Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit held that the magistrate judge's dual role—generator and administrator of court fees—creates a conflict of interest when the judge sets an arrestee's bail, and therefore violates due process. Like the mayor in Ward v. Monroeville, the court held that because a magistrate judge must manage his chambers to perform the judicial tasks the voters elected him to do, he has a direct and personal interest in the fiscal health of the public institution that benefits from the fees his court generates and that he also helps allocate. Furthermore, the bond fees impact the bottom line of the court to a similar degree that the fines did in Ward. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that the magistrate judge's institutional incentives create a substantial and unconstitutional conflict of interest when he determines the class's ability to pay bail and sets the amount of that bail. View "Caliste v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

Taeb’s attorney, Trigger, failed to appear for trial in Taeb’s dissolution case. The court entered a Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 sanctions order. The court of appeal reversed as to Taeb and affirmed as to Trigger, abrogating a 2016 holding that an objective standard applied when determining whether a party’s or an attorney’s conduct is sanctionable under section 128.5, as it did under section 128.7 and that section 128.5 did not incorporate the safe harbor provisions of section 128.7. Section 128.5 has since been amended to specifically overrule the decision on those points. The law concerning the kind of conduct sanctionable under sections 128.5 and 128.7 has largely returned to its previous state; a more stringent standard requiring subjective bad faith applies to section 128.5, and a lesser standard, requiring only objective bad faith, applies to section 128.7. The conduct for which Trigger was sanctioned can support the requisite finding of bad faith. Taab, however, did appear on the scheduled trial date and only relayed what Trigger told him. There is no evidence Taab was even aware Trigger had misrepresented her readiness for trial or that she made no effort to correct what she had told the court. View "In re: Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs in an action against Judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Judges' practices in collecting criminal fines and fees violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The court agreed and held that the district court did not err in applying the principles from Tumey v. State of Ohio, which held that officers acting in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided, and Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, which presented a situation in which an official perforce occupies two inconsistent positions and necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him. In this case, the Judges have exclusive authority over how the Judicial Expense Fund is spent, they must account for the OPCDC budget to the New Orleans City Council and New Orleans Mayor, and the fines and fees make up a significant portion of their annual budget. View "Cain v. White" on Justia Law

The parties dispute the district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff in an action successfully claiming a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The Second Circuit affirmed and held that plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees as a prevailing party; plaintiff may not obtain fees for the administrative proceedings for failure to identify "the discrete portion of the work product from the administrative proceedings" for which fees might have been awarded, North Carolina Dep't of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986); and the 50 percent reduction was appropriate. View "Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. v. Litchfield Historic District Commission" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of TJN's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendants, in an action arising from the Craighead County District Judges Boling and Fowler's implementation of an Amnesty Program forgiving all fees that probationers owed to TJN for probation services. The court held that Judges Boling and Fowler were entitled to absolute judicial immunity against all of TJN's claims, because Arkansas judges have authority to suspend the imposition of fines in criminal cases and may modify terms and conditions of supervision. Furthermore, TJN's request for declaratory relief was retrospective and thus it was not entitled to such relief under section 1983. The court also rejected the municipal liability claims and held that the judges are state government officials whose actions are not attributable to the county or city defendants. View "Justice Network Inc. v. Craighead County" on Justia Law

