Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant James Davis appealed from his conviction of one count of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he provided assistance in the drug deal that preceded his charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not have found that Davis purposely promoted or facilitated the sale of drugs, and therefore, the district court erred when it denied Davis' motion to dismiss the charge of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability on the basis of insufficient evidence.

Appellant Michael Miller was convicted of the deliberate homicide after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Miller subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that his appellate counsel's failure to raise his trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed Miller's petition for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Miller had exhausted his remedy of appeal and that his ineffectiveness claims were record-based assertions which he did or reasonably could have raised on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Miller's claims against his trial counsel were without merit, and thus, he could not state a claim of ineffectiveness against his appellate counsel for failing to raise ineffectiveness claims against his trial counsel in his direct appeal.

The State charged Anthony Leyva with sexual intercourse without consent. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the charge and filed an amended information charging Leyva with burglary by remaining unlawfully in the victim's home with the purpose to commit a sexual assault therein. Defendant was subsequently convicted of burglary following his plea of guilty. The district court sentenced him to twenty years in prison, fifteen years of which the court suspended on numerous conditions. Leyva appealed the conditions of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in imposing a condition designating Leyva as a Level II sexual offender, as, pursuant to controlling precedent, a district court cannot attach a sexual offender designation to a burglary conviction. Remanded for correction of the sentence.

After a jury trial, Defendant Cale Hauer was convicted of unlawful restraint, assault with a weapon, partner or family member assault, and aggravated assault. Hauser was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and forty-five years' imprisonment. The convictions stemmed from three separate arrests occurring in Missoula. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it prohibited Hauer from testifying that an altercation leading to the first arrest was caused by Hauer walking in on the victim purposely cutting herself; and (2) Hauer was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel agreed not to introduce evidence of the victim's intentional cutting.

Thomas Evans pleaded guilty to felony issuance of bad checks and received a suspended sentence. Evans was subsequently charged with misdemeanor partner or family member assault. As a result, the district court revoked Evans' suspended sentence after revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not lack jurisdiction to conduct the revocation proceedings; (2) Evans received due process of the law; (3) the State established grounds for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence; but (4) the district court erred in failing to award Evans credit for time served in jail prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. Remanded.

While driving his motorcycle, William Cleary struck a deer. Cleary was transported to the hospital, where a consensual blood alcohol content test revealed a BAC of .18. The State filed an information charging Cleary with felony driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). The felony charges were based upon Cleary's Montana driving record, which reported three previous DUIs, two in Montana and one in South Dakota. Cleary moved to have the felony dismissed, arguing that he should not be subject to the enhanced felony charges because the DUI issued in South Dakota was not a "prior conviction." The district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleary's South Dakota offense was neither a conviction nor a sentence for Montana purposes, and the expungement of the charge precluded it from being counted as a previous conviction for sentence enhancement purposes. Remanded.

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was whether the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district judge in youth court and on an appeal from justice court. Petitioners, two youths who appeared in court or detention hearings and a defendant who pled guilty in justice court to driving under the influence, petitioned for writ of supervisory control, claiming that the district court incorrectly denied as untimely their motions for substitution of district court judge in those cases. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district court on the appeal from justice court.

Tristeana Johnson was found guilty of the charge of criminal possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor. Johnson appealed the court's order denying her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of marijuana and the court's subsequent judgment and order convicting her of that charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of marijuana, as the Montana's Medical Marijuana Act (MMA) is clear and unambiguous on its face, and the district court's interpretation harmonized the statutes within the MMA; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the district court to convict Johnson of the charge.

Appellant Daniel Burns pleaded guilty to one felony count of sexual abuse of children. The Supreme Court remanded for the purpose of striking a portion of the district court's restitution order. Burns subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his public defender. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Burns had not presented a sufficient argument to overcome the presumption that counsel's action and advice were outside the broad scope of reasonable professional conduct, and as Burns had not established that his counsel was ineffective, he had not presented good cause to withdraw his guilty plea.

Trent Trier was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent BAC or greater. The justice court explained that upon demand of a jury trial, the final pretrial conference required the physical appearance of Trier and his counsel and that default in appearance would effect a waiver of Trier's right to a jury trial. After Trier filed a demand for a jury trial, both Trier and his counsel failed to appear at the final pretrial conference. A non-jury trial was held, and the justice court found Trier guilty of operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent BAC or greater. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the justice court correctly found Trier's non-appearance for a mandatory pretrial conference to be a waiver of his jury trial, and thereby properly dismissed Trier's appeal.