Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Missouri Department of Corrections appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of Respondent on her claim of disability discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). On appeal, the Department claimed the trial court erred in overruling its objection to Respondent's verdict director because it did not include an essential element of her discrimination claim and erred in calculating punitive damages under Mo. Rev. Stat. 510.265. The Supreme Court reversed because the verdict-directing instruction did not require the jury to find that Respondent was disabled, an essential element of her MHRA claim. The Court also held that the trial court's calculation of punitive damages was the correct application of section 510.265.

David and Glenette Nothum sought a writ prohibiting the circuit court from compelling them to testify in a judgment debtor's examination conducted pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 513.380. The court ordered the Nothums to testify despite their assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination and held them in contempt when they refused to do so, finding that the immunity granted to the Nothums pursuant to section 513.380.2 was coextensive with their constitutional privilege. The Supreme Court granted a permanent writ of prohibition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Nothums to testify, as the immunity in this case did not include derivative use immunity and, so, was not coextensive with the Nothums' constitutional privilege.

The Missouri Public Defender Commission petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition ordering the trial court to withdraw its appointment of the public defender's office to represent Defendant, alleging that the appointment violated 18 C.S.R. 10-4.010 (the rule). The rule, promulgated by the Commission, adopts a "caseload protocol" that permits a district defender office to decline additional appointments when it has been certified as being on limited availability after exceeding its caseload capacity for at least three consecutive calendar months. The trial court did not refuse to apply the rule, but rather, the trial court said it believed it had no choice but to appoint a public defender because to do otherwise would have violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as the court could identify no other realistic mechanism by which to provide other counsel. The Supreme Court ordered the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the court erred by (1) determining that the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel without regard to whether counsel would be able to offer competent representation; (2) failing to apply the rule; and (3) holding that the rule provides no realistic alternative mechanisms for handling the issue of excessive appointments.

David Miller was convicted of six sexual offenses against his minor daughter and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment with respect to Miller's convictions for first-degree statutory sodomy, deviate sexual assault, and first-degree child molestation, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence Miller committed the charged offenses of first-degree statutory sodomy and deviate sexual assault during the charged period of December 3, 2004 through December 3, 2005, and thus Defendant's double jeopardy rights were implicated; and (2) the circuit court plainly erred in submitting a verdict director to the jury allowing the jury to find Defendant guilty of the crime of first-degree child molestation for an act that was not criminal during the charged period. Affirmed in all other respects. Remanded.

During Defendant's trial for assault and armed criminal action she and the State jointly proffered a defense-of-others instruction to the trial court that was submitted to the jury. Defendant sought reversal of her conviction, claiming that the submission of the erroneous instruction to the jury was plain error. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Defendant waived appellate review by proffering the instruction she complained of; and (2) the Court declined to use plain error review because there was no sua sponte duty for the trial court to correct Defendant's faulty proffered instructions.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree robbery and armed criminal action. Defendant timely filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling his codefendant in the crime (Codefendant) at trial, alleging Codefendant would have testified that Defendant did not act as Codefendant's accomplice in the robbery. The motion court granted Defendant's motion for post-conviction relief. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Codefendant as a witness, and therefore, the motion court's judgment was not clearly erroneous.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, forcible rape, and armed criminal action and sentenced to death on the first-degree murder charge. Defendant's subsequent motion for post-conviction relief was overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed the motion court's denial of post-conviction relief, holding that the motion court did not (1) err in overruling Defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge, who sentenced Defendant to death, from presiding over Defendant's post-conviction relief proceeding, as Defendant failed to establish disqualifying bias or prejudice on the part of the judge; (2) clearly err in denying Defendant's eight claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) err in denying an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's claim that Missouri's death penalty was unconstitutional.

This was the fifth action to come before the Supreme Court involving murders committed in 1996 by Carman Deck. Deck filed this Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 post-conviction proceeding, asserting (1) his counsel at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses and for other alleged deficient performance, and (2) the motion court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Rule 29.15 relief and the denial of Deck's request for a new trial, holding (1) the motion court did not clearly err in finding that counsel was not ineffective; and (2) Deck was not entitled to a new trial based on the trial court's alleged destruction of juror questionnaires.

After a bench trial, Elton Norfolk was found guilty of one count of unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon and one count of possession of marijuana. Norfolk appealed, arguing that the circuit court clearly erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence and his objections to the admission of evidence seized because the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and check for a weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that Forfolk's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the evidence seized was properly admitted, and there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions.

Zane Valentine pleaded guilty to one count of child molestation in the first degree and three counts of statutory sodomy in the second degree. The plea agreement provided that Valentine would be placed in the Sex Offender Assessment Unit (SOAU), and the circuit court stated it would retain jurisdiction over Valentine for 120 days while he was assessed. The circuit court then sentenced Valentine. The SOAU later recommended the circuit court grant Valentine probation. More than 120 days after Valentine was sentenced the circuit court entered an order denying Valentine's release on probation. On reconsideration, the circuit court found that Valentine had not completed a "program" as defined in Mo. Rev. Stat. 559.115, and therefore, the court had authority to deny Valentine probation after the statutory time limits set forth in the statue had passed. The Supreme Court granted Valentine a writ of mandamus and ordered the circuit court to release Valentine on probation, holding (1) the SOAU is a 120-day program under section 559.115; and (2) therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Valentine's release on probation when the order was entered beyond the statutory time limits set forth in section 559.115.