Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the State did not have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle based on the odor of marijuana emanating from his person or on a police officer’s alleged knowledge that there were needles used for methamphetamine in Defendant’s vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) standing alone, the fact that Defendant smelled of burnt marijuana did not provide probable cause to search Defendant’s vehicle; and (2) the officer’s alleged knowledge of the needles in Defendant’s car was based solely on testimony that should be disregarded as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals should have given deference to the district court’s finding of fact that the officer was told about the needles prior to the search; and (2) probable cause existed for the search based on the combined facts that Defendant smelled of burnt marijuana and that he admitted prior to the search of his vehicle to having needles in the vehicle. View "State v. Dalland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of abuse of a vulnerable adult based on the financial exploitation of a relative and sentenced to three years’ probation. The district court subsequently revoked Defendant’s probation and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment, finding that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing assault. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred when it received into evidence hearsay statements of an unavailable witness at the probation revocation hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment confrontation guarantee and Crawford v. Washington rights do not apply to probation revocation proceedings because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, but a probationer is entitled to due process and an opportunity to controvert the evidence against him or her; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to revoke Defendant's probation. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several felonies for which he was serving probation. When Defendant’s probation officer conducted an investigation of Defendant's residence, the officer discovered an extensive knife and sword collection lining the walls of Defendant’s bedroom. After a subsequent search of Defendant’s residence by law enforcement officers, Defendant was charged with and convicted of violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1206, possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, and sentenced to two years’ probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant lacked standing to assert that section 28-1206 was vague because his conduct clearly violated the statute; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) the district court did not err in not instructing the jury on the offense of entrapment; (4) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; and (5) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault while being incarcerated and of being a habitual criminal. Approximately one year later, Defendant filed his first motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. The district court overruled the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a second motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds. The district court overruled Defendant’s motion, concluding that the State had twenty-eight days remaining to bring Defendant to trial. The court of appeals affirmed. The State petitioned for further review, contending that additional days should be excluded from the speedy trial calculation because of Defendant’s allegedly frivolous motion to discharge. The Supreme Court held that Defendant waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by filing unsuccessful motions to discharge that necessitated continuing trial beyond the statutory six-month period. View "State v. Mortensen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting evidence regarding the content of certain text messages because the text message evidence satisfied the authentication requirement; (2) the district court did not commit plain error when it overruled Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Elseman" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexually assaulting a child in the third degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant’s brief touch of the victim’s crotch over the victim’s clothes was “sexual contact.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although some facts suggested an innocent explanation for the Defendant’s touch of the victim, there were sufficient other facts supporting the trial court’s finding that Defendant’s touch was for the purpose of his sexual arousal or gratification; and (2) therefore, sufficient evidence supported the verdict. View "State v. Bauer" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of second degree murder and one count of use of a weapon to commit a felony. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment on both murder convictions and to ten to twenty years in prison on the weapon conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentences. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Defendant's trial counsel rendered effective assistance. View "State v. Fester" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding that the district court did not err when it (1) allowed a witness to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid testifying at trial; (2) denied Defendant's request to grant the witness use immunity to allow him to testify in Defendant's defense; (3) declined to admit the witness' recorded statement to police under a hearsay exception; (4) did not deny Defendant a complete defense by making the foregoing rulings; and (4) overruled Defendant's motion for a mistrial and his motion for a new trial. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in overruling Appellant's motions to suppress the eyewitness identifications of two witnesses and in subsequently allowing both witnesses to make in-court identifications of Appellant, as the identifications of both witnesses were reliable; and (2) the district court did not err when, in its articulation of its factual findings, it overruled Appellant's motions to suppress the eyewitness identifications. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony for the killing of his mother. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly stated the elements of the crime, and therefore, Appellant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for failing to object to the instructions; (2) Appellant failed to identify an expert who would have opined differently on Appellant's insanity, and therefore, Appellant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to obtain an additional expert opinion as to Appellant's sanity at the time of the killing; and (3) the arguments Appellant asserted were omitted by appellate counsel lacked merit. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law