Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Chad Norman pled no contest to third degree assault and was sentenced to probation for two years and jail for thirty days. After a hearing, the district court also ordered Norman to register under Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Norman appealed the portion of his sentence requiring him to register, claiming he was denied due process. The Supreme Court reversed the registration order, holding (1) before a court orders a defendant to be subject to SORA pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4003(1)(b)(i), the court must make a finding whether the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact as part of the incident that gave rise to the defendant's conviction for one of the offenses not sexual in nature listed in section 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B); (2) the court must provide procedural due process when it makes this finding, including proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (3) although the court in this case provided Norman with notice and a hearing, the court erred when it based its finding solely on statements in the State's factual basis for Norman's plea and explicitly ignored the evidence at the hearing. Remanded for resentencing.

After a jury trial, Matthew Fox was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Fox appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it found him competent to stand trial and when it allowed him to absent himself from major portions of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it determined that Fox was competent to stand trial, and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Fox knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial and allowed Fox to absent himself from trial.

Jeffrey Hessler was incarcerated and sentenced to death relating to the rape and murder of a fifteen-year-old. Hessler subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to demand a competency hearing before the trial court allowed Hessler to waive counsel and represent himself at sentencing. The court then denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hessler failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the sentencing hearing, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying postconviction relief.

Lucky Iromuanya was convicted of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and two related counts of use of a weapon. The Supreme Court modified his sentence. Iromuanya subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel directed at his trial and appellate counsel. The district court overruled the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Iromuanya's motion without a hearing where, for all of his claims, Iromuanya either failed to allege facts that showed his counsel's deficient performance or failed to allege facts that showed he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficiencies.

Timmy Timmens was convicted of second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Timmens subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several particulars and that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims without a hearing and denied the remaining claim following an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Timmens' appeal of the order denying all but one of his postconviction claims without a hearing was untimely; (2) trial counsel's performance with respect to Timmens' remaining claim was not deficient under the Strickland v. Washington standard, and therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective in not raising the issue of trial counsel's performance on direct appeal; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Timmens' motion to alter or amend the judgment.

A rental vehicle driven by James Nelson was stopped for speeding. A subsequent search disclosed a package of cocaine. After a jury trial, Nelson was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver or distribute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although Nelson was not the driver authorized on the rental agreement, he had permission from the authorized driver to drive the vehicle, and therefore, Nelson had standing to challenge his detention and the search of the vehicle; (2) the district court's denial of Nelson's first motion to suppress was not in error where an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer would have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Nelson; and (3) the district court did not err when it denied Nelson's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because the evidence at issue was not newly discovered evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2101(5), the evidence was not exculpatory, and its loss or destruction did not deprive Nelson of due process or a fair trial.

Jeffrey McCave was in his car, parked in the driveway of his father's house, when his father told him to leave. After McCave refused, his father called the police, who arrested McCave. McCave was subsequently convicted of DUI, refusing to submit to a chemical test, trespass, and possessing an open container. The district court affirmed the judgment of the county court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction for DUI, refusing to submit, and possessing an open container and remanded with directions to vacate those convictions and sentences, holding (1) McCave's arrest for DUI was unlawful because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest McCave, and therefore, the county court erred in failing to suppress evidence derived from the arrest, and the error was not harmless; (2) the unlawful arrest also rendered McCave's conviction for refusing to submit unlawful; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain McCave's conviction for possessing alcohol in an open container; and (4) the county court erred in excluding evidence relevant to the trespass charge and the statutory defense to that charge, and because the error was not harmless, the Court reversed this conviction and remanded for a new trial only on that charge.

Appellant Arthur Perina was charged with, among other things, motor vehicle homicide under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-306. Perina filed a motion to quash the motor vehicle homicide charge, asserting that section 28-306 was unconstitutional on the ground that it criminalized negligent acts. The county court overruled Perina's motion. Perina pled guilty to both charges, after which he renewed his constitutional challenge. It was again overruled. The district court affirmed Perina's convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Perina's constitutional arguments or affirming the county court's decision to convict him of motor vehicle homicide without proof of mens rea because motor vehicle homicide is a public welfare offense that does not require proof of mens rea.

Joshua Alfredson was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault and second degree false imprisonment. The trial court subsequently determined that an aggravated offense had been established and, as a result, subjected Alfredson to lifetime community supervision as part of his sentence. The court of appeals affirmed Alfredson's convictions and sentences, concluding (1) the trial court erred by failing to submit to the jury the aggravated offense determination regarding whether the offense included the use of force or the threat of serious violence pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-174.03, but (2) the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court's error was not harmless because the Court could not say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have found that Alfredson used force or the threat of serious violence in compelling the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. Remanded.

Jerad Parks was charged with first degree sexual assault on a child. Although Parks was twenty-four years old at the time he was charged, he filed a motion to transfer to the juvenile court because he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses. The district court denied the motion. Parks then pled no contest to attempted second degree sexual assault and felony child abuse. The district court ordered Parks to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Parks' motion to transfer because under the plain language of the juvenile code, the juvenile court's jurisdiction ends when the juvenile reaches the age of majority; and (2) because Parks pled no contest to a registrable offense under SORA, the plain language of the statute required Parks to register as a sex offender.