Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A peace officer stopped a vehicle Defendant was driving due to the vehicle's excessive speed and a report of drug trafficking. During the stop, the officer had Defendant exit the vehicle so the officer could detect whether the odor of marijuana was present. A large quantity of marijuana was ultimately discovered in the vehicle. The State charged Defendant with felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Defendant unsuccessfully filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer had unlawfully extended the scope of the stop by requiring Defendant to exit the vehicle. Defendant pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress, as the officer's requirement that Defendant exit the vehicle during the traffic stop did not violate Defendant's constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. View "State v. Roy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide and solicitation to tamper with physical evidence. The convictions were based on an incident in which a three-year-old died after Defendant shoved her into a wall. For the deliberate homicide conviction, the district court sentenced Defendant to one hundred years incarceration with a twenty-five year parole restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly concluded that assault on a minor is a forcible felony under the deliberate homicide statute; and (2) properly denied Defendant's motion in limine to exclude from evidence a portion of the police's videotaped interrogation of Defendant. View "State v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating the Privacy in Communications statute by using obscene, lewd, and profane language. The charges arose from an incident in which Defendant called an employee of the county Victim Assistance Program a "fucking cunt" over the telephone. Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge. Defendant appealed and filed a motion to dismiss in the district court. The district court denied the motion, finding (1) Defendant's utterance constituted unprotected speech in the form of "fighting words," and (2) the Privacy in Communications statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's conclusion that Defendant's speech constituted "fighting words," as the interaction was not face-to-face or in a circumstance likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace; and (2) struck the prima facie portion of the Privacy in Communications statute as unconstitutionally overbroad. Remanded to the district court to allow Defendant to withdraw his nolo contendere plea and proceed to trial. View "State v. Dugan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and partner/family member assault. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) his due process rights were violated when a portion of the trial was not recorded during the State's case in chief and effective appellate review was now unavailable, and (2) the district court erred by admitting evidence of his prior assault on the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the record was of sufficient completeness to afford effective appellate review, Defendant's right to due process was not compromised by the failure to record a portion of the State's case in chief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this was an appropriate case for introduction of evidence of a previous assault on the issue of consent and that the relevance of the evidence was not outweighed by unfair prejudice. View "State v. Caswell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two misdemeanor sexual assaults following pleas of guilty to both offenses. In sentencing Defendant, the municipal court imposed a condition of probation that required Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation and to follow through with a minimum of six months of therapy unless sooner released by a counselor or therapist. The district court upheld the requirement that Defendant undergo a psychosexual evaluation and receive counseling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court (1) acted within its authority by requiring Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation as a condition of probation; and (2) imposed a releasable condition of probation by requiring Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation following his conviction. View "City v. Cantu" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. The district court affirmed the municipal court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress that had challenged the particularized suspicion to stop Defendant based on the obstruction of a license plate. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, holding (1) the municipal court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, as Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches was not violated; (2) counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to elicit certain testimony from the arresting officers at trial and not renewing the motion to suppress once those facts were elicited; but (3) Defendant's sentence violated his due process rights because it was based on his indigency. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Haldane" on Justia Law

After Respondent voluntarily admitted herself to the behavioral health unit of a hospital, Respondent requested to be discharged. However, the county attorney's office filed a petition requesting that Respondent be committed for further evaluation and treatment. The district court appointed a public defender to represent Respondent, and following a hearing on the petition for commitment, the court committed Respondent to the Montana State Hospital with a treatment order that included the involuntary administration of medication. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) plaint error review of this issue was not warranted; and (2) Respondent was not denied the effective assistance of counsel during the hearing. View "In re J.S.W." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of felony negligent vehicular assault and one count of felony criminal endangerment. The district court sentenced Defendant to the Department of Corrections for six years with eighteen months suspended on each count, to run concurrently, ordered Defendant to complete 100 hours of community service, and imposed twenty-nine enumerated conditions of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court imposed a legal sentence on Defendant; (2) the district court did not impose unreasonable and unconstitutional probation conditions on Defendant; and (3) Defendant's argument that the sentence review division process was unconstitutional was not ripe for judicial determination. View "State v. Whalen" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with felony driving under the influence of alcohol and careless driving. The State filed notice that it intended to seek persistent felony offender status for Defendant due to Defendant's previous conviction for felony DUI. Defendant's attorney objected to the proposed designation, and the district court denied the objection. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to the felony DUI charge. After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted on the careless driving charge. The district court sentenced Defendant to ten years in prison as a persistent felony offender based on the felony DUI and to thirty days in jail on the careless driving conviction. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the sentence for felony DUI as a persistent felony offender, holding that the sentence was lawful; but (2) reversed the jail time sentence for the careless driving conviction and remanded with instructions to strike the jail time because the district court exceeded its authority when it imposed the sentence. View "State v. Kime" on Justia Law

Without entering a plea bargain agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to a felony DUI charge and admitted he violated the terms of the suspended sentence he was serving for a previous DUI conviction. The district court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and revoked Defendant's sentence. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the proceedings because his court-appointed attorney allegedly told him "just prior to sentencing" that the State had made a more favorable plea offer before he changed his plea to guilty that would have resulted in a shorter sentence. The district court dismissed Defendant's petition for failing to provide factual support for his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing Defendant's postconviction relief petition as insufficiently pled, as there was no record evidence of a formal plea offer or of Defendant's lawyer's failure to inform him of a plea offer, other than an insufficient affidavit submitted by Defendant. View "Kelly v. State" on Justia Law