Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Respondent Danny Vaughn was charged with one count of burglary and one count of harassment. Both charges contained harassment elements. Upon a motion by Respondent, the motion court dismissed both counts, concluding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.090.1(5) and 565.090.1(6) were vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 565.090.1(5) criminalizes communication protected by the First Amendment and is unconstitutionally overbroad; but (2) as construed, section 565.090.1(6) is not overly broad, provides a reasonable notice of the conduct it prohibits, and provides a sufficiently concrete standard so as to mitigate the potential for arbitrary enforcement.

After a jury trial, Vincent McFadden was found guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. Consistent with the jury's recommendation, McFadden was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in limiting the testimony of a defense witness; (2) McFadden was not subjected to double jeopardy; (3) the trial court did not err in striking a venireperson for cause or in denying McFadden's Batson challenge as to a venireperson; (4) the trial court did not plainly err during the guilt phase of McFadden's trial in admitting certain testimony; (5) the trial court properly instructed the jury; (6) the State did not violate McFadden's due process rights during all phases of the trial; (7) the trial court did not improperly admit hearsay into evidence; and (8) the imposition of the death penalty met the statutory requirements.

David Liberty was convicted of one felony count of first-degree promoting child pornography and eight felony counts of first-degree possession of child pornography. Liberty alleged that the evidence the State presented to insufficient to convict him of the charges. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Liberty's conviction for promoting child pornography and one of his convictions for possession of child pornography, as the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; but (2) reversed the remaining convictions for possession of child pornography, holding that the imposition of eight separate sentences for one instance of possession violated Liberty's constitutional protections against double jeopardy, as Mo. Rev. Stat. 573.037 did not ambiguously permit separate prosecutions for each image a defendant simultaneously possessed. This holding, however, did not preclude the State from retrying Liberty on the reversed charges, as double jeopardy principles did not bar Liberty's retrial. Remanded.

Jermane Clark was convicted of first degree murder and armed criminal action. The prosecution's case against Clark depended principally on the testimony of two witnesses. One of the witnesses, Maurice Payne, claimed to have been an eyewitness to the murder. Previously, Payne had pleaded guilty to unrelated charges before the same judge who presided over Clark's murder trial. Payne admitted that he subjectively hoped that his testimony against Clark would favorably affect his sentence even though Payne's decision to testimony in Clark's case was not motivated by a plea agreement in his own case. Clark's attorney was not permitted to question Payne concerning this potential bias. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing Clark the opportunity to cross-examine Payne on whether he was biased, and there was a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Remanded.

The director of revenue for the State revoked James Hill's driving privileges for a period of ten years beginning October 2000. In June 2005, Hill was convicted of the misdemeanor of possession of drug paraphernalia. In April 2011, Hill filed a petition for reinstatement of his driving privileges. The director asserted that Hill's 2005 conviction precluded reinstatement because Me. Rev. Stat. 302.060.1(9) barred reinstatement for persons convicted within the previous ten years of an offense related to alcohol, controlled substances or drugs. The trial court reinstated Hill's driving privileges and held that section 302.060.1(9) was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court versed, holding that section 302.060.1(9) was not unconstitutionally vague given the facts in this case.

After a jury trial Kenneth Baumruk was found guilty of the first degree murder of his wife and sentenced to death. Baumruk timely filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief. The motion court denied some of the claims without an evidentiary hearing and held an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims. The court then issued a judgment overruling all claims put forth by the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the motion court's judgment, holding that the motion court did not err by overruling Baumruk's claims that his competency hearing counsel, trial counsel, and appellate counsel were ineffective for numerous reasons.

Defendant Michael Tisius was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for killing two law enforcement officers and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court did err in (1) admitting the certified court record of the complaint for Defendant's conviction for possession of a prohibited item in the department of corrections; (2) overruling Defendant's objections to the State's cross-examination of his expert; (3) failing to intercede sua sponte at multiple times during the State's closing argument; (4) submitting verdict mechanics instructions or mitigating circumstances instructions; and (5) sentencing Defendant to death, as the imposition of the death penalty met the statutory requirements.

Kevin Bromwell and several other inmates (Appellants) of the Jefferson County Correctional Center filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that the circuit court's application of the Missouri Prisoner Litigation Reform Act to petitions for writs of habeas corpus violated the state and federal Constitutions. Appellants then filed a consolidated petition for writs of habeas corpus. The circuit court quashed service of process, dismissed the counts alleged in the consolidated petition for declaratory judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and dismissed the petition for writs of habeas corpus without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the consolidated petitions for writs of habeas corpus claims were properly dismissed and there was no right to appeal; and (2) the circuit court properly dismissed Appellant's declaratory judgment petition, as Appellants failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted.

Defendant Tyler McNeely refused to consent to an alcohol breath test or a blood test after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The arresting patrolman, without seeking a warrant from a judge, ordered a medical professional to draw Defendant's blood. The trial court sustained Defendant's motion to suppress the results of the blood test, concluding that the nonconsensual and warrantless blood draw was a violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the fact that blood-alcohol levels dissipate after drinking ceases is not a per se exigency pursuant to Schmerber v. California justifying an officer to order a blood test without obtaining a warrant from a neutral judge; and (2) the arresting patrolman, therefore, was not justified in failing to seek a warrant before drawing Defendant's blood over his refusal to consent.

Jesse Dorris, Jose Lopez-McCurdy and Louis Hill were denied the right to appeal their post-conviction relief motions on the merits because they were filed out of time. The State did not raise the issue of timeliness below. The Supreme Court (1) held that, pursuant to Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 and 24.035 (the Rules), the motion court had no authority to hear the motions, regardless of the State's failure to raise the issue, because the motions were filed out of time; (2) affirmed the dismissal of Dorris' and Lopez-McCurdy's cases because they were filed outside the mandatory time limits provided in the Rules and resulted in Dorris and Lopez-McCurdy completely waiving their post-conviction relief claims; and (3) remanded Hill's case for a hearing on the timeliness of his motion.