Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a joint jury trial with his codefendant, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ninety-six to 150 years. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that the district court did not err in (1) refusing to sever Defendant's trial from his codefendant's; (2) allowing the State to introduce evidence of gang membership and prior bad acts without a hearing; (3) allowing the State to introduce hearsay evidence under the excited utterance exception to hearsay; (4) overruling Defendant's motions for mistrial; and (5) admitting post mortem photographs depicting the victim's face with a fatal wound, as the admission was not unfairly prejudicial to Defendant. The Court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's convictions and that Defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial with his codefendant, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ninety-six to 150 years. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to sever Defendant's trial from his codefendant's, as Defendant was not prejudiced by the joint trial; and (2) allowing the jury to separate without obtaining a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Defendant's right to sequester the jury, as the district court met the requirement that the defendant expressly agrees to waive sequestration. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the felony offense of driving with a revoked license in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.06(1). The court sentenced Defendant to ninety days' jail time and a fifteen-year license revocation. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) in State v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court held that section 60-6,197.06(1) was ambiguous and that ignition interlock device violations fall under a different misdemeanor statute; (2) his Department of Motor Vehicles record and documents, and the statements certifying their authenticity, were inadmissible hearsay that violated his right to confrontation; and (3) his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to apply the reasoning of Hernandez, as Defendant's conduct was distinguishable from the conduct of the defendant in Hernandez; (2) admitting the disputed documents, as any error on this issue was undoubtedly harmless; and (3) imposing the sentence of ninety days' jail time. View "State v. Leibel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in (1) denying Defendant's motion to continue trial based upon a witness's plea agreement to testify because her deal was struck upon the eve of trial; and (2) admitting into evidence a receipt showing that Defendant pawned the victim's jacket two days before the victim's murder because the evidence was inadmissible as evidence of other bad acts, namely theft. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence, holding that the district court (1) erred in denying Defendant's motion for continuance, as the failure to provide a continuance under the circumstances was prejudicial; and (2) abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the theft under the inextricably intertwined exception to the rule making a defendant's uncharged bad act inadmissible. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Ash" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a pregnant sixteen-year-old who sought authorization for an abortion with consent of a parent or guardian. In general, an abortion can only be performed on a unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen with the consent of both the pregnant woman and one of her parents or a legal guardian. The district court denied Petitioner's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a waiver of consent under the provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-6903(3) for abuse or neglect by a parent or guardian, the pregnant woman must establish that a parent or guardian has abused or neglected her; (2) Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that she was a victim of abuse or neglect under section 71-6903(3); and (3) Petitioner failed to establish that was sufficiently mature and well informed to decide on her own whether to have an abortion. View "In re Petition of Anonymous 5" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erroneously gave a step jury instruction relating to the charge of first degree murder, and the court erred in refusing to give a "negative element of 'sudden quarrel'" instruction; and (2) his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in using a step instruction, the elements of first degree murder exclude any reference to "sudden quarrel," and the jury's presumed adherence to the step instruction precluded any prejudice regarding the rest of the instruction; and (2) the record was insufficient to address two of Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and Defendant's remaining claims of ineffective assistance lacked merit. View "State v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with first degree sexual assault stemming from his conduct toward his stepdaughter, M.H. During trial, M.H.'s therapist testified, over Appellant's objection, that Appellant's sexual abuse of M.H. caused M.H.'s posttraumatic stress disorder. The court subsequently granted Appellant's motion for a mistrial on the grounds that the therapist's testimony was "over the edge." Appellant then filed a plea in bar, arguing that the State's questioning of the therapist was intended to provoke a mistrial so that the State could have a second change at a more favorable prosecution and thus circumvent the protections of the double jeopardy clause. The trial court denied the plea in bar. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the prosecutor did not intend to goad Appellant into moving for a mistrial, Appellant's plea in bar was properly denied. View "State v. Muhannad" on Justia Law

Michael and April are the biological parents of Avalyn, born out of wedlock in 2002. A court ordered Michael to pay child support but did not order visitation. In 2005, the state took temporary emergency custody of Avalyn after April attempted suicide. The county sought an adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), but did not give Michael notice. Avalyn was placed in foster care with her maternal grandmother in April’s home. Michael claims that because he was paying support through the state, caseworkers knew or should have known how to contact him. About six months after the disposition he received notice and intervened. The court placed Avalyn with Michael until November 2007, when the parties stipulated that Avalyn should be placed with April but divide her time between her parents. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Michael alleged that in failing to notify him of the juvenile proceedings, the defendants interfered with constitutional rights to familial integrity, substantive due process, and equal protection and that the Nebraska statutes were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that claims against state defendants for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity; qualified immunity shielded employees from liability in their individual capacities because they did not violate a clearly established right. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not barred. In a juvenile proceeding alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard for a child’s known adjudicated or biological father who is providing substantial and regular financial support; the statutes at issue are not facially unconstitutional, but cannot be constitutionally applied to avoid notification. View "Michael E. v. State" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder, and in 2007, Defendant pled guilty to a separate charge of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive life sentences for the murders. Defendant subsequently filed motions for postconviction relief in both cases, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied Defendant's motions without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief in each case without an evidentiary hearing, as Defendant's motions in the two cases did not allege facts constituting a denial of his constitutional rights, and the record refuted his claims as to his other allegations. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder under a theory of aiding and abetting, criminal conspiracy to unlawfully possess and deliver a controlled substance, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced when the district court allowed his counsel to withdraw prior to counsel and by accepting Defendant's waiver of conflict of interest created by the former counsel's new employment with the county's attorney's office, which was prosecuting Defendant in this case; (2) the district court did not err in allowing evidence of prior bad acts; (3) Defendant's trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failing to request jury instructions regarding robbery and attempted robbery as lesser-included offenses of felony murder did not prejudice Defendant; (4) a jury instruction error did not require reversal of Defendant's second degree murder conviction; (5) the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; and (6) the district court did not impose excessive sentences. View "State v. McGuire" on Justia Law