Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Respondent recorded a deed he had altered. At a bench trial, Respondent was convicted of counterfeiting pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 8-601. The court of special appeals reversed based on its conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to show an intent to defraud another. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated Respondent's conviction, holding (1) the trial's finding that Respondent had committed a fraud on the system of recordation satisfied the specific intent element of section 8-601 that a defendant have acted with the "intent to defraud another" because the fact that Respondent acted with the intent to defraud the system of deed recordation inherently reflected the intent to defraud anyone who would later seek to rely on the accuracy of the deed; and (2) Respondent did not act in good faith.

Following his arrest at age sixteen, Petitioner was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other crimes even though the indictment returned by the Grand Jury did not charge assault with intent to murder. Petitioner did not raise this issue at trial, at sentencing, or on direct appeal. Not until sixteen years after his conviction did Petitioner file a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that the trial court lacked the power to convict and sentence him for assault with intent to murder because that charge was not contained in the indictment. The circuit court denied the petition, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the court of special appeals and vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence for assault with intent to murder, holding (1) Petitioner's sentence for assault with intent to murder was illegal because that crime was not contained in the indictment returned by the Grand Jury; and (2) Petitioner's motion to correct and illegal sentence was timely because Maryland Rule 4-345(a) allows the trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time.

This matter stemmed from an order of the circuit court granting Petitioner postconviction relief by vacating his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and leaving in place Petitioner's related convictions for felony murder and first degree rape. The court of special appeals reversed that order and reinstated Petitioner's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's writ for certiorari and the State's conditional cross-petition, holding (1) the court of appeals properly exercised jurisdiction when it decided the State's appeal; (2) Petitioner was not entitled to postconviction relief; and (3) the term-of-years Petitioner received for first degree premeditated murder, but not the sentence for first degree rape, was illegal and must be corrected on remand. Remanded.

Petitioner Jerome Pinkney was convicted of second degree assault and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4-215(e) by failing to inform him of his right to discharge counsel and proceed to trial pro se. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial judge was not required under the plain language and meaning of Rule 4-215(e) to inform Petitioner of the right to conduct his trial pro se in the absence of a statement by Petitioner reasonably indicating a desire to represent himself at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge was not required to inform Petitioner of his right to pro se representation in a situation where the trial court denied Petitioner's unmeritorious request to discharge trial counsel and petitioner made no statement that reasonably could be understood as indicating a desire to invoke the right to self-representation.

In 1976, Petitioner Merle Unger was indicted for felony murder, armed robbery, and using a handgun in the commission of the felony. During the trial, the trial judge told the jury that all of the judge's instructions as to the law were advisory. In 1996, Unger filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the judge's instructions at his 1976 trial violated his right to due process of law because they empowered jurors to ignore the law. The post-conviction trial court granted a new trial. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that because Unger did not object to the advisory instructions given in his case, he waived his right to receive postconviction relief. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the trial judge's instructions at Unger's trial, telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters were "merely advisory" were clearly in error, at least as applied to matters implicating federal constitutional rights.

After his convictions for attempted second-degree murder, attempted armed carjacking, and first-degree assault, Petitioner Chaz Bazzle appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and (2) allowing a witness to testify as to the certainty of his eyewitness identification. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence did not generate an instruction on voluntary intoxication because it was insufficient to allow a jury to rationally conclude that Petitioner was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the intent necessary to constitute his crimes; and (2) Petitioner failed to preserve his objection to the witness's testimony because the trial court, by stating that it would overrule the objection unless grounds were provided, triggered the requirement that Petitioner provide grounds or lose the opportunity to raise the objection on appeal.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner McKenzie Nicolas was convicted of resisting arrest and second degree assault stemming from a confrontation with two officers at Petitioner's home. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d); but (2) the court of special appeals erred in holding that Petitioner's convictions for second degree assault do not merge into his conviction for resisting arrest for sentencing purposes where the record is ambiguous as to whether the jury convicted Petitioner of second degree assault based on acts different than those underlying his conviction for resisting arrest. Remanded.

Petitioner Ocie Black was convicted of child sexual abuse, second degree sex abuse, and third degree sex abuse and sentenced to thirty-two years incarceration. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in failing to disclose a jury note to him and his trial counsel. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication at issue in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d), which governs communications between a jury and the trial court; and (2) therefore, the trial court's responsibilities under the rule were never triggered.

While incarcerated, Petitioner Daniel Genies masturbated in sight of a female correctional officer, while smiling and making eye contact with her, despite her orders to stop. Genies was subsequently charged with committing the common law offense of indecent exposure and violating Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. 8-803, which prohibits an inmate with intent to harass a correctional officer from indecently exposing private parts of the inmate's body in the officer's presence. A jury acquitted Genies of the statutory offense but convicted him of the common law offense. The court of special appeals affirmed. Genies appealed, arguing that the statutory, specific intent crime preempted the field, with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer, and thus the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of common law indecent exposure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in failing to dismiss the common law charge because section 8-803 was intended to serve as a discrete offense, supplementing rather than supplanting the common law, so both prevailed; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Genies's motion for a new trial without a hearing.

Petitioner Muhammad Abdul-Maleek was convicted in the district court of theft. Petitioner exercised his right to appeal and was afforded a de novo trial by jury in the circuit court. The jury likewise convicted Petitioner of left, and the circuit court imposed a more severe sentence than that imposed by the district court. Petitioner appealed, asserting that the circuit court impermissibly based his sentence on the fact that he exercised his right to appeal and receive a de novo jury trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that Petitioner was entitled to resentencing because the court's comments at sentencing could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the sentence was based in part on Petitioner's exercise of his right to a de novo trial on appeal. Remanded for resentencing.