Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and tampering with a witness. In this direct appeal, Defendant contended (1) the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the district court erred in giving jury instructions that incorrectly stated the law; and (3) the prosecutor's closing remarks were so inflammatory that reversal under the plain error standard was warranted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced and his substantial rights were not affected by the jury instructions; and (3) the prosecutor's comments did not prejudice Defendant.

After the U.S. Supreme Court declared a campaign finance statute in Arizona to be unconstitutional, the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission sought an opinion from the Nebraska attorney general as to the constitutionality of Nebraska's Campaign Finance Limitation Act (CFLA). Under the CFLA, candidates for certain covered elective offices and other public officials could choose to abide or not to abide by voluntary spending limits. A candidate who abided by the limits and raises and spent qualifying amounts in accordance with the CFLA became eligible for public funds. The attorney general opined that the CFLA would likely be found to be unconstitutional by a court, and the Commission determined it would not enforce the CFLA. The attorney general was then directed to file an action in court to determine the validity of the CFLA. The Supreme Court found that the CFLA substantially burdened the First Amendment rights of Nebraska citizens and that it was, therefore, unconstitutional.

Defendant appealed his Class IV felony conviction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4011(1) based on his failure to comply with certain registration provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4004(9) of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Defendant claimed the district court erred when it rejected his constitutional challenges to SORA. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) Defendant had not shown that either section 29-4004(9) or section 29-4011 is an ex post facto punishment either on its face or as applied; (2) the district court did not err when it rejected Defendant's due process challenge; and (3) Defendant's additional constitutional challenges were without merit.

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault in 1995. The Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) had not been enacted at the time of Defendant's conviction, but because he was still on probation on January 1, 1997, he became subject to then newly enacted SORA. Defendant was released from probation in April 1997. In 2009, Defendant was notified that he would be subject to life-time registration under SORA. Defendant was later found guilty of violating SORA. Defendant appealed, asserting that SORA as amended violated the ex post facto and due process clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions on its face and as applied to him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it rejected the constitutional challenges that were raised by Defendant in his criminal proceeding.

Following a trial by jury, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of eighty to ninety years' imprisonment. At trial, two witnesses testified that sometime before the murder of the victim, they had seen Defendant with a gun, and that he carried his gun in his backpack. Defendant argued (1) this testimony was evidence of a prior crime - possession of a firearm by a felon - and fell under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-404(2); and (2) as such, the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the incident occurred pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-404(3). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the testimony fell under section 27-404(2); (2) the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing outside the presence pursuant to section 27-404(3); but (3) viewed in context of the whole record, this error was harmless.

Defendant Francis Seberger was convicted of first degree murder. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising Sixth Amendment concerns regarding his trial and appellate court representation. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the decision of the district court to deny Defendant an evidentiary hearing on his allegation that he was not properly advised of his right to testify and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on this single allegation; and (2) affirmed the decision of the district court in all other respects.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault and felony child abuse. At issue on appeal was the admission of evidence of Defendant's prior sexual contacts with minors, which Defendant claimed violated Nebraska rules of evidence and the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-414 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions; and (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence of prior acts.

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder, use of a weapon to commit a felony, criminal conspiracy, and tampering with a witness. On appeal, the Supreme Court first rejected Defendant's claim that the district court was divested of jurisdiction when Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari part way through the proceedings. The Court then reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding (1) the district court erred when it gave the jury a written instruction stating that the jury must consider Defendant's refusal to testify as an admission of guilt, and (2) the error was not harmless.

Chad Sorensen was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), second offense, with a blood alcohol content over .15. Sorensen was sentenced to probation, and his license was revoked for one year. Sorenson appealed, contending that his confrontation rights were violated when the county court admitted into evidence the affidavit of the nurse who performed Sorensen's blood draw without also requiring that nurse to testify at trial. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed Sorensen's convictions, holding that Sorensen's right to confrontation was violated when the State was not required to call the nurse as a witness at trial. Remanded for a new trial.

At issue in this appeal was whether an alleged victim of child sexual abuse may claim a privilege against testifying in the criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1210, which provides, "When the matter sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness criminally liable or to expose him or her to public ignominy, the witness is not compelled to answer...." The district court found the privilege against exposure to public ignominy did not apply to the victim because her testimony was highly material to the crimes charged. The victim appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds after noting that section 25-1210 does not include a materiality exception, holding that public ignominy privilege cannot be asserted by a witness in a criminal case, regardless of the materiality of the testimony.