Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Respondent-appellant N.A. was committed to Montana State Hospital for 90 days by a District Court order. N.A. appealed that order. Respondent was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. After some treatment at the Phoenix House, professionals there became concerned that he was a danger to himself and others. The State instituted an involuntary civil commitment proceeding. At his initial appearance, N.A. was informed of his right to a jury trial and the subsequent hearing that would occur, which would include a prehearing mental health evaluation. N.A. did not want evaluation by professionals who had evaluated him in the past because he believed them to be guilty of perjury. N.A. informed the court that he needed more time to find and choose an evaluator. The court gave N.A. a one-day continuance to obtain his chosen professional, but he failed to provide a name to his attorney in time for her to contact the evaluator. When the commitment proceeding resumed, the District Court found that N.A. had been given a reasonable choice of evaluator, and denied the continuance. After the State had finished presenting its case, N.A. moved for a jury trial, which the court rejected as untimely. Upon careful consideration of the District Court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court properly denied N.A.'s motions for continuance and for a jury trial, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not supported by sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced by his attorney's actions. View "Matter of N.A." on Justia Law

Appellant Laura Lee Neva sued Appellee Jim Bates, arguing he violated Montana's Human Rights Act by halting necessary repairs to a commercial building she rented from him because she rebuffed his sexual advances. In her complaint to the Human Rights Commission, Appellant alleged violation of the Public Accommodations Provision but made no mention of the Real-Estate Transaction Provision. The Commission nevertheless found that Appellee violated the Real-Estate Transaction Provision by sexually harassing Appellant while she was leasing the space from him. The District Court reversed that decision, holding that the Commission’s action violated Appellee's right to due process. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the District Court erred in its conclusion that Appellee was not afforded due process when Appellant brought claims under section 49-2-304 of the Act, but that the Commission did not find he violated section 49-2-305. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that the essential difference between a 49-2-304 claim and a 49-2-305 claim was the setting of the discrimination: a place of public accommodation as opposed to a real-estate transaction. "The setting here was fully litigated, as was the discrimination- Bates' sexual harassment of Neva." The Court concluded Appellee understood the issues as was afforded full opportunity to justify his conduct. Therefore, his due process rights were not violated. View "Bates v. Neva" on Justia Law

Landowners protested pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6) to block the Board of County Commissioners of Missoula County from establishing a special zoning district north of Lolo, Montana. Landowners effectively blocked the zoning proposal pursuant to section 76-2-205(6). L. Reed Williams filed a complaint against Commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Landowners intervened in the action. The district court denied Landowners' motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Williams and Commissioners, concluding that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional violation of the right to equal protection and the right to suffrage. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioners' adoption of the special zoning district and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Landowners' motion to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to join them as necessary parties; (2) determining that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and (3) ruling that section 76-2-205(6) was severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Williams v. Bd. of County Commr's" on Justia Law

Concerned that Defendant had collided with a fire hydrant, a police officer approached Defendant's vehicle and spoke to Defendant, at which time he noticed indicators that Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. The officer ultimately arrested Defendant and cited him for driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the stop. The municipal court denied the motion, concluding that the caretaker doctrine started the stop, and it ripened into a proper DUI investigation. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to DUI. The district court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the district court based its reasoning on the community caretaker doctrine, the motion to suppress was appropriately denied on the ground that there was particularized suspicion for the stop. View "State v. Marcial" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent, partner or family member assault, unlawful restraint, and violation of a no contact order. The district court sentenced Defendant to forty years imprisonment with twenty years suspended. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by allowing the State to question Defendant about his prior criminal history once he testified about the alleged victim's prior acts of violence against him, as the introduction of Defendant's criminal history, including convictions overturned by an appellate court for legal error, violated Defendant's right to a fair trial. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexual assault, among other crimes. Defendant was subsequently arrested in New Mexico pursuant to an arrest warrant. Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual assault as part of a plea agreement. After a sentencing hearing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay $1069 in restitution to reimburse the State for the cost of extraditing Defendant from New Mexico and imposed a twenty-year term of imprisonment. The district court subsequently re-sentenced Defendant to a term of fifteen years but also imposed the original restitution order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the State was not a "victim" for the purposes of the restitution statutes, the district court lacked the authority to award restitution to the State. Remanded. View "State v. Brothers" on Justia Law

Appellant worked at Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility as a correctional officer for approximately three years. Appellant worked in the sex offender unit during the majority of her employment with Pine Hills. After quitting her job, Appellant filed an action against Pine Hills for sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Pine Hills on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial credible evidence supported the district court's determination that Pine Hills held open an offer for Appellant to transfer units for one year until Appellant quit; (2) the district court correctly determined that Pine Hills reasonably and promptly offered a solution to end one inmate's harassment of Appellant; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed Appellant's retaliation claim against Pine Hills. View "Puskas v. Pine Hills Youth Corr. Facility" on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-7-211 requires the Department of Revenue (Department) to reappraise all residential property in the state every six years. The Department assessed the value of Plaintiff's property in 2008 and used the 2008 appraisal to establish Plaintiff's tax liability for the six-year tax cycle ending in 2014. Plaintiff argued that section 15-7-111, as applied, violated its right to equal protection. The State Tax Appeal Board rejected the claim. The district court, however, concluded that section 15-7-111 violated Plaintiff's right to equal protection because the six-year tax cycle caused some taxpayers to pay a disproportionate share of taxes due to their over-assessed property value and other taxpayers to pay less than their fair share of taxes due to their under-assessed property value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that similarly situated taxpayers, for a short time, may pay divergent taxes, and such a divergence in taxes does not violate equal protection privileges. View "Covenant Invs., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony DUI offenses and associated offenses, including two misdemeanor offenses. After Defendant began serving his period of probation, the State filed a petition to revoke Defendant's probation based upon his violation of certain conditions of probation. The district court issued a bench warrant for Defendant's arrest, but Defendant had absconded from supervision. Eight years later, the State petitioned the district court to quash the original arrest warrant and to issue a new warrant for Defendant's arrest. Defendant was subsequently arrested and sentenced. Defendant appealed, arguing that the eight-year delay between the initial arrest warrant and his actual arrest violated his right to due process. The Supreme Court remanded for resentencing, as the district court may have imposed a longer period of imprisonment than allowed. View "State v. Sullivant" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute and was appointed counsel. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of criminal possession with intent to distribute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court's pre-trial inquiry into Defendant's complaint about his counsel was adequate, and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to further consider Defendant's complaints in a hearing; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (3) the case was remanded so that the district court may conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement of sentence, which conditioned any assessment of fees upon Defendant's future ability to obtain work if released on parole. View "State v. Hammer" on Justia Law