Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Hughes died after hanging himself from his bed in the Butler County Prison, where he was incarcerated on charges of robbery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and abuse of the drugs cocaine and Concerta. Hughes showed no outward signs that he was suicidal, but he did have a history of depression and asked to see Tepe, the prison psychiatrist, about anti-depression medication. Hughes and Dr. Tepe never met. Hughes had told an intake worker that he had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation. There was a suicide alert in the computer system and Hughes told a paramedic that he had not been taking his prescribed medication. Hughes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her son’s serious medical need. Tepe sought summary judgment, arguing that he was The district court held that Tepe could not assert a qualified-immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent and public policy do not support immunity for a privately paid physician working for the public.

Plaintiff began experiencing severe headaches and swelling in his left eye in 2007 while incarcerated. Shortly after his release, plaintiff was diagnosed with Ewing’s Sarcoma, a serious form of bone cancer. According to plaintiff, surgery would have been sufficient to treat the disease had prison staff detected it earlier. However, due to the late diagnosis, chemotherapy and radiation are now necessary. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that plaintiff pled sufficient facts upon which one could draw the inference that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and committed medical malpractice. The doctor and nurse filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that their involvement with plaintiff was minimal and cannot form the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference or gross negligence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. Neither negligent medical care, nor delay in providing medical care, can rise to the level of a constitutional violation absent specific allegations of sufficiently harmful acts or omissions reflecting deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff, a minor, sustained serious injuries at birth due to the negligence of medical professionals who attended her delivery. As a result of plaintiff's injuries, DHHS, through the state Medicaid program, paid more than $1.9 million in medical and health care expenses on her behalf. Plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice action in state court and eventually settled the action for a lump some of approximately $2.8 million. The settlement agreement did not allocate separate amounts for past medical expenses and other damages. DHHS subsequently asserted a statutory lien on the settlement proceedings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat 108A-57 and 59 (third-party liability statues), which asserted that North Carolina had a subrogation right and could assert a lien upon the lesser of its actual medical expenditures or one-third of the medicaid recipient's total recovery. Plaintiff brought the instant action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to forestall payment under federal Medicaid law known as the "anti-lien provision," 42 U.S.C. 1396p. The court was persuaded that the unrebuttable presumption inherent in the one-third cap on the state's recovery imposed by the North Carolina third-party liability statutes was in fatal conflict with federal law. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the Secretary and remanded for further proceedings.

An inmate sued, claiming that the prison medical director was deliberately indifferent to his need for eye surgery. He was diagnosed in 2001, with pterygia, a thin film covering the eye, which significantly obstructs his vision and apparently causes itching and irritation. The prison denied requests for surgery. The inmate alleged that there was an unofficial policy of denying off-site care to death row inmates. Medical recommendations were mixed; several doctors recommended the surgery. Following a remand of dismissal of his suit, the inmate got surgery in 2008, and filed a second suit, based on the delay The district court entered summary judgment, in favor of the doctor. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the evidence remains insufficient to eliminate fact disputes. The medical recommendations are enough to create genuine fact disputes that the pterygia had become objectively serious and that the doctor intentionally or with deliberate indifference ignored the condition.

This case arose when Pauline Thomas brought her daughter, Jane Doe and four of her grandchildren, including John Doe and R.N.T. to the Emergency Room at the Hennepin County Medical Center and reported her concerns that Jane Doe might have been sexually abused by R.N.T. Appellants brought suit against appellees claiming that the 72-hour hold placed on John Doe, the internal examination of Jane Doe, and the examination of John Doe violated the children's rights under the Fourth Amendment and that the seizure and search of both children violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all appellants. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees and denied appellants' motion for partial summary judgment on their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court rejected appellants' contention that appellees failed to move for summary judgment on all of appellants' claims; that the district court ignored questions of material fact; and that the district court at times used the wrong legal standards when analyzing the facts. The court also held that because it affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment against appellants, the court did not reach the denial of appellants' partial motion for summary judgment.