Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress illegal drug evidence seized as a result of a protective pat-down search for weapons and in a subsequent search of his vehicle, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the protective pat-down search of Defendant was justified.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erroneously held that the pat-down search of Defendant was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Mont. Code Ann. 46-5-401(2)(b), whether incident to a valid Terry investigative stop or analogous community caretaker doctrine stop, but did not err in concluding that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the illegal drug evidence seized in the warrantless pat-down and vehicle searches at issue; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in his coat pocket as a result of the initial pat-down search but correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in the subsequent consent search of his vehicle. View "State v. Laster" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting admission of evidence regarding other acts and statements made by Defendant.Defendant filed a motion in liming to preclude the admission of evidence involving the occurrence of any other sexual acts or statements regarding the victim. The district court denied the motion, concluding that evidence of Defendant's sexual conduct with the victim, apart from the conduct alleged in the information, was relevant and admissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. View "State v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress based on its determination that Defendant had not been seized, holding that the district court clearly erred when it concluded that Defendant was not seized.Defendant was found guilty of felony possession with intent to distribute. The district court order denying Defendant's motion to suppress concluded that Defendant voluntarily engaged with the law enforcement officer and was not seized because a reasonable person would have felt free to disengage and leave. Further, the order concluded that Defendant validly consented to the officer searching his vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was seized in this case; and (2) the officer did not have particularized suspicion to justify the seizure. View "State v. Pham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the deliberate homicide case against him, holding that the district court erred when it ordered Appellant to pay his public defender fees.Appellant was convicted of the deliberate homicide of his father and for tampering with evidence. The district court imposed a seventy-year prison year for the two offenses and ordered Appellant to pay $25,250 in costs for the assistance of assigned counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's due process rights were not violated by the State's conduct investigating and relating the crime scene; (2) the prosecutor's comments at trial did not improperly distort Appellant's presumption of innocence or the State's burden of proof; but (3) the imposition of costs must be stricken in the interests of justice. View "State v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of bail-jumping, one count for each scheduled trial he missed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in granting the State's Gillham motion to allow his former attorney to testify and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the District Court did not err by allowing Defendant's former attorney to testify as a state witness in his bail-jumping trial, and the testimony did not violate Defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel; and (2) Defendant's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims were unavailing. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual assault and incest involving his biological son, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that sexual assault is a lesser included offense of incest and that his conviction violated double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's convictions for sexual assault and incest did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, the Montana Constitution, and Mont. Code An. 46-11-410; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's representation was deficient. View "State v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the sentencing order and judgment issued by the district court imposing a four-year suspended sentence for Defendant's convictions for criminal possession of dangerous drugs, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance during the sentencing hearing.On appeal, Defendant argued that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney, while arguing for a deferred sentence, failed to inform the district court of his authority to impose an alternative sentence under Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-202. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed Defendant's sentence, and remanded for resentencing, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentence when her counsel failed to cite the Alternative Sentencing Authority, Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-202, as authority for Defendant's eligibility for a deferred sentence. View "State v. Wright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent with a victim twelve years old or younger, holding that eliciting testimony that vouched for the victim's credibility and the prosecutor's personally commenting on the victim's reliability as a witness undermined Defendant's right to a fair trial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the State's questioning of its expert witnesses, whom bolstered the victim's credibility, and the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that the victim was a "reliable witness" undermined his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the convictions, holding that the testimony elicited from four witnesses vouching for the victim's credibility and the prosecutor personally commenting that the victim was a reliable witness who had no incentive to lie violated Defendant's right to a fair trial. View "State v. Byrne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to confront his accusers was violated during his second criminal trial.The victim, T.C., was thirteen years old, deaf, and developmentally delayed. During trial, the district court found T.C. incompetent and declared a mistrial. At the second trial, Defendant objected to the hearsay testimony from five witnesses who would testify to what T.C. told them. Defendant argued that his right to confrontation was violated when he was denied his request to interview or depose T.C. and when he could not cross-examine T.C. during trial. Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting T.C. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated when the court admitted testimony from three witnesses about T.C.'s out-of-court statements without Defendant having a prior opportunity to cross-examine T.C., and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Tome" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for felony driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI) and misdemeanor obstructing a peace officer, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance.At issue was whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object to an incorrect jury instruction, which lowered the State's burden of proof on the offense of obstructing a peace officer. The Supreme Court held that Defendant did receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys neither objected to the incorrect instruction nor proposed the correct one themselves and that a new trial was warranted. View "State v. Secrease" on Justia Law