Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In October 2011, Defendant was charged with, inter alia, first degree murder and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The cases were not consolidated but both cases were set for trial in March 2012. Defendant's counsel requested a continuance in the murder case. The district court continued trial in both cases to July 2012. In June 2012, Defendant moved for discharge in the murder case, alleging that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion for discharge based upon a violation of Defendant's statutory or constitutional rights to a speedy trial, as all delays in the trial were the result of Defendants' motion for continuance and motion for discharge. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence and was sentenced to a fifteen-year license revocation, which began in 2003 and was to continue until 2018. In 2011, Defendant was found operating a motor vehicle. Defendant pleaded no contest to driving during revocation. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-1,197.06, the trial court ordered Defendant's license be revoked for fifteen years consecutive to the revocation that was due to end in 2018. Defendant appealed, arguing that a court cannot order a fifteen-year license revocation to be consecutive to the unexpired period of revocation under which the defendant committed the offense of driving with a revoked license. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its choice of the date for Defendant's fifteen-year revocation period to commence. View "State v. Policky" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with first degree felony murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery stemming from the robbing and killing of a pizza delivery worker. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in receiving into evidence certain DNA reports and related testimony; (2) the circuit court properly admitted Defendant's confession into evidence because the officers had probable cause to arrest him and because his confession was voluntary; (3) the circuit court correctly refused to instruct the jury regarding unlawful manslaughter; (4) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's convictions; and (5) defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to peremptorily strike one of the jurors during voir dire. View "State v. McClain" on Justia Law

After an investigation by the Omaha Police Department's "cold case" homicide unit, Defendant was charged in 2010 with the 1978 murder of Carroll Bonnet. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant appealed, claiming (1) because approximately thirty-three years had passed since the murder, he was denied his right to confront witnesses and present a complete defense, as many of the alleged original witnesses were dead or unavailable; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during the questioning of a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Defendant's motion to dismiss where the charges were brought thirty-three years after the commission of the crimes, as Defendant could not show the State intentionally waited to bring charges to gain an unfair tactical advantage, and therefore, Defendant could not show his due process rights were violated; (2) there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant's motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. View "State v. Watson" on Justia Law

On October 5, 2011, Defendant appeared in county court and pled guilty to four misdemeanors in three separate cases. When Defendant failed to appear for the scheduled sentencing in the cases, the county court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. Defendant was arrested on January 3, 2012 and was released on January 11, 2012. On April 4, 2012, Defendant was sentenced. Defendant appealed, claiming that the county court erred when it failed to give her credit for time previously served. The district court rejected Defendant's assertion, citing to State v. Heckman. The Supreme Court vacated the sentences, holding that Defendant was entitled to credit for time served from January 3 through 11. Remanded. View "State v. Bree" on Justia Law

On November 10, 2010, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that Appellant carried a concealed weapon on his person and possessed a "pistol, revolver or other form of short-barreled hand firearm." On October 12, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to discharge for failure to adjudicate within the time statutorily required. At the adjudication hearing on October 14, 2011, the juvenile court denied the motion to discharge. The hearing was then continued to December 22, 2011. On November 8, 2011, Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to discharge. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in affirming the decision of the juvenile court; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in not addressing Appellant's constitutional speedy adjudication rights. View "In re Shaquille H." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Columbus after raw sewage that Plaintiffs claimed was the result of a malfunction of the City-run sanitary sewage system flooded into Plaintiffs' home. The district court found in favor of the City on all theories of recovery, including inverse condemnation, negligence, nuisance, and trespass. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's rulings with respect to negligence and inverse condemnation. The court of appeals affirmed the district court with respect to negligence but reversed the court's finding in the City's favor with regard to inverse condemnation. The Supreme Court granted review of inverse condemnation issues and reversed, holding that Plaintiffs did not establish an inverse condemnation claim because Plaintiffs failed to show the City exercised its right of eminent domain. Remanded. View "Henderson v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in several respects. Defendant's trial counsel was also his appellate counsel. The district court ruled that Defendant's counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, as Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel's representation, and there was no merit to Defendant's assignments of error. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the unlawful sale or purchase of a motor vehicle under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-1416. Defendant was classified as a habitual criminal and sentenced to twelve to thirty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed ad remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting "expert" testimony interpreting section 60-1416 because the testimony instructed the jury on how to make its decision of Defendant's guilt, and only the trial court should instruct the jury on the relevant law. In addition, the Court held that acting without a dealer's license under section 60-1416 is a public welfare offense, which doesn't require proof of mens rea. View "State v. Merchant" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for the Class II felony offense of attempted kidnapping. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his trial and appellate counsels were ineffective for failing to challenge the classification of the felony. At the time Defendant was sentenced, criminal attempt was a Class II felony when the crime attempted was a Class IA felony offense and was a Class III felony when the crime attempted was a Class II felony offense. The postconviction court denied Defendant's petition. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Defendant's counsel was ineffective for not challenging the classification at sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the postconviction court, holding that Defendant failed to establish the trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise at sentencing or on direct appeal that Defendant should have been sentenced for attempted kidnapping as a Class III felony. View "State v. Pittman" on Justia Law