Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Rivera, a federal inmate, was burned on his leg, foot, and ankle while working in the prison kitchen. A nurse initially treated the second-degree burn. Rivera returned to the healthcare unit daily so that staff could clean and dress the wound, and complained about pain and numbness. A physician assistant stated that his symptoms probably were normal and suggested that he return in six months. He did so and was told that his symptoms were probably permanent. He saw a physician, Gupta, explaining that his family was willing to pay for him to consult a burn specialist. According to Rivera, Gupta refused to examine him, look up his records, or authorize any treatment, admonishing him that he wouldn’t have scalded himself had he not been in prison, that “only God” could help him, and that if he complained again, Gupta would write a disciplinary report. Gupta disputes Rivera’s account. Rivera sued Gupta and Lopez, an administrator, who did not respond to Rivera’s complaints, for deliberate indifference, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Lopez, who is not a medical professional, but reversed as to Gupta, noting that Lopez was without legal representation. A reasonable jury might infer that personal hostility, divorced from medical judgment, had motivated Gupta’s refusal to provide Rivera with any further treatment, even by a burn specialist whom Rivera’s family would have compensated. View "Rivera v. Gupta" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and orthopedic examination as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed summary judgment in favor of the doctors, but on rehearing, en banc, reversed. Even if a doctor denies knowing that he was exposing a plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm, evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer a doctor knew he was providing deficient treatment is sufficient to survive summary judgment. Petties produced sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the doctors knew the care they were providing was insufficient. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law

On December 24, 2009, inmate Conley’s hand was examined by a prison nurse, who described Conley’s symptoms to Dr. Birch over the phone; throbbing pain, severe swelling, discoloration, and loss of function throughout the entire hand. The nurse concluded in his treatment notes that Conley suffered from a “possible/probable fracture.” Dr. Birch ordered a regimen of ibuprofen and ice but did not order an x-ray until almost five days later. The x-ray revealed that Conley’s hand was fractured, and years later, he continues to suffer from chronic pain and limited mobility. In 2011, Conley brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in the days following his injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Birch, stating that a reasonable jury could find that, based on the information conveyed to her in her December 24 telephone conversation, Dr. Birch strongly suspected that Conley’s hand was fractured. Dr. Birch’s uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that, by declining to order an x-ray of Conley’s hand at such a crucial point in the healing process, she exacerbated his lasting injuries. View "Conley v. Birch" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his left ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “meals lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and examination by an orthopedist as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that more than a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The court granted the doctors summary judgment, reasoning that waiting before immobilizing Petties’s ankle could not have constituted deliberate indifference because several physicians held different opinions and that a jury could not reasonably find that rejection of the recommendation for physical therapy constituted deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A jury could not reasonably find that the treatment of Petties’s ankle rose to the level of a constitutional violation. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 2011, after about two weeks of reporting symptoms and being treated for constipation and gas, Allard, a prisoner at the Clarinda Correctional Facility of the Iowa Department of Corrections , suffered a bowel obstruction and perforation. Allard had emergency surgery where a colostomy bag was installed and his bowel was repaired. Allard filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison staff. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that material questions of fact existed regarding the appropriateness of the care Allard received. Although Allard demonstrated that CCF medical staff failed to properly diagnose his bowel obstruction, and demonstrated that failure to treat the bowel obstruction led to a bowel perforation, Allard failed to put forward evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Allard v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of her children, sued two physicians for medical malpractice. During the ensuing trial, one of the jurors fainted while she was sitting in her chair in the jury box. One of the defendant physicians immediately rose to assist the juror, after which the juror recovered and was excused. Plaintiffs moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The jury subsequently returned verdicts for the physicians. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial as to both physicians. The physician who did not help the ailing juror sought further review. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals as to the appellant, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the jury verdict to stand as to the physician who had not rendered medical assistance because nothing in that physician’s behavior during the incident could have “engendered any particular good will in her favor.” Remanded. View "Jack v. Booth" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Wheeler sued the prison’s medical director, Dr. Talbot, for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Wheeler claims that he experiences excruciating pain from “large and protruding” keloids (growths of scar tissue) on his chest, hips, and legs; that he tested positive for a stomach infection caused by the bacterium helicobacter pylori; and that Dr. Talbot ignored both conditions. The district court allowed the keloid claim to proceed but dismissed the h. pylori claim because the blood-test results that Wheeler attached to his complaint establish that he tested negative for the infection. The court then denied a motion requesting an order requiring Dr. Talbot to refer Wheeler immediately to “a suitable doctor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even ignoring the lack of advance notice to Dr. Talbot, there was enough in the record to demonstrate that immediate referral was unwarranted. The limited evidence established neither that Wheeler will experience irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction nor that his deliberate-indifference claim against Dr. Talbot has a reasonable likelihood of success.View "Wheeler v. Talbot" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (Department) permanently revoked the health care licenses of physicians (plaintiffs) pursuant to the Department of Professional Regulation Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105-165) as a result of plaintiffs’ prior misdemeanor convictions for battery and criminal sexual abuse of their patients. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed their challenges. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that the Act: did not apply to individuals who were convicted of a triggering offense prior to the Act’s effective date; was impermissibly retroactive and impaired certain fundamental rights, in violation of substantive due process; violated procedural due process; was unenforceable based on the res judicata effect of the previous discipline imposed by the Department; violated federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy; violated the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder; violated the federal takings clause; and violated federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto law.View "Hayashi v. IL Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation" on Justia Law

While working as a home care provider, Carl experienced a psychotic break, urinating on one client’s head. Muskegon County prosecutors charged Carl with vulnerable-adult abuse. He was held at the county jail, which contracted mental health services to CMH. CMH employees examined Carl at the jail. McLaughlin, a physician’s assistant, indicated that Carl was “floridly psychotic,” that he had considered suicide, and that he required treatment in a psychiatric facility. McLaughlin had previously prescribed Carl an anti-psychotic medication but noted that it was “not very effective.” Weinert, a limited licensed psychologist, documented that Carl was “paranoid” and “require[d] intensive psychiatric treatment” and hospitalization. Dr. Jawor, a CHM independent contractor, examined Carl two days later. Carl denied feeling depressed, suicidal,or homicidal, and denied having paranoid delusions and hallucinations. Carl stated that he was “messing with” Weinert and McLaughlin. Jawor concluded that he did not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. Carl sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) arguing that, due in part to Jawor’s negative certification, he did not receive mental health services he needed and that his uncontrolled psychotic state worsened, seriously harming his mental and physical health while detained. All defendants except Jawor were dismissed after signing a settlement agreement. The district court held that Jawor was not a state actor. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Jawor acted under color of state law because she performed a public function by evaluating an individual in state custody.View "Carl v. Muskegon Cnty." on Justia Law