Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and coercion. Defendant moved to suppress the confession he made while at the police station, claiming that interrogation began after he invoked his right to counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Defendant asked "Can I get an attorney?" but denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's statement was ambiguous and that there was no substantive questioning until after Defendant was given a second set of Miranda warnings at the police station and waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the question "Can I get an attorney?" is an unequivocal request for the aid of counsel, triggering the requirement that all interrogation immediately cease; (2) once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, there may be no further interrogation unless the suspect reinitiates contact with the police, there is a sufficient break in custody, or the suspect is provided the aid of the counsel that he requested; and (3) Appellant's confession was inadmissible, and the error in admitting the confession was not harmless. Remanded. View " Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. The district court determined that restitution should be imposed as part of the sentence but did not set an amount of restitution. Instead the court ordered Appellant to appear within sixty days after his release from prison to have the court determine the restitution at that time. Appellant appealed, arguing that Nevada law requires that the district court set an amount of restitution when it determines that restitution is appropriate as part of a sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because the judgment of conviction contemplated restitution in an uncertain amount, it was not final and therefore was not appealable. View " Slaatte v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of willfully endangering a child as a result of child abuse, a gross misdemeanor, and battery by strangulation, a felony. Appellant's defense was parental discipline privilege as to the child abuse charge and self-defense as to the battery charge. Appellant challenged (1) the district court's admission of evidence that Appellant had struck one of his sons in public and that Defendant got into an argument with nursing staff about his son, and (2) the court's admission of testimony from a witness reporting that she also had a heated exchange with Appellant over his disciplining a young boy. Appellant alleged the admission of this evidence violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045's prohibition against using character or prior-bad-act evidence to prove criminal propensity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) one of the episodes involving one of Defendant's sons was properly admitted to refute Appellant's claim of parental privilege; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony about the incident involving Appellant's discipline of the young boy, but the error was harmless. View " Newman v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with sexual assault of a minor and lewdness with a child. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the lewdness count and deadlocked on the sexual assault count. The district court declared a mistrial on the sexual assault count and set a date for a new trial. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the double jeopardy clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited a second trial for sexual assault because he was acquitted of lewdness, and both offenses were based upon the same event. The district court denied the motion based on the jury's inability to reach of verdict on the sexual assault count. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) in determining whether an issue of ultimate fact has been decided and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial, the district court must examine the record of the first trial and determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on some other issue of fact; (2) in conducting this analysis, the court may not consider the jury's inability to reach a verdict on the other counts; and (3) in this case, the district court improperly analyzed Petitioner's double jeopardy claim. View "Gonzalez v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of invasion of a home in violation of a temporary protective order (TPO). Defendant did not file a motion with the district court regarding the TPO's validity and did not address the issue during his sentencing. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the procurement of the TPO violated the procedure set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 33.020(5) and violated Defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant may not collaterally attack the TPO's validity in a subsequent prosecution for violating the TPO; and (2) the other issues Defendant raised on appeal also lacked merit. View " Truesdell v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and discharging a firearm at or into a vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was denied his counsel of choice at his preliminary hearing before the justice court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the justice court's denial of Defendant's request to be represented by retained counsel at the preliminary hearing violated Defendant's qualified right to counsel of his choice; but (2) the denial of Defendant's counsel of choice at the preliminary hearing was harmless error. View " Patterson v. State" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Petitioner, and Richard Tannery was appointed to represent Petitioner. A notice of intent to seek an indictment was served by facsimile transmission to Tannery's office. The grand jury ultimately returned an indictment against Petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of reasonable notice. The district court denied the motion. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the State's facsimile service of the grand jury notice was inadequate. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that a facsimile service of a notice of intent to seek an indictment constitutes adequate service under Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.241(2), as section 172.241(2) does not require personal service, and Nev. Rev. Sat. 178.589(1) permits facsimile transmission of motions, notices, and other legal documents where personal service is not required. View "Davis v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault in an Alford plea. Before sentencing, John Pacult, a licensed social worker, performed a psychosexual evaluation of Appellant. After conducting a series of assessments, Pacult concluded that Appellant had a high risk to reoffend. Appellant filed a motion to strike the psychosexual evaluation and to order a new psychosexual evaluation and presentence investigation (PSI) report. The district court denied Appellant's motion and sentenced him to prison. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether Pacult's evaluation comported with currently accepted standards of assessment. After a hearing, the district court held that Pacult's evaluation was proper. The court then denied Appellant's request for a new psychosexual evaluation and reinstated the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the evaluation was based upon currently accepted standards of assessment. View "Blackburn v. State" on Justia Law

The City brought an eminent domain action to acquire a forty-foot-wide strip of real property from Respondent. Respondent's predecessor-in-interest originally acquired title to this property through a federal land patent that reserved a thirty-three-foot-wide easement across the strip of property for "roadway and public utilities purposes." The City asserted that it sought to utilize its existing rights to the thirty-three-foot right-of-way under the federal land patent's easement and to attain, by condemnation, the remaining seven-foot portion of land. The district court granted Respondent partial summary judgment and awarded Respondent $394,490 in compensation, concluding that the City lacked any right to use the easement because the federal patent did not specifically name the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the federal land patent did not create a thirty-three-foot-wide easement, as the plain meaning of the patent's language created a valid public easement; (2) determining that the City's proposed use of the easement constituted a taking, as the use of this easement was within its scope and did not strip Respondent of a property interest; and (3) awarding Respondent just compensation and attorney fees. View "City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged via criminal complaint with sex offender failure to notify appropriate agencies of change of address. Appellant's counsel filed a motion to dismiss. The State did not file an opposition, and the justice court dismissed the case due to the lack of an opposition. Subsequently, the State obtained an indictment against Appellant for the same offense charged in the criminal complaint. Appellant filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the State willfully failed to comply with important procedural rules and acted with conscious indifference to his procedural rights when it failed to oppose the motion to dismiss. Appellant argued that this conscious indifference barred a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The district court concluded that the State did not exhibit willful or conscious indifference to Appellant's rights. Thereafter, Appellant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant' pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the State acted with conscious indifference to important procedural rules. View "Woods v. State" on Justia Law