Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The case involves two sets of plaintiffs, Douglas Bienvenu et al. and John Doe et al., who filed lawsuits against two defendants for alleged sexual abuse of minors. The plaintiffs argued that the revival provisions of Section 2 of 2021 La. Acts 322 and Section 2 of 2022 La. Acts 386, which were designed to revive previously prescribed claims related to sexual abuse of minors, were constitutional and should apply retroactively. The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the retroactive application of the amended statute would unconstitutionally deprive them of a vested property right to claim the accrued defense of liberative prescription.The case was initially heard in the 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, overruling the exception of prescription and finding that Act 322, as interpreted by Act 386, was constitutional and applied retroactively to revive all causes of action related to sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted a rehearing to address the plaintiffs' contention that the original opinion erred in its due process analysis. The court vacated its original opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the legislature's intent to apply the amended provisions of La. R.S. 9:2800.9 retroactively by reviving previously prescribed claims was clearly and explicitly stated in Act 386. The court also held that when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of liberative prescription, that right becomes a vested property right protected by the constitution’s due process guarantees. However, the court found that the revival provision in Act 386 was rationally related to a legitimate government interest and therefore did not violate the due process clause. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Bienvenu v. Defendant 1" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on whether the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupts prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit. This query arose from the case of Randall Kling who initially filed suit in state court alleging his dismissal from the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control was in retaliation for submitting written complaints about workplace and ethics violations. He later filed a complaint in federal district court citing substantially similar facts and seeking relief for violations of his federal First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The Supreme Court of Louisiana answered the certified question by stating that prescription or the period within which a lawsuit may be filed is interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully inform the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant. The Court explained that the essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved. The court emphasized that notice is sufficient when it fully informs the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and what is demanded of the defendant. Thus, the court took a balanced approach between a broad interpretation of interruption and a narrow one, placing emphasis on notice to the defendant, addressed on a case-by-case basis. View "KLING VS. HEBERT" on Justia Law

Darrell J. Robinson was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Robinson appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, arguing that the state suppressed material evidence that violated his due process rights. The evidence in question included undisclosed deals with jailhouse informant Leroy Goodspeed, serology reports and notes, other forensic evidence, and eyewitness accounts inconsistent with trial testimony.The court found that the state did suppress evidence and this evidence was favorable to the defense. The court further found that the undisclosed evidence was material and its suppression undermined confidence in the verdict. Consequently, the court decided that Robinson did not receive a fair trial, resulting in a verdict unworthy of confidence. The court reversed Robinson's conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "STATE EX REL. ROBINSON VS. VANNOY" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. Mckesson, 2 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The plaintiff in this personal injury case named as defendants the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) organization1 and DeRay Mckesson (alleged to be a leader and co- founder of BLM). The plaintiff alleges that he was a duly commissioned police officer for the City of Baton Rouge on July 9, 2016, when he was ordered to respond to a protest “staged and organized by” BLM and DeRay Mckesson, which was in response to the July 5, 2016 death of Alton Sterling, who was shot by a Baton Rouge police officer when Sterling resisted arrest. The issues raised by the Fifth Circuit were: (1) whether Louisiana law recognized a duty, under the facts alleged in the complaint, or otherwise, not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party; (2) assuming Mckesson could otherwise be held liable for a breach of duty owed to Officer Doe, whether Louisiana’s Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine barred recovery under the facts alleged in the complaint. The Court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in the negative. View "Doe v. McKesson et al." on Justia Law

On May 4, 2015, the Eunice Police Department arrested Marlon Eaglin, Paul Powell, and two others and charged them with second degree murder. Eaglin and Powell remained imprisoned until their release on August 21, 2015. On April 29, 2016, Eaglin filed this lawsuit against the Eunice Police Department, the City of Eunice, and Chief Randy Fontenot (collectively, “defendants”), alleging false arrest and false imprisonment. More than one year following the arrest, Eaglin amended his petition to add Powell as a party plaintiff. In response to the amended petition, defendants filed an exception of prescription, alleging Powell’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment were prescribed. Defendants argued Powell’s claims prescribed on May 4, 2016, one year after the date of his May 4, 2015 arrest. Powell opposed the exception, arguing the amended petition adding his claim related back to Eaglin’s timely-filed petition. In addition, Powell argued his claim for false imprisonment did not commence until the date he was released from prison (August 21, 2015), thereby making his May 9, 2016 claim timely. After a hearing, the district court granted defendants’ exception of prescription and dismissed Powell’s claims with prejudice. The district court initially rejected. Powell’s relation back argument, finding there was no legal or family relationship which would allow the amended petition adding Powell’s claim to relate back to Eaglin’s original claim. The court further reasoned that prescription on Powell’s false imprisonment claim commenced to run on the date of his arrest, rather than his release from custody. After its review, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the action was prescribed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Eaglin v. Eunice Police Dept." on Justia Law

In a suit for alleged age discrimination brought by plaintiff, James Robinson against his employer, the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System (ULL), the Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of the district court’s judgment on a jury verdict finding that ULL discriminated against Robinson based on his age and awarded him damages. After reviewing the record of these proceedings, as to liability, the Supreme Court found no legal or manifest error in the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff; thus, the Court affirmed the jury’s finding of age discrimination in favor of Robinson. However, as to damages, the Court found that the amount of the jury’s damage award of $367,918.00 was not supported by the record. Therefore, the Court amended the judgment in part and affirmed the jury’s damage award as amended herein. View "Robinson v. Bd. of Supervisors University of Louisiana System" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs prevailed in their action under the Americans with Disabilities Act and sought attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The district court rendered a fee award, but reduced the requested number of billable hours by 20%, set an hourly rate, and declined to enhance the overall award. The plaintiffs and the defendants both appealed. The court of appeal amended the award for purposes of the lodestar calculation to increase the number of billable hours to the amount requested and the prevailing hourly rate to $265. The court of appeal further enhanced the fee award, finding the case to be "rare" and "exceptional" based upon the results achieved and the protracted and highly-contested litigation. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s fee award. The Court therefore reversed the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Covington v. McNeese State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Class Representatives sought summary judgment in favor of numerous others similarly situated arising out of the failure of Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens) to timely initiate loss adjustment on the enumerated members' insurance claims. The District Court granted summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor and awarded penalties for each compensable claim, totaling $92,865,000. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding a factual determination of whether the insurer breached its duty of good faith was required before assessing penalties. This litigation presented two issues of first impression for the Supreme Court: (1) whether an insurer is subject to the penalties imposed by former La. Rev. Stat. 22:658(A)(3) for its untimely initiation of loss adjustment in the absence of a showing of bad faith; and (2) whether the provisions of former La. Rev. Stat. 22:1220(C) capped those penalties at five thousand dollars when damages were not proven. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the plain language of La. Rev. Stat. 22:2658(A)(3) does not require a showing of bad faith by the insurer, but simply requires proof of notice and inaction for over thirty days. Furthermore, the Court found that the provisions of La. Rev. Stat. 22:1220(C) capped the penalties for such inaction at five thousand dollars when damages are not proven. Finding no error in the district court's award of the statutory cap for each failure to timely initiate, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and reinstated the district court's judgment.