Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial in 1992, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. Appellant was fifteen years old at the time. Under a mandatory sentencing scheme, the district court imposed life sentences with the possibility of release after thirty years for the first-degree murder convictions. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Appellant filed a postconviction motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his sentence violated the rule announced in Miller. The postconviction court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant’s sentence was lawful because Miller was not retroactive. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the issue of Miller’s retroactivity, holding that Miller did not make the sentencing scheme at issue here unlawful because the mandatory sentencing scheme did not require life imprisonment without the possibility of release. View "Ouk v. State" on Justia Law

The State filed a delinquency petition charging Appellant, who was then fourteen years old, with first-degree felony murder (drive-by shooting), second-degree felony murder (drive-by shooting), and attempted first-degree felony murder (drive-by shooting). Defendant pled guilty to the murder charges, but the Supreme Court vacated the convictions. On remand, the case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Appellant guilty of all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over Appellant’s offenses; (2) sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s convictions; (3) assuming that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of drive-by shooting, Appellant did not establish that the error affected his substantial rights; (4) Appellant’s mandatory life sentence with the possibility of release was not unconstitutional under the principles of Miller v. Alabama; (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a longer sentence upon Appellant after his trial and conviction; and (6) the postconviction court did not err when it summarily denied Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief. View "State v. Vang" on Justia Law

James Bergstrom and Vanessa Rew dissolved their marriage in 2008. In 2002, 2007, and 2008, Rew obtained a series of one-year orders for protection (OFPs) against Bergstrom. In 2010, before the extended expiration date of the 2008 OFP, Rew filed an application under Minn. Stat. 518B.01(6)(a) to extend the terms of the 2008 OFP. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court extended the OFP for up to fifty years in favor of Rew and the couple’s minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 518B.01(6)(a) does not require a finding of domestic abuse before a district court may extend the duration of an OFP; (2) the extension of an OFP under section 518B.01(6)(a) does not facially violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Minn. Const. art. I, 3; (3) the record was insufficient to conclude that the extended OFP was constitutional with respect to Bergstrom’s children; and (4) the extension of an OFP for up to fifty years does not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clause of either the United States of Minnesota Constitutions. Remanded. View "In re Rew" on Justia Law

In 2001, Respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct and first-degree premeditated murder. Respondent was a juvenile when he committed the crime. The district court sentenced Respondent to life without the possibility of release (LWOR) under the mandatory sentencing scheme in Minn. Stat. 609.106(2)(1). After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Respondent filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court granted Respondent’s petition and resentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently issued its decision in Chambers v. State, which held that the Miller rule does not apply retroactively to a juvenile whose sentence of LWOR under section 609.106(2)(1) became final before the Miller rule was announced. Thereafter, in the instant case, the Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court’s order and reinstated the original sentence of LWOR, holding that the postconviction court’s legal conclusion was in direct conflict with Chambers, and the circumstances of this case did not warrant granting relief to Respondent under the Court’s supervisory powers to ensure the fair administration of justice. View "Roman Nose v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aiding suicide in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.215(1), which makes it illegal to intentionally “advise, encourage, or assist another in taking the other’s own life.” Defendant had responded to posts on suicide websites by encouraging the victims to hang themselves, falsely claiming that he would also commit suicide. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 609.215(1) violated the First Amendment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the statute prohibited speech that was unprotected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State may prosecute Defendant for assisting another in committing suicide but not for encouraging or advising another to commit suicide, and thus the words “advises” and “encourages” must be severed from the statute as unconstitutional; and (2) because the district court did not make a specific finding on whether Defendant assisted the victims’ suicides, the case must be remanded. View "State v. Melchert-Dinkel" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers stopped a truck driven by Thomas Anthony, a suspected drug dealer. Charles Lemert was a passenger in Anthony’s car. Officers ordered Lemert to get out of the truck and proceeded to conduct a pat search of Lemert. Based on the evidence discovered during the pat search, the State charged Lemert with a fifth-degree controlled-substance offense. Lemert moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was unlawful because the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Lemert might have been armed and dangerous. The district court denied the motion and convicted Lemert of the charge. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Lemert might have been armed and dangerous, and therefore, the district court did not err when it denied Lemert’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Lemert" on Justia Law

After Scott Schuette, who was working as a police officer at the time, responded to an accident at the local high school he began experiencing mental health problems. Schuette was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Schuette filed a claim petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits for PTSD. A compensation judge denied Schuette’s claim, finding that Schuette’s PTSD lacked a physical component and was thus not a compensable injury under Minnesota law. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, determining (1) to be compensable under Lockwood v. Independent School District No. 877, an injury must include a physical component; and (2) the compensation judge’s findings that Schuette’s PTSD did not result in a physical brain injury had substantial evidentiary support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the compensation judge’s findings were not manifestly contrary to the evidence; and (2) applying the doctrine of stare decisis, Schuette’s request to overrule Lockwood was declined. View "Schuette v. City of Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree while committing domestic abuse and with a past pattern of domestic abuse. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence to establish a past pattern of domestic abuse beyond a reasonable doubt. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Defendant engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse against the victim; (2) the district court did not err in its jury instructions on a past pattern of domestic abuse; and (3) the district court did not commit plain error by admitting evidence connected to orders for protection obtained by the victim, as Appellant’s substantial rights were not affected by the admission of this evidence. View "Gulbertson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Defendant subsequently filed two petitions for postconviction relief, both of which were denied. The instant appeal concerned the postconviction court’s summary denial of Defendant’s second petition for postconviction relief. On appeal, Defendant raised three claims: ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court did not err by summarily denying Defendant’s second petition for postconviction relief because all three of Defendant’s claims failed as a matter of law. View "Erickson v. State" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search Appellant and Appellant’s residence after Appellant allegedly threatened a woman for stealing his drugs. At the apartment the officers seized gun and drug evidence. Appellant filed a motion to suppress, which the district court granted on the ground that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Defendant’s alleged criminal activity and the apartment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the search warrant affidavit established a sufficient nexus between Appellant’s alleged criminal activity and the place to be searched. View "State v. Yarbrough" on Justia Law