Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Glazebrook was convicted for first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Glazebrook contended (1) that the State's delay in charging him with the offense violated his constitutional rights, and (2) that the trial court erred in receiving certain evidence over his objections. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) the district court's determination that Glazebrook failed to establish a denial of due process resulting from preindictment delay was not clearly erroneous, but (2) the district court abused its discretion in receiving evidence of Glazebrook's criminal history, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial.

Jonathan Becker pleaded guilty to motor vehicle homicide and was sentenced to five years of probation, which included a requirement that Becker participate in a work ethic camp. The court also revoked Becker's driver's license for five years as a condition of probation. Becker later violated his probation, and the court revoked it. The court then sentenced Becker to five years in prison and again revoked Becker's license, this time for fifteen years. The court did not give Becker credit for the time he served in the work ethic camp or for his previous driver's license revocation. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding (1) Becker should receive credit for the time served at the work ethic camp, but (2) Becker should not receive credit for the time his license was revoked while he was on probation. Remanded for resentencing.

A state patrol officer stopped for speeding a vehicle driven by Anthony Laws in which Stuart Howard and Sarah McGee were passengers. When consent to search was denied, a trained drug detection canine unit was brought to the scene. The canine alerted, and a subsequent search disclosed over 700 pounds of marijuana being towed behind the car. Laws, Howard, and McGee were all charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. After their motions to suppress were denied, each was convicted. This appeal addressed McGee's challenge to the denial of her motion to suppress and to the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed McGee's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court correctly denied McGee's motion to suppress for the reasons articulated in its opinion related to Laws and Howard, and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support McGee's conviction.

A state patrol officer stopped for speeding a vehicle driven by Anthony Laws in which Stuart Howard was a passenger. When consent to search was denied, a trained drug detection canine unit was brought to the scene. The canine alerted, and a subsequent search disclosed over 700 pounds of marijuana. Laws and Howard were both charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Each filed a motion to suppress. The motions were denied, and Laws and Howard were convicted of the charge. Both filed notices of appeal, assigning separate but related errors. In a consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle after the traffic stop, and the length of the continued detention was not unreasonable; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's factual finding that the results of the canine sniff were admissible; and (3) the reasonable suspicion factors combined with the canine alert constituted probable cause to search the vehicles.

Trevelle Taylor was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. On appeal, Taylor contended that the district court erred in giving certain jury instructions, receiving expert opinion testimony regarding the presence of gunshot residue on Taylor's hands, and admitting cellular telephone records purporting to prove contacts between Taylor and his codefendant on the basis of insufficient foundation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court committed reversible error in giving a jury instruction that allowed the jury to presume that Taylor was guilty of the crimes charged but failing to specify that the jury that was not required to draw the inference of guilt in violation of Neb. R. Evid. 303(3); (2) Taylor was not unfairly prejudiced by the other jury instructions given; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of gunshot residue; and (4) there was sufficient authentication to support the admission of the cellular telephone records. Remanded for a new trial.

A jury found Armon Dixon guilty of one count of first-degree sexual assault and one count of robbery. The trial court determined that Dixon was a habitual offender as to both counts and sentenced Dixon to consecutive terms of thirty-five to sixty years in prison. On appeal, Dixon asserted that the district court erred in, inter alia, failing to sustain his motions for a change of venue, a mistrial, a continuance when he could not produce a witness, and for a directed verdict, and in imposing excessive sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that none of Dixon's assignments of error had merit.

Larry Williams was convicted and sentenced in district court for five counts of first degree sexual assault and one count of sexual assault of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams' convictions, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams' motion for new trial on the bases that (a) the informations were signed by persons were signed by persons not properly identified as the prosecuting authority, (b) prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and (c) the court erroneously admitted certain evidence; and (2) the district court did not impose excessive sentences, but the court committed plain error when it granted Williams forty-five days of credit for time against each of the five counts. The Court modified the sentencing order to state that Williams was entitled to a credit for time served in the amount of forty-five days against the aggregate of the minimum and the aggregate of the maximum sentences of imprisonment.

Defendant Karnell Burton was convicted of manslaughter, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Burton's convictions and sentences, holding (1) Burton waived any violation of his right to a speedy trial by not moving for discharge before trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Burton's motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct during the state's rebuttal in final argument; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that evidence of gang membership of two of the State's witnesses was not relevant; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing lengthy terms of imprisonment because of the nature of Burton's offenses.

Raad Almasaudi was charged with theft by receiving stolen property pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-517 after various items of stolen property were found in his residence. A jury convicted Almasaudi of the charge. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Almasaudi was prejudiced by an instruction directing the jury to apply an objective rather than a subjective standard to the knowledge requirement of section 28-517 because such an instruction was contrary to law and failed to conform to the criminal code, and (2) the totality of the evidence was sufficient to sustain Almasaudi's conviction. Remanded for a new trial.

Frederick Skaggs was convicted in California of attempted forcible rape, kidnapping, robbery, and the unlawful taking of a vehicle. After he was paroled, Skaggs eventually moved to Nebraska. The Nebraska State Patrol required Skaggs to register under the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). After Skaggs requested a determination of the applicability of SORA to him, a hearing was held, and a hearing officer determined that Skaggs was required to register. The State Patrol adopted the recommendation of the hearing officer in full. The district court agreed that Skaggs was required to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State Patrola and district court did not err in determining SORA applied to Skaggs, and (2) the district court did not err when it refused to address the issue of whether SORA, as applied to Skaggs, was unconstitutional because it was not properly preserved for judicial review.