Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant Cale Hauer was convicted of unlawful restraint, assault with a weapon, partner or family member assault, and aggravated assault. Hauser was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and forty-five years' imprisonment. The convictions stemmed from three separate arrests occurring in Missoula. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it prohibited Hauer from testifying that an altercation leading to the first arrest was caused by Hauer walking in on the victim purposely cutting herself; and (2) Hauer was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel agreed not to introduce evidence of the victim's intentional cutting.

Thomas Evans pleaded guilty to felony issuance of bad checks and received a suspended sentence. Evans was subsequently charged with misdemeanor partner or family member assault. As a result, the district court revoked Evans' suspended sentence after revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not lack jurisdiction to conduct the revocation proceedings; (2) Evans received due process of the law; (3) the State established grounds for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence; but (4) the district court erred in failing to award Evans credit for time served in jail prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. Remanded.

While driving his motorcycle, William Cleary struck a deer. Cleary was transported to the hospital, where a consensual blood alcohol content test revealed a BAC of .18. The State filed an information charging Cleary with felony driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). The felony charges were based upon Cleary's Montana driving record, which reported three previous DUIs, two in Montana and one in South Dakota. Cleary moved to have the felony dismissed, arguing that he should not be subject to the enhanced felony charges because the DUI issued in South Dakota was not a "prior conviction." The district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleary's South Dakota offense was neither a conviction nor a sentence for Montana purposes, and the expungement of the charge precluded it from being counted as a previous conviction for sentence enhancement purposes. Remanded.

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was whether the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district judge in youth court and on an appeal from justice court. Petitioners, two youths who appeared in court or detention hearings and a defendant who pled guilty in justice court to driving under the influence, petitioned for writ of supervisory control, claiming that the district court incorrectly denied as untimely their motions for substitution of district court judge in those cases. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district court on the appeal from justice court.

Tristeana Johnson was found guilty of the charge of criminal possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor. Johnson appealed the court's order denying her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of marijuana and the court's subsequent judgment and order convicting her of that charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of marijuana, as the Montana's Medical Marijuana Act (MMA) is clear and unambiguous on its face, and the district court's interpretation harmonized the statutes within the MMA; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the district court to convict Johnson of the charge.

Appellant Daniel Burns pleaded guilty to one felony count of sexual abuse of children. The Supreme Court remanded for the purpose of striking a portion of the district court's restitution order. Burns subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his public defender. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Burns had not presented a sufficient argument to overcome the presumption that counsel's action and advice were outside the broad scope of reasonable professional conduct, and as Burns had not established that his counsel was ineffective, he had not presented good cause to withdraw his guilty plea.

Trent Trier was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent BAC or greater. The justice court explained that upon demand of a jury trial, the final pretrial conference required the physical appearance of Trier and his counsel and that default in appearance would effect a waiver of Trier's right to a jury trial. After Trier filed a demand for a jury trial, both Trier and his counsel failed to appear at the final pretrial conference. A non-jury trial was held, and the justice court found Trier guilty of operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent BAC or greater. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the justice court correctly found Trier's non-appearance for a mandatory pretrial conference to be a waiver of his jury trial, and thereby properly dismissed Trier's appeal.

Jeffrey Hardman was found guilty by a jury of deliberate homicide and tampering with the evidence. The district court sentenced Hardman to 110 years in prison with no parole eligibility for thirty years. Hardman appealed his conviction and sought a new trial, arguing (1) the district court made numerous erroneous evidentiary rulings amounting to cumulative error and requiring reversal, and (2) under the due process clause, the court's one-sided evidentiary rulings prevented him from effectively rebutting the State's case and presenting a defense, violating his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly exercised its discretion in all but one of its evidentiary rulings, and therefore, cumulative error did not warrant reversal of Hardman's conviction; and (2) since the holding on the first issue controlled, the constitutional argument was not considered.

Appellant Marla Ward filed suit seeking damages for personal injuries she sustained as she was sorting horses on Appellee Paul Johnson's property. Johnson resided in Pondera County. Johnson filed a motion to change venue, arguing that Pondera County was the appropriate place for trial because it was the only county where a defendant resided. Ward opposed the motion, asserting that case law permitted Ward to file her claim in Yellowstone County, her place of residence. The district court ruled in favor of Johnson. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ward's decision to file her complaint in Yellowstone County was legally correct under Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-122(2)(b); and (2) the statute permitting Ward to file her action in the county of her residence did not deprive Johnson of the equal protection of the laws.

After Brandon Burns was charged with felony DUI, Burns entered into a non-binding plea agreement with the State requiring the State to recommend a fifteen year prison sentence with five years suspended. The plea agreement was silent as to any possible fine. During the sentencing hearing, the State abided by its promise to recommend a fifteen year sentence and further recommended a $5,000 fine. The district court issued the State's recommended sentence, including the fine. Burns subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the $5,000 fine violated the plea agreement. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the fine did not violate the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence established that Burns failed to object to the fine at every step of the process, and accordingly, the district court properly denied Burns's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.