Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the practice by which the Nation’s pledge of allegiance is recited each morning in Defendants’ public schools violated (1) Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights under the Massachusetts Constitution because the pledge included the words “under God,” and (2) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 76, 5, which prohibits discrimination in Massachusetts public school education. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the intervenors. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the recitation of the pledge, which no student is required to recite, does not violate the Constitution or the statute. View "Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the murder of his four-year-old daughter, who died from intoxication due to sedating drugs found in her system, or from pneumonia, or from a combination of both intoxication and pneumonia. Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his motions for a new trial and for funds to retain a toxicologist. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and the orders denying Defendant’s motions, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in handling the issue of toxicological evidence at trial, and trial counsel did not otherwise render ineffective assistance; (2) the evidence of malice was sufficient to support the conviction; (3) the prosecutor properly used and commented on evidence of acts Defendant committed after the charged offense to show intent or state of mind at the time of the charged offense; and (4) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing and in denying Defendant’s posttrial motion for funds to retain a forensic toxicologist. View "Commonwealth v. Riley" on Justia Law

The Department of Public Utilities imposed on Petitioners, electric companies, monetary assessments for the Storm Trust Fund (“assessment”) pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 12P, 18, which specifically prohibited Petitioners from seeking recovery of the assessment in any rate proceeding. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the recovery prohibition, both as required by the statute and impose by the Department’s order, claiming it was an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Department’s order, holding (1) the mere obligation to pay the assessment, regardless of whether recovery was permitted or precluded, did not rise to the level of a compensable per se taking; (2) Petitioner’s claim that the assessment constituted a taking by way of a confiscatory rate was inadequate on the facts as presented to the Court; and (3) the Department’s order imposing the assessment and articulating the recovery prohibition did not constitute a regulatory taking because the order simply required Petitioners to pay an assessment that served a legitimate public purpose and did not interfere with Petitioners’ overall property rights. View "Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

After receiving a telephone call from Defendant’s neighbor, police entered Defendant’s front yard without a warrant and seized three dogs, two of which appeared to be dead, that had been left outside in severely inclement winter weather. Defendant was subsequently charged with three counts of animal cruelty. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search. The superior court granted the motion but reported the question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court of whether the ‘pure emergency’ exception to the warrant requirement extends to animals. The Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement extends to police action undertaken to render emergency assistance to animals. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Duncan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder, and related crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of conviction and declined to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial pursuant to the Court’s power under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (2) Defendant’s counsel rendered effective assistance; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Johnston" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant, who was known to be associated with a gang, was indicted for the murder of a fourteen-year-old and the wounding of a fifteen-year-old. The Commonwealth, which believed the murder was committed in connection with the gang’s criminal activities, obtained from a cooperating witness a surreptitiously recorded conversation between Defendant and other gang members, during which Defendant admitted to the killing. Defendant sought to suppress the recorded conversation as well as statements he made to the police during a post-arrest interview. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress as to all of his statements. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress with respect to Defendant’s recorded conversation; but (2) reversed the denial with respect to statements Defendant made during the custodial interview after clearly invoking his right to remain silent. View "Commonwealth v. Hearns" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. Defendant’s appeal centered on his argument that the victim, an undocumented immigrant, characterized her consensual sex with Defendant as rape in her report to police to obtain immigration benefits. Specifically, Defendant claimed (1) he was denied the right to impeach the victim with evidence of a prior incident of sexual assault, after which she received a temporary work authorization; and (2) he should have been allowed to access Boston Area Rape Crisis Center (BARCC) records concerning the victim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge properly determined that the probative value of any testimony concerning the prior incident of sexual assault would be outweighed by its prejudicial impact; and (2) Defendant did not make the necessary threshold showing that he was entitled to production of BARCC records. View "Commonwealth v. Sealy" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were amendments to the Sex Offender Registry Law that the Governor signed into law on July 12, 2013, including amendments that would require the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) to publish on the Internet information contained in the sex offender registry regarding individuals given a level two or three classification. On July 5, 2013, Plaintiffs, as putative representatives of a class of persons presently and prospectively classified as level two sex offenders, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking an injunction barring SORB from publishing registry information on the Internet of the class of level two offenders. The Supreme Judicial Court declared unconstitutional the retroactive application of the amendments to the extent they would require the Internet publication of the registry information of individuals who were finally classified as level two sex offenders on or before July 12, 2013 but noted that SORB was allowed to publish on the Internet the registry information of any individual who was given a final classification as a level two sex offender after July 12, 2013. View "Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the town of Hanover, filed suit against Defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, alleging that Defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings by maintaining the litigation, providing legal counsel, and controlling the plaintiffs’ interests, despite not being named a plaintiff in the suit. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the “anti-SLAPP” statute, asserting that the town’s claims against it were solely based on Defendant’s constitutionally protected right to petition. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that Defendant did not have standing to bring its motion under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant showed that the suit against it was based on protected petitioning activity; (2) the town did not meet its burden of showing that Defendant’s exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s special motion to dismiss should be allowed. View "Town of Hanover v. New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

After a probation revocation hearing, a district court judge found that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation and revoked Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the judge made no separate finding as to good cause for proceeding without a witness with personal knowledge of the evidence presented, as required by Rule 6(b) of the District Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing comported with due process because the hearsay testimony on which the judge relied was substantially reliable and trustworthy; (2) Rule 6(b) of the District Court Rules of Probation Violation Proceedings is not to be construed as requiring more than is constitutionally mandated, and due process does not require, when the hearsay is substantially reliable, separate proof as to good cause; and (3) there was no improper interference by the office of the district attorney with the probation department’s conduct of the hearing that would give rise to a violation of article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Bukin" on Justia Law