Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The State charged Defendant with DUI and two drug counts. The DUI count was charged as a felony because the State maintained that Defendant had three prior DUI convictions. Defendant had been convicted of DUI twice in Idaho and once in Montana. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the felony DUI charge arguing that his two Idaho DUI convictions should not be counted because the Idaho DUI statute was not similar to Montana's DUI statute. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, determining that while the statutes were not precisely identical, they were similar because they had characteristics in common and were alike in substance. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to felony DUI, and the State dismissed the drug charges. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Idaho's DUI statute was similar enough to Montana's DUI statute to allow the enhancement of a Montana DUI to a felony. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted for driving under the influence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court erroneously allowed the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus and preliminary breath test to be admitted at trial without expert testimony to establish the reliability of the tests, but the cumulative evidence of Defendant's intoxication presented at trial overcame any reasonable probability that the indirect admission of the test results contributed to Defendant's conviction; and (2) the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding cross-examination regarding Defendant's blood alcohol content at the time that Defendant had been driving. View "State v. Chavez-Villa" on Justia Law

This was Defendant's second appeal to the Supreme Court. In the prior appeal, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of felony sexual assault and remanded the case for resentencing. The district court subsequently granted Defendant's petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss the criminal charges for which the State intended to re-prosecute him on double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy did not prohibit the State from re-prosecuting him after his conviction was overturned by the postconviction court's determination of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated burglary and sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant argued on appeal that his convictions should be reversed because his standby counsel had a conflict of interest, the district court erred by modifying the jury instructions regarding aggravated burglary during jury deliberations, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an independent medical expert. The State conceded reversible error on the instruction issue and requested that Defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary be vacated on that basis. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary and affirmed Defendant's conviction for sexual intercourse without consent, holding (1) Defendant's standby counsel did not have an active conflict of interest that required reversal of Defendant's sexual intercourse without consent conviction; and (2) because the record did not fully explain why an independent medical examination or expert was not ultimately obtained by Defendant's counsel, Defendant's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a medical expert could not be reviewed on appeal. View "Longjaw v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial in justice court, Defendant was convicted for DUI per se. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Defendant moved the justice court to dismiss the charge on grounds of insufficient evidence, arguing that the margin of error in the Intoxilyzer breath test's result created reasonable doubt that Defendant's alcohol concentration had, in fact, reached the statutorily prohibited level. The district court affirmed the justice court's denial of Defendant's motion, concluding that Defendant had forfeited his right to challenge the veracity of his breath test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant had an evidentiary right to challenge the veracity of his Intoxilyzer breath test at trial, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise; but (2) the district court did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction, as a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's alcohol concentration was over the statutorily proscribed limit. View "State v. Gai" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from his conviction in the district court of one count of felony aggravated assault. Appellant argued (1) his conviction should be reversed under the plain error doctrine because law enforcement failed to investigate his claim of justifiable use of force as required by Mont. Code Ann. 45-3-112; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move for dismissal of his charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish that any alleged failure of law enforcement officials to comply with section 45-3-112 prejudiced his defense requiring the Court to exercise plain error review; and (2) Appellant failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Bobby Cooksey was convicted of deliberate homicide. The district court sentenced Appellant to a term of fifty years in prison with credit for time served. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion for a new trial; (2) the district court properly excluded Appellant's offered evidence concerning the presence of the drug Paxil in the deceased's blood; (3) the investigation of the crime was conducted in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 45-12-112; and (4) Appellant failed to establish that the prosecution's statements during closing argument constituted unfairly prejudicial misconduct. View "State v. Cooksey" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony partner or family member assault. The district court designated Defendant a persistent felony offender and committed him to the department of corrections (DOC) for the statutory minimum period of five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the complaining witness had a history of a felony forgery charge over a decade before Defendant's trial based on the remoteness in time of the forgery charge and the substantial evidence in the record to support the assault against the witness; and (2) the district court lawfully based its sentence upon Defendant's likelihood of reoffending and the court's desire to rehabilitate him. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Birth mother N.S. (Mother) and birth father K.R. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated their parental rights to their four-year-old twin daughters, T.R. 1 and T.R. 2. Mother also appealed the District Court’s order denying her a new trial. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion by terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights; (2) whether the District Court erred in finding it was in the children’s best interests to terminate those rights; (3) whether the District Court erred in finding the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; (4) whether the District Court adequately addressed the appropriateness of the treatment plans in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Furthermore, Mother asserted that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her a new trial based on new evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence in the record to support the District Court’s findings that the conditions rendering Mother and Father unfit were unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. "It [was] manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that there was not an abuse of discretion."

This matter involved two cases, one involving two youths who appeared in youth court for detention hearings and one involving an adult who pled guilty to driving under the influence in justice court. After appearing in district court, the youths filed motions to substitute district court judge, and the court denied the motions as untimely. After the adult pled guilty in justice court, she appealed only the justice court's denial of her pretrial suppression motion, which the district court denied as untimely. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of supervisory control for the youths and denied it for the adult, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court correctly denied the adult's motion for substitution of district court judge, as no right exists under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804 to substitute a district judge in an appeal of a specific pre-trial legal ruling from justice court.