Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Susan Overfield was charged with assault and disturbing the peace after appearing to speak at a City Commission meeting about perceived conflicts of interest between City officials and the Animal Foundation of Great Falls. Overfield subsequently sued the City. Before the City and Overfield settled the case, the district court concluded (1) the Animal Foundation, its trustee, and its attorney (Petitioners), who were non-parties in the underlying case, were in contempt for wrongfully redacting information from documents produced to Overfield, and (2) the Foundation was in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition with subpoenaed documents. After the case was settled, the district court entered an order awarding Overfield attorney fees against the Petitioners based on the contempt orders. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the contempt orders of the district court, holding that the district court properly considered and decided the contempt issues below without referral to another judge, and the contempt orders were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) vacated the district court's order to arrest the trustee, the court's imposition of sanctions against an attorney who filed a protective order on behalf of the Foundation, and the court's order awarding attorney fees. Remanded.

Alicia Hocter was caring for a six-month-old when she swung the child's head into the top bar of her crib and failed to seek medical attention for the child. Hocter pled guilty to charges of aggravated assault and criminal endangerment, after which she withdrew her guilty plea. A jury found Hocter guilty of both charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Hocter's motion to dismiss the charge of criminal endangerment as Hocter had actual notice of the facts that the State was obligated to prove to support its theories of criminal endangerment; and (2) the district court did not err in instructing the jury on criminal endangerment predicated on a defendant's omission or failure to act as the instructions properly required the jury to determine whether Hocter breached that duty.

Patrick Chesterfield was convicted in district court of driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI), his fourth offense. Chesterfield appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss without holding an evidentiary hearing concerning his claim that his three prior convictions for DUI were constitutionally infirm because he was denied his right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Chesterfield failed in his burdens of production and persuasion to demonstrate that his three prior DUI convictions were constitutionally infirm, and accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Chesterfield's motion to dismiss.

Leslie Staebler was convicted by a jury in municipal court of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and violation of the seatbelt law. The district court affirmed, holding that Staebler's fundamental right to a fair trial was not violated. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the municipal court where (1) the City attorney did not unfairly imply that Staebler's conduct was worse than it actually was; (2) comments of one juror did not inflame or prejudice other members of the jury against Staebler; (3) the City attorney did not err during rebuttal to Staebler's closing argument when she inferred that because Staebler was not able to brake appropriately for oncoming traffic, he would not have been able to brake properly had a child been playing in the road; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Staebler's conviction.

Harley Howard was charged with incest and was sentenced to forty years' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Howard was not denied effective assistance of counsel where he did not meet his burden of showing deficient performance by counsel's failure to challenge the competency of the State's two child witnesses or the admission of their hearsay statements; and (2) the district court's sentence was not augmented because Howard maintained his innocence, but rather, the sentence was within the statutory parameters for incest and was based on ample testimony relating to Howard's treatment potential, risk to his children, and numerous psychosexual evaluations.

Appellant Angela O'Connell was involved in a theft scheme whereby Appellant's husband would steal property from a local business and sell the stolen goods for cash. Appellant pled guilty to accountability for theft pursuant to a plea agreement. Upon sentencing, Appellant was prohibited from entering bars and casinos and consuming alcohol, and was ordered to pay restitution to the business she stole from in the amount of $159,606. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) because the district court's determination of lost profits in this matter was based upon speculation and not supported by substantial evidence, the district court erred by ordering payment of lost profits, in addition to the replacement value of the stolen property, as part of Appellant's restitution obligation, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Appellant from entering bars as a condition of her sentence because the restriction furthered Appellant's rehabilitation. Remanded for recalculation of restitution based upon the replacement value of the stolen property.

Robert Riggs was convicted by a jury of incest, sexual intercourse without consent, and two counts of sexual assault. Riggs filed an amended petition for postconviction relief, alleging approximately eighty claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court partially denied Riggs' petition, finding many of the claims were barred for various reasons. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Riggs' remaining twelve claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counsel was not ineffective in his pretrial work, and counsel did not make the errors alleged by Riggs during trial. Because the Court found no ineffective assistance of counsel on Riggs' individual claims, the Court found there was no cumulative error.

Jule Roundstone was convicted of assault with a weapon and sentenced to a five-year commitment to the department of corrections (DOC). Roundstone's request for a furlough was granted, and he was released for a ten-day period. Roundstone failed to report after the first day of his furlough and was apprehended about a month later. Roundstone was charged with felony escape pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-7-306. The district court denied Roundstone's motion to dismiss the charge as to the allegation that Roundstone had removed himself from official detention while on furlough and, therefore, could not commit escape. Roundstone entered a plea of guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Roundstone was sentenced to ten years at the DOC, with five years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roundstone's motion to dismiss as Roundstone was not excluded from official detention while on furlough, and (2) the prosecution did not violate Roundstone's due process rights by making certain sentencing recommendations during the sentencing hearing.

Scott Heddings was charged with felony incest in State court. While the incest charge was pending, Heddings was charged in federal court with receipt of child pornography, possession of child pornography, and destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure. Heddings pled guilty to federal court to these charges. Heddings then pled guilty to the incest charge in State court. Heddings subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing (1) he was subjected to double jeopardy because he was sentenced in State court for conduct that was used to enhance his federal sentence, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not challenge the State court charge on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the petition, concluding that because the federal and State charges were based on separate conduct, Heddings' double jeopardy claim had no legal merit and, therefore, it would have been frivolous for his counsel to raise that claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure of Heddings' trial counsel to move for the dismissal of the State incest charge on double jeopardy grounds did not constitute ineffective assistance since the motion lacked merit and would not have changed the outcome of the proceedings.

Defendant John Finley's wife pleaded guilty to felony theft, and later, her probation officer conducted a valid search of her home. During a search of a safe in the couple's bedroom, the officer discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant later entered conditional plea agreements to felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs and misdemeanor criminal possession of drug paraphernalia while reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the safe, arguing that the probation officer exceeded the scope of the probationary search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probation officer legally searched the unlocked and open safe pursuant to the valid probationary search.