Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant Mario Gutierrez was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence following the shooting death of the victim. At trial, witnesses testified that the incident was related to Defendant's affiliation with a street gang. The trial court permitted testimony of a gang expert who generally described the violent customs of the gang. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) expert testimony about the history, hierarchy, and common practices of a street gang is permissible where fact evidence establishes that the crime charged was gang-related and the probative value of the testimony is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice to the defendant; and (2) the circuit court in this case did not abuse its discretion in permitting the gang expert to testify because ample fact evidence established a connection between the victim's shooting death and the street gang, and although the unfair prejudice of one of expert's statements outweighed its probative value, the error was harmless.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of third-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault. The victim was not referred for a sexual assault forensics exam. Before closing arguments, the trial judge gave a scientific evidence instruction instructing the jury that there was no legal requirement that the State utilize any specific investigative technique or scientific test to prove its case. Petitioner challenged the jury instruction on appeal. The court of special appeals affirmed. After the Court of Appeals granted certiorari in this case, it decided Atkins v. State, which stated that the most important consideration in evaluating whether a trial judge abused her discretion in giving a scientific evidence jury instruction was whether the instruction would run afoul of the prohibition against relieving the State of its burden where the the instruction's relation to the reasonable doubt standard was unclear. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on Atkins, no duty instructions are not per se improper, but (2) in the context of the present case, the trial court abused its discretion in giving such a jury instruction. Remanded for a new trial.

Petitioner Christopher Mansfield was tried in a bench trial at the circuit court on five counts charging statutory sex-related offenses. At the close of the evidence, the trial judge, sua sponte and over Petitioner's objection, declared a mistrial, explaining that her knowledge of Petitioner's prior convictions and the partiality it engendered made a mistrial manifestly necessary. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that there was not manifest necessity for the granting of the mistrial where the trial judge had knowing of Petitioner's prior convictions well before the trial began. The motions judge and the court of special appeals upheld the decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under these circumstances, when it is the court that is the trier of facts, and the court's impartiality, whether due to a personal bias or prejudice toward a criminal defendant or an inability to resolve disputed factual allegations, is impaired, manifest necessity does not exist when the reasonable alternative of recusal existed prior to jeopardy attaching. Remanded.

Petitioners were nonresidents who neither lived nor worked in Maryland but had a source of income in the State. In 2005, the Comptroller of the Treasury issued a notice of assessment against Petitioners' 2004 joint Maryland nonresident income tax returns for failure to pay the Special Nonresident Tax (SNRT). The assessment included the amount owed for the SNRT and interest. Petitioners challenged, on federal and state constitutional grounds, the State's authority to impose the SNRT. The tax court (1) declared the SNRT to be constitutional, and (2) denied Petitioners' request to abate the accrued interest, reasoning that the court lacked the authority to do so. The circuit court affirmed as to the constitutionality of the tax but determined that the tax court could abate the interest assessment. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the SNRT does not violate the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Privileged and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) the SNRT does not violate Maryland's equal protection doctrine; and (3) the tax court's power of review extends to the abatement of interest assessments. Remanded to consider whether Petitioners were entitled to the abatement of interest.

Appellant Norman Derr was convicted of multiple sexual offenses in circuit court. On appeal, Derr challenged the admission of forensic evidence introduced at trial through the testimony of an expert witness who did not take part in or observe the physical testing of the evidence or independently determine the test results. At issue on appeal was whether the admission of the evidence and the testimony of the expert witness violated Derr's constitutional right to confrontation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a testimonial statement may not be introduced into evidence without the in-court testimony of the declarant, unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness; and (2) the trial judge in this case erred in admitting the results of scientific testing through a surrogate analyst who did not, on the basis of the record, perform or observe the actual testing.

A jury convicted Petitioner Robert Thomas of carrying a handgun. Petitioner appealed, contending that the trial court erred in not allowing him to impeach a State's witness's testimony with evidence of either the witness's prior conviction or the conduct underlying that conviction. The court of special appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing either form of impeachment evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding the trial court (1) did not err or abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Petitioner to make impeachment use of the witness's prior conviction, but (2) committed reversible error in denying Petitioner's request to make impeachment use of the conduct underlying the prior conviction. Remanded for a new trial.

In 1974, Appellant Douglas Arey was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. In 2002, Arey filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing of evidence related to his conviction. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that the evidence related to Arey's conviction no longer existed. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Arey's petition, holding (1) the circuit court's ruling that the State had performed a reasonable search for biological evidence relating to Arey's conviction was premature; and (2) the circuit court erred in ruling on Arey's petition for testing only two days after the State submitted an affidavit from a key witness because the court's ruling did not give Arey a reasonable opportunity to respond to the factual allegations contained in that affidavit prior to dismissal. Remanded.

Petitioner Enrique Silva was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder. At trial, the State called three witnesses who were present at the crime scene, one of whom was an admitted accomplice to the murders. The other two witnesses denied involvement in the crime. The trial court denied Petitioners' request to instruct the jury that the two witnesses denying involvement were accomplices as a matter of law and, consequently, their testimony linking Petitioner to the murders required corroboration in order to be credited. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court correctly denied Petitioners' requested jury instruction. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the requested instruction.

A jury convicted Petitioners Cyrus Beads and Joseph Smith of several crimes against the person of three victims as well as several related offenses, including use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The court of special appeals consolidated Petitioners' appeals and affirmed their convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erroneously overruled objections to unfairly prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor, (2) the trial court erroneously concluded that the cross-examination of Smith's trial counsel "opened" the door to testimony that Smith had previously been incarcerated, and (3) because the trial court failed to take any corrective actions in response to the improper arguments and inadmissible evidence, these erroneous rulings were not harmless. Remanded for a new trial.

A jury convicted Petitioner Anthony Miller of two counts of second degree murder. The court of special appeals affirmed. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The question Petitioner presented was whether the lower courts erred by ruling admissible a handwriting expert's testimony that Petitioner might have written the victim's signature on an important questioned document and that fact prevented Petitioner's elimination as a suspect in the case. The Court of Appeals granted the writ and affirmed, holding that the lower courts did not err in their conclusions that the handwriting expert's testimony was admissible as (1) because an expert opinion regarding handwriting need not be based on absolute certainty in order to be admissible, Petitioner was not unfairly prejudiced by the testimony even though the expert was unable to express the definite opinion that petitioner had forged the victim' signature on the document; and (2) Petitioner was not unfairly prejudiced by what occurred during the expert's redirect examination as the questions the expert was asked on cross-examination "opened the door" to the opinion that was elicited on redirect examination.