conspiracy to commit the crime of compensation for registration of voters, and was adjudged guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 293.805 triggers a less exacting standard of review than strict scrutiny; (2) the State demonstrated an interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation imposed on canvassing activities, and therefore, section 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment; and (3) section 293.805 is not unconstitutionally vague. View "Busefink v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent issued an eminent domain action against Appellants. The district court awarded Respondent possession of the property, and the jury found Respondent owned Appellants $4.4 million in just compensation. Appellants appealed and Respondent cross-appealed. While the appeals were pending, Respondent filed a notice of its intent to abandon the condemnation proceedings and a motion to vacate the judgment of condemnation. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order vacating the judgment while an appeal was pending but certified its inclination to grant the motion to vacate based on its conclusion that Respondent was entitled to abandon the proceedings. The Supreme Court held (1) a public agency may abandon an eminent domain action after it has paid just compensation and the district court has entered a final order of condemnation, but before the resolution of issues pending on appeal; (2) the district court retains jurisdiction to address a notice of abandonment and motion to dismiss, even while an appeal of the matter is pending in the Supreme Court; and (3) thus, the motion to remand was denied as moot because a remand was unnecessary for the district court to decide the motion to dismiss. View "Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pac. Power Co." on Justia Law