Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Thunder Collins was tried and convicted for numerous crimes, including first degree murder. On Collins' first appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the cause for a hearing to determine whether Collins was prejudiced by the jury's weekend separation during its deliberation. At that hearing, Collins moved for the judge's recusal and to conduct discovery. Both motions were denied. Following the hearing, the district court determined that Collins suffered no prejudice from the jury's separation and overruled his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Collins' convictions and sentences, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collins' motions.

David Kofoed, the supervisor of the Crime Scene Investigation Division for the sheriff's office was charged with tampering with evidence during the investigation of two suspects in two 2006 murders. After a Neb. R. Evid. 404 hearing, the trial court admitted evidence of an uncharged extrinsic crime during the 2003 investigation of a child's murder. The trial court subsequently found Kofoed guilty of evidence tampering during the 2006 murder investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) the trial court did not err in sustaining the State's motion to admit evidence of Kofoed's alleged act of evidence tampering in 2003 during the Rule 404 hearing; (2) the court did not err in overruling Kofoed's motion for a directed verdict and in finding him guilty of tampering with evidence; and (3) the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself from the proceeding and in overruling Kofoed's motion for a new trial.

Michael Ross was convicted by a jury of discharge of a firearm at a person, building, or occupied motor vehicle while in the proximity of a motor vehicle he had just exited, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a felon. On direct appeal, the court of appeals determined the evidence was insufficient to support Ross' convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in reversing the convictions, as the evidence, when considered under the deferential standard of appellate review, was sufficient to support the three felony convictions challenged in this appeal.

The State appealed from a district court order sentencing William Parminter to twelve to eighteen months in prison for aggravated driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, and twelve to fourteen months in prison for DUI, fourth offense. The court ordered that Parminter serve the sentences concurrently. The State appealed, arguing that the sentences were excessively lenient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentences on Parminter because the sentences failed to adequately protect the public from Parminter and thus were excessively lenient. Remanded with directions to resentence Parminter to consecutive terms of five to five years and to revoke Parminter's license according to the applicable statutes.

Brandon Reinhart was convicted of using a minor to distribute a controlled substance and conspiracy to use a minor to distribute a controlled substance, specifically marijuana. Reinhart was sentenced to three to five years' imprisonment on each conviction with the sentences to run concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Reinhart's convictions on both counts; (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony, but the admission of the hearsay statement was harmless error; and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make certain hearsay objections because the challenged statements were either admissible or their admission was, at most, harmless error.

After a jury trial Patrick Bauldwin was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Bauldwin appealed. The primary issue on appeal was whether the police violated Bauldwin's Miranda rights. The Supreme Court affirmed Bauldwin's conviction and sentence, holding (1) a Miranda violation occurred because Bauldwin clearly invoked his right to remain silent during his interrogation, and the police did not scrupulously honor that right; (2) based on the record, the trial court's admission of the statement was harmless because, when viewed relative to the properly admitted, overwhelming evidence of Bauldwin's guilt, there was no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was attributable to he court's erroneous admission of Bauldwin's statement; and (3) Bauldwin's other assigned errors were without merit.

Tyler Britt was convicted in the county court of first-offense driving under the influence with a concentration of more than .15 of one gram alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The district court affirmed the conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that the admission of a certificate containing a chemical analysis certification of the alcohol breath simulator solution used to test the machine that was used to test Britt's breath did not violate the confrontation clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it concluded that the certificate was not testimonial, and therefore not subject to confrontation analysis; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it did not note plain error with regard to Britt's hearsay objections.

After a bench trial, Benjamin Sprunger was convicted of four counts of possessing child pornography. Sprunger appealed, challenging the search that uncovered the images and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the search, as (1) probable cause did not support the warrant to search Sprunger's computers for child pornography; and (2) the warrant was lacking probable cause to such a degree that the officers' reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable and thus did not bring it within the U.S. v. Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

A jury found William Kinser guilty of felony flight to avoid arrest and found Kinser to be a habitual criminal. Kinser appealed, contending that the habitual criminal determination was erroneous because the flight to avoid arrest conviction was enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony based upon Kinser's willful reckless operation of a motor vehicle and that any further enhancement under the habitual criminal statute would result in an improper double enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Kinser was properly sentenced as a habitual criminal; and (2) the district court did not impose an erroneous sentence for Kinser's flight to avoid arrest conviction.

The Douglas County attorney filed a petition with the Mental Health Board alleging that S.J. was a dangerous sex offender within the meaning of Nebraska's Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA). The Board concluded that S.J. was a dangerous sex offender. The Board then held a hearing in which it concluded that inpatient treatment at Norfolk Regional Center was the least restrictive alternative presently available and ordered inpatient commitment. S.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's findings that S.J. was substantially unable to control his behavior; (2) clear and convincing evidence supported the court's finding that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative; and (3) SOCA's provision regarding the composition of the Board was consistent with due process requirements.