Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted on several counts of sexual assault of a child under the age of sixteen. The victim was a mute and autistic child, and Defendant was the victim's grandfather. Carrie, the victim's older half-sister, suspected abuse and set up a hidden video camera in the bedroom in Defendant's home, aiming the camera at the bed. Carrie then took the recording to the police department, after which Defendant was arrested. Defendant moved to suppress the victim's oral communications in the audiovisual recording and subsequent statements he made to the police. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that, under the circumstances, Carrie could vicariously consent to the recording of the victim's oral communications under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. View "Commonwealth v. F.W." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to dismiss for violations of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, impairment of the integrity of the grand jury, and loss of evidence; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for funds to retain an identification expert; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to police officers; (4) the trial court did not err in making certain evidentiary rulings at trial; and (5) Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "Commonwealth v. Carr" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree based on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in accepting the assertion by a witness of privilege under the Fifth Amendment and in conducting a hearing on the witness's claim of privilege; (2) Defendant's delay in raising the issue of the unanimity of the jury's verdict of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon was dispositive of his claim in this appeal; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial where Defendant's trial counsel provided him with effective assistance; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to prove extreme atrocity or cruelty. View "Commonwealth v. Alicea" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree of his wife on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting the medical examiner's testimony or Defendant's jailhouse telephone call recordings; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument; and (4) the jury was properly instructed on "dangerous weapon"; (5) cumulative error did not require reversal; and (6) there was no reason to reduce the murder conviction or order a new trial pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Roy" on Justia Law

After police found marijuana plants that collectively weighed less than one ounce growing in a closet in Defendant's home, Defendant was charged with cultivation of marijuana and committing that violation in a school zone. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32L, a person who cultivates marijuana plants that weigh one ounce or less may not be charged with cultivation in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws 94C, 32C(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case was controlled by the Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Keefner, and (2) section 32L decriminalized simple possession but did not repeal the offense of cultivation of marijuana under section 32C(a) where the amount of marijuana cultivated is one ounce or less. View "Commonwealth v. Palmer" on Justia Law

A State trooper was patrolling a state park when he spotted a vehicle parked in a handicapped parking space that did not display a handicapped placard. The trooper approached the driver's side window and smelled the strong odor of freshly burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The vehicle's occupants admitted to smoking marijuana. The trooper then searched the vehicle, including the trunk, in which he discovered a semiautomatic handgun in a backpack. Defendant was charged with several firearm and ammunition offenses. Defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression of the firearm and ammunition found in the backpack. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying the motion to suppress, holding that the trooper did not have probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband or evidence of a crime could be found in the trunk, and therefore, the search of the trunk was illegal. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

Defendants were stopped by police officer for a motor infraction. The interior of the vehicle smelled of burnt marijuana, and in response to a question from the officer, the driver produced two bags containing marijuana. The officer searched the vehicle and found a handgun and ammunition in the glove box. Defendants were charged with firearms offenses and successfully moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed the order that the evidence be suppressed, holding (1) the search was not justified by the need to search for contraband; (2) the officer's extensive search was not justified by his need to ensure his safety; and (3) the Commonwealth failed to establish that the officer's search of the vehicle was proper because he had probable cause to believe the driver was operating while under the influence of marijuana. View "Commonwealth v. Daniel" on Justia Law

Police officers observed Defendant sharing what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette with two others on a park bench. The officers seized the cigarette and conducted a warrantless search of Defendant's person and backpack. In the backpack they found marijuana with a total weight of less than one ounce. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and a corresponding drug violation in or near a school or park. The municipal court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was not a lawful search incident to arrest, as the officers had no basis to arrest Defendant before searching him. View " Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses. Defendant's appeal from his convictions was pending in the appeals court, where he was represented by counsel. Acting pro se, Defendant filed a motion in the appeals court, which responded that it would consider only filings submitted by counsel of record. Defendant filed a petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, seeking relief from that ruling and a stay of his appeal until he was allowed to proceed without counsel. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court was not obligated to permit Defendant to proceed in a hybrid manner with representation in part by counsel and in part by himself. View "LeBaron v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. The appeals court affirmed, concluding that any delay in bringing Defendant to trial did not violate Mass. R. Crim. P. 36. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the appeals court that Defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been allowed under the speedy trial provisions of the state or federal Constitutions. The motion was denied, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where (1) the speedy trial clock starts when a Massachusetts criminal complaint issues; (2) the speedy trial clock "resumes" when the Commonwealth reinstates charges following dismissal; and (3) although the delay from the attachment of the right to a speedy trial in September 1991 to Defendant's trial in May 2003 was lengthy, the factors set forth in Baker v. Wingo did not establish that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. View "Commonwealth v. Butler " on Justia Law