Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of theft by shoplifting, $200 or less. The district court relied on two prior county court convictions to enhance the crime for punishment as a Class IV felony. In the second of these two prior proceedings, the county court had refused to enhance the conviction and had treated it as a first offense. Defendant argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required the district court to treat the instant conviction as only a second offense, and thus, as a Class I misdemeanor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for enhancement as a third or subsequent offense, the plain language of the relevant statute required only that Defendant have been previously convicted of two instances of theft by shoplifting, whether the earlier convictions were called first offense or second offense; and (2) Defendant's two prior convictions clearly satisfied this requirement. View "State v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and no drug tax stamp. The principle issue on appeal was whether a reasonable person would understand that a general consent to search a vehicle for illegal drugs authorized the opening of a gift-wrapped box in the vehicle's storage area. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the possession of a controlled substance conviction, holding that because (i) the object of the search was clearly disclosed, (ii) the container was not equivalent to a locked container and was not destroyed, and (iii) the consent was not withdrawn after the officer's interest in the container was communicated to its owner, the search did not exceed the scope of the consent; but (2) reversed the no drug tax stamp conviction, holding that the record contained no evidence of the absence of a drug tax stamp. View "State v. Howell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of one count of attempted first degree sexual assault and one count of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child. During the proceedings, the jurors were addressed by juror number instead of by name, with a few exceptions. Noting plain error, the court of appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial after determining that the district court abused its discretion in impaneling an "anonymous jury." The Supreme court reversed, holding that Defendant waived any objection to the jury that was impaneled, and plain error review was improper because the record did not plainly show that the district court impaneled an anonymous jury. Remanded. View "State v. Nadeem" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with numerous crimes, including first degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and two weapons charges. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant appealed, asserting (1) the prosecutor improperly removed a prospective juror from the jury pool because the of the juror's race, (2) the police did not properly advise him of his Miranda rights, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his criminal conspiracy conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's reasons for striking the prospective juror were race neutral and, overall, persuasive; (2) although the Miranda warnings did not expressly state that Defendant was entitled to appointed counsel before questioning, that information was obviously implied from the warnings that the police read to him; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the criminal conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Nave" on Justia Law

After successfully appealing his conviction for first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony, Appellant pled guilty upon remand to manslaughter and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Appellant asserted that the second judge was vindictive because of Appellant's successful appeal and, thus, imposed a harsher sentence for the weapons conviction in violation of Appellant's due process rights. At issue was whether the presumption of vindictiveness applies when a different judge gives a greater sentence after the defendant successfully appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a vindictiveness presumption does not apply when there is a different sentencing judge after a successful appeal; and (2) furthermore, the second district court judge did not act with actual vindictiveness. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Ashley W. as a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(1) for possession of marijuana. Ashley appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. The court of appeals declined to address issues previously raised by Ashley in a motion to suppress, concluding she had failed to preserve the alleged errors. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Ashley's motion to suppress and in finding that she had waived her objection to the evidence at the adjudication hearing and that the court of appeals erred in affirming the order of adjudication. View "In re Ashley W." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were Bryan Behrens, Bryan Behrens Co., Inc., National Investments, Inc., and Thomas Stalnaker. Defendants were Christian Blunk, Berkshire and Blunk, and Abrahams Kaslow & Cassman LLP. In 2008, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action against all plaintiffs except Stalnaker. In 2009, the federal government indicted Behrens on charges of securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. Prior to the filing of the indictment, Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging that Blunk had committed legal malpractice. Plaintiffs also sued Blunk's former partnership and the firm that later employed Blunk. Both civil and criminal cases were proceeding at roughly the same time. In 2010, Behrens pled guilty to securities fraud. Later that year, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Defendants for legal malpractice. The district court found the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by the doctrine of in pari delicto. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222. View "Behrens v. Blunk" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming that the State violated his due process rights by presenting fabricated evidence during his trial, and alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the following two claims required an evidentiary hearing: (1) that the State presented fabricated forensic evidence at Defendant's trial; and (2) that Defendant's trial counsel had a conflict of interest because of his relationship with the officer accused of fabricating evidence. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

The district court gave a pro se inmate notice of the court's intent to dismiss the inmate's marital dissolution proceeding but identified two ways of avoiding dismissal. The inmate timely performed one of the court's specified actions. Despite this compliance and without explanation, the court dismissed the inmate's complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that because the prison previously had denied the inmate transportation and telephone access to the court, the inmate would be unable to attend any hearing no matter how many motions he made. The Supreme Court reversed where (1) the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the inmate's complaint without explanation even though the inmate did what the court instructed, and (2) the court of appeals erred in basing its decision on predictions of future events. Remanded. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to deliver and criminal conspiracy. At trial, evidence of previous drug deals between a confidential informant and Defendant was admitted with a limiting instruction informing the jury that it could consider the evidence only for the purpose of identifying Defendant or to establish motive or intent. At the close of the case, the trial court denied defense counsel's oral motion to give the jury a written instruction on the limited use of evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts. The jury convicted Defendant on both counts. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of convictions, holding that the district court's failure to properly limit the use of the prior bad acts evidence involving Defendant and the refusal to give the jury a written instruction on the limited use of this evidence were reversible error. Remanded for a new trial.