Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Because of Defendant Oscar Hernandez's third conviction for driving under the influence, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his license. Defendant received an ignition interlock permit from the Department. Before the revocation expired, Defendant was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle that did not have an ignition interlock device. The State charged Defendant with driving during revocation under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.06. The district court concluded that section 60-6,197.06 did not apply to Defendant's conduct and that Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,211.05(5) did. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) section 60-6,197.06 does not provide the penalty for a driver who has a valid ignition interlock permit but operates a vehicle not equipped with such a device; and (2) rather, that conduct is a Class II misdemeanor under section 60-6,211.05(5).

Servio Diaz, a Honduran disaster refugee with authorization to reside in the U.S., pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to misdemeanor charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and driving while intoxicated. Diaz subsequently filed a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief on the basis that his counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to advise Diaz of potential deportation consequences he would face when he entered his guilty plea. The district court determined that Diaz had not established entitlement to relief and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that the error asserted by Diaz was not an appropriate basis for relief by a writ of error coram nobis.

A jury convicted LeRoy Parmar of first degree murder for the 1987 killing of Frederick Cox, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. In 2005, Parmar moved to have the DNA testing performed on evidence used at trial. The laboratory's analysis of the DNA samples from Cox's bedsheet excluded Parmar as a contributor to the DNA found in those samples. Parmar subsequently filed a motion requesting the court to vacate his conviction or grant him a new trial. The district court overruled Parmar's motion, concluding (1) Parmar was not entitled to have his conviction vacated because the DNA testing did not conclusively establish his innocence; and (2) Parmar was not entitled to a new trial because the evidence would not have produced a substantially different result. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DNA evidence did not exonerate Parmar of guilt, but the evidence excluded Parmar's DNA from a crucial piece of evidence and contradicted the eyewitness testimony crucial to the State's conviction; and (2) thus, the DNA evidence probably would have produced a substantially different result if it had been available at trial. Remanded with direction to grant Parmar a new trial.

S.C. was convicted of sexual assault of a child. The mental health board subsequently found S.C. to be a dangerous sex offender under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) and ordered him to undergo secure inpatient treatment. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) S.C.'s due process rights were not violated when the State did not allow him to undergo sex offender treatment while still incarcerated, as obtaining treatment was not necessary to affect S.C.'s release from prison, no statutory language existed to create a substantive right to treatment, and SOCA was civil and nonpunitive in nature; and (2) The State presented clear and convincing evidence that S.C. was a dangerous sex offender and that secure inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative.

Marco Torres was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree murder, one count of robbery, three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of unauthorized use of a financial transaction device. Torres was sentenced to death on each count of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Torres' conviction and death sentence, holding (1) the district court (i) did not err in making certain evidentiary rulings, and where it did err in admitting certain evidence, the error was harmless, and (ii) did not err in overruling Torres' motion to suppress; and (2) the sentencing panel, among other things, (i) did not err by receiving for purposes of the State's proof of aggravating circumstances the trial court's bill of exceptions over Torres' objections, (ii) did not err in finding certain statutes challenged by Torres to be constitutional, (iii) incorrectly considered the mental suffering of one of Torres' victims in determining whether an aggravating circumstance was in existence, but the failure of this one finding did not affect the existence of the aggravator, and (iv) did not err in concluding that no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors existed.

After a jury trial, Appellant Jorge Vigil was found guilty of sexual assault of a child. Vigil appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine and allowing a video-recorded interview of the victim to be heard by the jury after finding that the interview was admissible under Neb. R. Evid. 803(3), a hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. At issue was whether the statements were admissible when some time had passed since the sexual assaults and the victim did not see the physician the day of the interview. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that the elements of the medical purpose exception found in Rule 803(3) were met.

Appellant Joshua Nolan was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony in connection with the killing of Justin Gaines. Nolan, relying primarily on inconsistencies among the statements and testimony of the State's witnesses, argued that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Nolan had shot and killed Gaines. A jury convicted Nolan of both charges. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself; (2) the step instruction used in this case was not constitutionally infirm; (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict; and (4) trial counsel did not perform in a deficient manner.

Timothy Jimenez pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Jimenez was arrested in Colorado. He failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and the county attorney obtained a warrant for his arrest. Thereafter, a detainer was placed on Jiminez in Nebraska. Jimenez then requested a final disposition or an order directing the State to release the detainer. The district court denied Jimenez's request, determining that the interstate Agreement on Detainers, which allows a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged to demand a speedy disposition of outstanding charges, did not apply because Jimenez had no untried matters pending in Nebraska. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding Jimenez was not eligible to invoke the Agreement, as a detainer for a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense but not sentenced does not relate to an "untried indictment, information or complaint" under the Agreement and thus does not trigger the procedural requirements of the Agreement.

Alma Gonzalez was convicted of fraudulently obtaining public assistance benefits based upon a no contest plea that she entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Over two years after her sentencing, Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw her plea, alleging that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney had not explained that her plea would result in automatic deportation. The district court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) procedurally, Gonzalez was permitted to move for withdrawal of her plea; but (2) Gonzalez failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal of her plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.

Robert Dunkin pled no contest to the charge of murder in the second degree. The district court accepted Dunkin's plea, entered a judgment of guilty, and sentenced Dunkin to forty years to life imprisonment. Dunkin filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Dunkin was not pressured or coerced to enter his plea; (2) Dunkin failed to establish that counsel's preparation for the case was unreasonable or inadequate; (3) Dunkin's counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency; (4) Dunkin's allegation that a specific sentence was promised or that the plea agreement was conditioned on such a sentence was without merit; and (5) Dunkin's counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal where Dunkin and counsel had no contact following the sentencing proceedings.