Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Helena Sand and Gravel, Inc. (HSG) challenged Lewis and Clark County's decision to adopt a citizen-initiated proposal to configure a zoning district that favored residential uses and prohibited mining. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County had properly adopted the zoning pattern and regulations creating the district, and the County's zoning decision did not constitute a taking of HSG's property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded, holding (1) the County's decision to adopt the zoning pattern and regulations for the district was not clearly unreasonable or an abuse of discretion; (2) the County's adoption of zoning regulations prohibiting sand and gravel mining did not constitute illegal reverse spot zoning; and (3) because HSG had a constitutionally protected property interest in property within the district, the Court granted HSG's request for remand to the district court for the parties to brief the Penn Central takings test, narrowly limited to whether the County's adoption of the zoning pattern and regulations in the district constituted a taking of HSG's real property interest without just compensation. View "Helena Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling that Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(1) violated their constitutional rights to free speech by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. Plaintiffs argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC barred Montana from prohibiting independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, and that Montana's century-old ban on independent corporate expenditures therefore was invalid. The district court granted ATP's motion for summary judgment on the merits of its constitutional claim, declared section 13-35-227(1) unconstitutional, and denied ATP's request for attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding (1) the statute was constitutional; and (2) Plaintiffs' cross-appeal on the attorneys' fee issue, therefore, was moot. The Court's decision thereafter was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Montana Supreme Court then returned to ATP's cross-appeal on the issue of attorneys' fees and affirmed the district court's order declining to award attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs, holding that equitable considerations did not require the district court to award fees against the State under either the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or the private attorney general doctrine. View "W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony arson for setting fire to a car and two dumpsters. After a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to a four-year suspended DOC commitment and required him to pay $1600 in restitution. It further imposed recommended probationary conditions, including that Defendant register as a violent offender and complete anger management classes and chemical dependency and mental health evaluations. Defendant challenged the sentencing condition requiring him to register as a violent offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's sentencing condition requiring that Defendant register as a violent offender did not violate his constitutional right to privacy, as whatever limited expectation of privacy Defendant had as a violent offender in his whereabouts and residential information, the State's compelling interest in requiring that he register justified the enactment of the statute requiring registration. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Shortly after Defendant was charged with DUI, she notified the police department that she believed she had been given a "date rape" drug that caused her impairment. Before trial commenced, Defendant claimed she would assert the involuntary intoxication defense to show she did not commit a voluntary act by driving. The municipal court granted the City's motion to prevent Defendant from claiming involuntary intoxication as a defense and from calling witnesses about the use of "date rape" drugs in the City. The district court affirmed, concluding that involuntary intoxication can only be used where the mental state of the defendant is an element of the crime. Defendant appealed, contending that the lower court erred by failing to apply the voluntary act element of Montana's DUI statute. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the lower court erred by precluding Defendant from raising automatism as an affirmative defense to the DUI charge; and (2) if Defendant was able to lay the proper foundation, she could elicit from certain law enforcement officers evidence regarding their personal knowledge, opinions, and statements regarding whether Defendant was unknowingly drugged, and voluntarily drove a vehicle. View "City of Missoula v. Paffhausen" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted sexual intercourse without consent, a felony. The district court sentenced Defendant to Montana State Prison for a term of fifteen years, with five suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not violate Defendant's right to due process by excluding evidence of alleged sexual conversations between the complainant and Defendant and photos of third parties allegedly sent by the complainant to Defendant on the basis that they were irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative under the rules of evidence; and (2) Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was better examined within a postconviction relief proceeding. View "State v. Bishop" on Justia Law

The district court involuntarily committed and authorized the involuntary medication of thirty-year-old C.R. after it determined that he suffered from a mental disorder and that his condition met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment to the Montana State Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly disregarded C.R.'s hearing testimony, as substantial evidence supported the court's findings that the testimony was unreliable; (2) the district court's failure to offer C.R. a court-appointed friend did not violate C.R.'s statutory or constitutional rights, as the appointment of a friend was not statutorily mandated; and (3) C.R. received effective assistance of counsel. View "In re C.R." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide stemming from the shooting death of his former roommate. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred by instructing the jury it was prohibited from considering Defendant's intoxication when rendering its verdict in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 45-2-203 because the statute violated a criminal defendant's due process right to present a defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the instructions given by the court fully and fairly instructed the jury on the applicable law and did not prejudice Defendant's right to present a defense, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving the instruction to the jury. View "State v. Myran" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with DUI and two drug counts. The DUI count was charged as a felony because the State maintained that Defendant had three prior DUI convictions. Defendant had been convicted of DUI twice in Idaho and once in Montana. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the felony DUI charge arguing that his two Idaho DUI convictions should not be counted because the Idaho DUI statute was not similar to Montana's DUI statute. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, determining that while the statutes were not precisely identical, they were similar because they had characteristics in common and were alike in substance. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to felony DUI, and the State dismissed the drug charges. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Idaho's DUI statute was similar enough to Montana's DUI statute to allow the enhancement of a Montana DUI to a felony. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted for driving under the influence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court erroneously allowed the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus and preliminary breath test to be admitted at trial without expert testimony to establish the reliability of the tests, but the cumulative evidence of Defendant's intoxication presented at trial overcame any reasonable probability that the indirect admission of the test results contributed to Defendant's conviction; and (2) the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding cross-examination regarding Defendant's blood alcohol content at the time that Defendant had been driving. View "State v. Chavez-Villa" on Justia Law

This was Defendant's second appeal to the Supreme Court. In the prior appeal, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of felony sexual assault and remanded the case for resentencing. The district court subsequently granted Defendant's petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss the criminal charges for which the State intended to re-prosecute him on double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy did not prohibit the State from re-prosecuting him after his conviction was overturned by the postconviction court's determination of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law