Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Lionel Ellison was convicted in the county justice court of misdemeanor party or family member assault. He appealed the conviction to the district court. Ellison subsequently appealed from an order of the district court denying his motion to supplement the record and denying his issues on appeal. The court denied the motions, which were based upon the State's alleged withholding of exculpatory information in violation of Ellison's right to due process according to Brady v. Maryland, concluding that Ellison's claims were not ripe for appellate review. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the district court did not err in denying Ellison's motions, as Ellison failed to establish a prima facie Brady violation and did not establish that his defense was prejudiced under the facts.

Before being arrested for DUI, Richard Bollman underwent the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Bollman was subsequently convicted of his fifth DUI offense, a felony, after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the court did not err in (1) finding that a highway patrol trooper was qualified under Mont. R. Evid. 702 to testify as an expert about the correlation between alcohol consumption and HGN, which was the scientific basis of the HGN test; and (2) denying Bollman's motion for a mistrial based on a police officer's reference to "felony DUIs" during questioning by the State, as any prejudice from the statement was very minor, if it was prejudicial at all, and the statement did not contribute to Bollman's conviction.

Husband and Wife filed for divorce. During the dissolution proceeding, a guardian ad litem (GAL), who was appointed for the parties' two daughters, recommended co-parenting with equal visitation by both parents. At the final hearing, the parties stipulated to the district court that they had reached agreement on a final parenting plan. They also agreed that no child support or maintenance would be paid to either party. The district court took judicial notice of the GAL's recommendations. Subsequently, and prior to dissolution, the GAL revised her recommendations and recommended that Husband be the children's primary residential parent with Wife having visitation rights. The court adopted the GAL's custody recommendation and also ordered Wife to pay Husband child support. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the GAL's revised plan constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in relying upon the hearsay evidence in order to determine the matter of child custody. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Jimmy Booth was charged with, inter alia, felony criminal possession of precursors to dangerous drugs pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-107. Booth appealed, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of the charge and that his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move for dismissal at the close of the State's case. At issue was whether the plain language of section 45-9-107 required a showing that Booth possessed a combination of listed precursors set forth in the statute or whether possession of pseudoephedrine alone was sufficient for a conviction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) section 45-9-107(1)(a) requires possession of two or more of the statute's listed precursor chemicals as an element of the offense; and (2) therefore, the jury could not have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence seized from Booth met the statutory requirements of the statute.

After Susan Brady, who was driving, reported that another driver in a pickup truck had been engaging in illegal activity, a highway patrol trooper pulled over a pickup truck matching Brady's description. The driver of the truck, James Gill, later received citations for DUI and possession of alcohol while under the age of twenty-one. Gill filed a motion to suppress, arguing that law enforcement did not have a particularized suspicion to support an investigative stop of his vehicle. The justice court denied the motion. Gill subsequently entered a guilty plea of DUI and unlawful possession. The district court also denied Gill's motion to suppress and remanded the case to justice court for execution of sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the information provided to the trooper contained sufficient indicia of reliability to form the basis for the trooper's particularized suspicion that Gill's pickup was the same one that Brady observed engaged in criminal activity, thereby warranting further investigation.

Rozell Cook pled guilty via an Alford plea to two charges of felony sexual assault. Cook was sentenced to two concurrent, twenty-year terms with ten years suspended. The State moved to revoke the suspended portion of Cook's sentence two days before he was scheduled to be released from custody. The district court revoked Cook's suspended sentence, sentenced him to two concurrent, ten-year commitments with five years suspended, and imposed new sentencing conditions. Cook appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's revocation of Cook's suspended sentence, but (2) reversed the district court's imposition of an illegal condition in the revocation order. Remanded to strike the illegal condition.

Appellant Wesley Benn was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. Benn appealed and then died the following month. Counsel for Benn filed a notice advising that Benn had passed away, and the State moved for dismissal, arguing that Benn's death had mooted the appeal. Benn's counsel filed a response opposing the State's motion, suggesting that the Supreme Court's precedent was unclear about the effect of a defendant's death upon the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) abatement of the proceeding ab initio is an inappropriate resolution of a case when the defendant has died; (2) a criminal case is not moot if the appeal involves concrete interests which are not individual to the defendant and survive the defendant; and (3) in this case, Benn's appeal was moot because his challenge to his sexual assault conviction and his contention that his counsel was ineffective were individual to him, and therefore, the Court could not grant effective relief.

After a jury trial, Richard Covington was convicted of robbery and deliberate homicide. The court issued a life sentence without the possibility of parole based on Covington's two previous robbery convictions pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 56-18-219(1)(b)(iv). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Covington failed to meet his burden of establishing that the district court infringed on an enhanced right to a jury trial under the Montana Constitution in his argument that the existence of facts, including a prior conviction, that triggers the application of the sentence enhancement process of section 46-18-219(1)(b)(iv) must be submitted to the jury; and (2) the district court did not err by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from Convington's binder and notebooks.

Appellant Charles Clary was charged with aggravated burglary and assault with a weapon. The day before the omnibus hearing, Clary's attorney filed a motion to have Clary transported to the proceeding. The district court did not rule on the motion, and the omnibus hearing proceeded without Clary present. Clary subsequently insisted on proceeding pro se, which the district court allowed. The jury found Clary guilty as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Clary's right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding was not violated by his absence from the omnibus hearing where the hearing did not constitute a critical stage requiring Clary's presence; and (2) the district court did not err in allowing Clary to continue pro se without conducting further inquiry into Clary's complaints regarding his attorney where substantial evidence supported the court's finding that Clary made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and Clary did not request substitute counsel.

After a jury trial, Susan Miner was convicted of the offense of assault on a peace officer, a felony. Miner appealed, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel did not move for a mistrial when two consecutive prosecution witnesses inadvertently mentioned Miner's potential DUI charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Miner was not prejudiced by the statements, there was no reasonable possibility that the testimony of the witnesses contributed to Miner's conviction; and (2) therefore, the second prong of Strickland v. Washington was not met because Miner was not prejudiced by her counsel's failure to make a motion for a mistrial, and her trial was fundamentally fair.