Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Child was born out of wedlock to Mother in 2005. Six years later, Sherman filed an amended complaint seeking to establish paternity both as an individual and behalf of Child as "next friend." Alternatively, Sherman asserted that Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1411 denied him due process and equal protection. The district court dismissed the amended complaint filed by Sherman as an individual as untimely and dismissed the amended complaint as to Sherman's filing as the next friend of Child, determining that suit may be brought on behalf of a child as next friend only when the child lacks a guardian. The court made no findings as to Sherman's constitutional claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's dismissal of Sherman's constitutional claims, holding that Sherman's complaint stated plausible due process and equal protection claims, and the factual allegations suggested the existence of the elements required to show both a due process and an equal protection violation; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Sherman T. v. Karen N." on Justia Law

Employee, an African-American, was employed by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services for several years. Employee filed suit against the State and individual defendants in their official capacities, alleging she was denied the opportunity to enroll with the health insurance carrier that had insured her prior to 2007 due to a ZIP code exclusion plan. Specifically, Employee alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of her race because most African-American employees resided in three excluded ZIP codes and were offered substandard health insurance based on the ZIP codes associated with their residential addresses. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Employee's claim of disparate impact arising under Title VII, as the evidence presented by Defendants established that the plans offered in the excluded ZIP codes were equivalent to the plans offered statewide. View "Cartwright v. State" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant pled no contest to attempted first degree arson pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant was discharged from prison in 2003 and was thereafter removed from the United States. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of no contest and vacate his conviction, alleging that his plea and conviction were obtained in violation of his due process rights and that his counsel was ineffective because he did not advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that neither the postconviction statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02, nor the common-law "manifest injustice" procedure, all of which Defendant attempted to collaterally attack his plea under, provided a basis for relief in this case. View "State v. Osorio" on Justia Law

While serving as county attorney, Defendant established a pretrial diversion program wherein participants paid an enrollment fee and court costs. The fees and costs were deposited into a separate bank account with Defendant as the only authorized signer on the account. After the state auditor's office conducted an audit, Defendant was charged with three counts of theft by unlawful taking, among other charges. The third theft charge was based on a check Defendant wrote on the account of the diversion program to a local trapshooting team. The jury acquitted Defendant of the first two theft counts but convicted him of the third. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court plainly erred in instructing the jury on Defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment of estoppel. Remanded for retrial. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of life to life for the second degree murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in giving jury instructions on "sudden quarrel"; (2) did not err in giving a step instruction; (3) did not abuse its discretion in admitting autopsy photographs into evidence, as their potential prejudice did not substantially outweigh their probative value; and (3) did not err in imposing a sentence of life to life for second degree murder. View "State v. Abdulkadir" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced on nine counts involving actual or attempted violence or physical abuse upon persons with intellectual disabilities who required residential care. All counts arose from Defendant's employment at a developmental center and involved three adult residents at that facility. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the district court erred in permitting the jury to take into the jury room for use during deliberations the State's "road map," a chart admitted for demonstrative purposes only. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the use of this demonstrative exhibit during jury deliberations without providing adequate limiting instructions or employing any other safeguards against prejudice. View "State v. Pangborn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault, use of a weapon to commit a felony, and robbery. Defendant was determined to be a habitual criminal and sentenced to eighty to 140 years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) overruling Defendant's two motions for mistrial; (2) overruling Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the victim's identification of him as her assailant and in admitting her identification testimony at trial over Defendant's objection; (3) overruling Defendant's motion for a directed verdict; (4) determining that Defendant was a habitual criminal and sentencing him accordingly; and (5) sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several counts of child abuse and sexual assault of a child. Defendant appealed, asserting, among other things, that the district court erred in receiving evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-414. Before trial, the trial court heard testimony from Defendant's prior victims, compared the testimony to the current charges, and made a conditional ruling of admissibility under 27-414. The court, however, prohibited the State from mentioning or presenting the section 27-414 evidence at trial until after the evidence of the current alleged victims. At trial, the State first presented the current evidence and then, outside the presence of the jury, the State alerted the court of its intent to call a prior victim as a witness, which the court allowed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in receiving evidence under section 27-414; and (2) Defendant's other assignments of error were rejected. View "State v. Valverde" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a child and four counts of child abuse. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction and vacated the sentences, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to sever the sexual abuse charge from the child abuse charges, and Defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a limiting instruction that the jury could not consider the evidence of sexual assault to prove the charges of child abuse and vice versa, and Defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance. Remanded. View "State v. Rocha" on Justia Law