A 2004 Ohio statute regulated the "off-label" prescription of mifepristone (RU-486), which is commonly used in conjunction with misoprostol, to induce first-trimester abortions without surgery. Planned Parenthood challenged the statute under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction “insofar as it prohibits unconstitutional applications of the [statute].” In 2006, the district court entered a permanent injunction. After the Ohio Supreme Court answered certified questions, the Sixth Circuit remanded for a determination regarding the injunction’s scope. In 2011, the district court clarified that the statute was enjoined only as it applied to instances where the health of the patient was at risk and denied broader relief, leaving one remaining claim. In 2016, the FDA amended its approval and label for mifepristone, authorizing the off-label uses at issue. The statute remains in force, requiring physicians to prescribe medication abortion according to the FDA’s updated approval. Planned Parenthood sought $10,365.35 to cover costs for litigation on the merits and attorneys’ fees at 2016 rates to offset lost interest. Using this rate, the requested fees for the preliminary injunction litigation totaled $372,164.63. The district court granted that request, finding the requested hours and rates reasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Planned Parenthood does not properly qualify as a “prevailing party” because its relief was narrow and preliminary; that the court erred in refusing to apply a blanket fee reduction based on the degree of success; and that the court erred in applying 2016 rates rather than 2006 rates The court properly engaged in a contextual, case-specific review, considered the aims of section 1988, and adequately explained its rationale. View "Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Alden and his ex-wife shared custody of their children. Alden’s ex-wife complained that Alden was trying to turn the children against her. The court-appointed psychologist, Gardner, evaluated the children, concluded that Alden was using “severe alienation tactics,” and recommended that the court limit Alden to supervised visitation and give full custody of the children to their mother. The court terminated Alden’s custody and ordered all of Alden’s visitation to be supervised. The Appellate Court affirmed. After three unsuccessful attempts to change the decision in state court, Alden filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Gardner, challenging the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act as permitting state courts to take parents’ constitutionally-protected speech into consideration when deciding the best interests of the child and treating parents differently based on whether they are divorced. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Alden could challenge the Act in his state custody proceedings. The court stated: “This is abusive litigation. Alden, a lawyer representing himself, seems determined to continue the child-custody litigation in another forum even if that means exposing an innocent person such as Gardner to travail and expense. He concedes—indeed, he trumpets—that he has sued someone who he knows is not responsible for enforcing the state’s child-custody laws” and referred the matter to Illinois authorities for determination of whether Alden’s misuse of the legal process calls into question his fitness to practice law. View "E.A. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Ohio Revised Code 4123.88 addresses how workers' compensation claimant information is handled and protected by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and contains the solicitation ban at issue: “No person shall directly or indirectly solicit authority” (1) to “represent the claimant or employer in respect of” a worker’s compensation “claim or appeal,” or (2) “to take charge of” any such claim or appeal. The district court rejected Bevan's challenge on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the state has prohibited all solicitation, whether oral or written, by any person to represent a party with respect to an Ohio workers’ compensation claim or appeal and that such a prophylactic ban violates the First Amendment under the Supreme Court’s 1988 "Shapero" decision. The court rejected an argument that the constitutionally questionable language is part of a larger statutory scheme that Bevan allegedly violated by obtaining claimant information from the Bureau in an unlawful manner. Whether Bevan violated other statutory provisions governing disclosure of claimant information is not relevant to whether the solicitation ban itself is constitutional. The solicitation ban makes no distinction as to how the person doing the soliciting learned of the claimant’s information: it bans all solicitation regardless of where or how that information was obtained. The prohibition is repugnant to the First Amendment's free speech clause. View "Bevan & Associates, LPA v. Yost" on Justia Law

Westech sued 3M in the Western District of Washington, alleging infringement. 3M moved to dismiss the original and amended complaints. While 3M’s motion was pending, the Supreme Court decided, in TC Heartland, that under the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 1400(b), a corporation “resides” only in its state of incorporation. 3M amended its motion to argue improper venue. Westech sought to amend its complaint and argued that the presence of sales representatives and 3M’s sales in Washington supported venue and that 3M had a “principal place of business” and other business locations at various Washington addresses. At the time of the original complaint, 3M did not own, lease, use, or maintain property at any of the specified locations, and, at the time of the motion did not occupy any of the locations. The district court denied 3M’s motion without prejudice and allowed Westech amend its complaint. In the interim, the Federal Circuit held that section 1400(b) requires a defendant to have a physical place in the district that serves as a regular and established place of business. The district court then dismissed the case. On appeal, 3M sought attorneys’ fees and double costs, arguing that Westech’s appeal was frivolous. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal but denied the motion for fees and costs. Westech’s behavior on appeal bordered on sanctionable, but Westech pursued the appeal when the question of who shoulders the burden of establishing proper venue was unanswered. View "Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the disciplining of Defendant's attorney for professional misconduct that included his handling of Defendant's defense did not prove that counsel had provided ineffective assistance.Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of armed robbery as a party to a crime. Before sentencing, Defendant asked to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided a disciplinary case brought against Defendant's counsel and disciplined the attorney for professional misconduct. On appeal, Defendant argued that his attorney's discipline for his misconduct in handling Defendant's defense is proof to establish the deficiency of his counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the record did not demonstrate that the professional misconduct of Defendant's attorney prevented Defendant from receiving effective assistance of counsel, and therefore, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Defendant's motion. View "State v. Cooper" on Justia Law