Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In the Matter of Antavis Chavis, the Supreme Court of Maryland ruled that a bar applicant diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) had met his burden to prove that he had a "disability" under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and that the testing accommodation he requested—50% additional time to take the Uniform Bar Examination (UBE)—was warranted. The court adopted a two-step test to determine whether a bar examination test accommodation request should be granted. First, the court must determine if the applicant meets the ADA definition of "disability." Second, the court must determine if the test accommodation requested by the applicant is "reasonable, consistent with the nature and purpose of the examination and necessitated by the applicant’s disability." The court observed that under the ADA and related federal regulations, the definition of disability should be broadly construed and that evidence of past test accommodations must be given considerable weight. The court sustained the applicant’s exceptions to the denial of his test accommodation request by the State Board of Law Examiners (SBLE), reversed the denial, and remanded the matter to the SBLE with instruction to grant the applicant’s test accommodation request. View "In the Matter of Antavis Chavis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's performance was deficient.At issue was whether trial counsel's failure to object to an order prohibiting any consultation regarding the case between Petitioner and trial counsel during Petitioner's murder trial resulted in the actual denial of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held (1) prejudice was presumed under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's failure to object was objectively unreasonable. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the circuit court on postconviction review ordering a new trial for Petitioner, holding that Petitioner was provided ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's order prohibiting any consultation about the case (a no-communication order) between Petitioner and trial counsel under the circumstances of this case.At issue was a no-communication order entered into between Petitioner and trial counsel during an overnight recess prior to the final day of testimony in Petitioner's murder trial and trial counsel's failure to object to the order. The circuit court ruled that the no-communication order, and trial counsel's failure to object, deprived Petitioner of the assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and presumed prejudice, thus ordering a new trial. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Petitioner could not show prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) trial counsel's conduct in this case resulted in the actual denial of the assistance of counsel, and prejudice was presumed; and (2) therefore, the circuit court properly ordered a new trial for Petitioner. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this action brought under the Maryland Health Care Worker Whistleblower Protection Act (the Act), Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. (HO) 1-501 through 1-506, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the lower court did not err by requiring Plaintiff to show that the protected conduct was the but-for cause of the challenged personnel action; (2) a plaintiff may avail herself of the burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas to prove but-for causation; (3) Plaintiff failed to genuinely dispute Defendant's evidence that she was terminated for reasons unrelated to her alleged protected disclosure; and (4) the circuit court did not err by granting judgment to Defendant as a matter of law. View "Romeka v. RadAmerica II, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the post-conviction court denying Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, holding that the post-conviction court did not err in ruling that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance and that the State had not violated its Brady obligations during the underlying proceedings, holding that there was no error.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of distribution of heroin and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant later filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the appellate court certified questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the post-conviction court did not err in ruling that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move production of certain evidence; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that the State was required to disclose challenged impeachment evidence prior to the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, Defendant failed to establish the Brady materiality standard. View "Blake v. State" on Justia Law