Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the District, alleging a violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.1400 et seq. After plaintiff prevailed, the district court awarded her $62,225 in attorneys' fees and costs for approximately one hundred hours of work. On appeal, the District argued that the district court abused its discretion when it adopted plaintiff's proposed fee matrix. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in relieving plaintiff of her burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the rates. In this case, plaintiff's proposed fee matrix set the prevailing market rate for her lawyer’s services well beyond the next highest hourly rate used by district courts in IDEA litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated the fee award and remanded. View "Eley v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, requires each federal district court to establish a plan to furnish representation to indigent persons charged with federal crimes. In seven different Post-Conviction Review Act cases in various Pennsylvania counties, hearings were initiated to disqualify the Federal Community Defender (FCD) as counsel, based on that organization’s alleged misuse of federal grant funds to appear in state proceedings. FCD acknowledges that it sometimes appears in PCRA proceedings without a federal court order directing it to do so, but claims that it uses federal grant funds only for preparatory work that will be relevant to a federal habeas petition and only if it has received a federal court order appointing it as counsel for federal habeas proceedings or is working to obtain such an appointment. FCD removed the motions under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), (d)(1). The Commonwealth moved, under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), to return each to state court, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FCD argued that the Commonwealth lacked a federal private right of action and that federal law preempted the motions. The district courts split. The Third Circuit held that FCD properly invoked removal jurisdiction and that the Commonwealth’s attempts to disqualify it as counsel proceedings are preempted. View "In Re: Commonwealth's Motion" on Justia Law

The City of Milwaukee is defending several lawsuits brought by scores of plaintiffs alleging that its police officers conducted unconstitutional stops and searches, including strip‐searches and body‐cavity searches. Judge Stadtmueller was assigned to preside over several cases. Milwaukee, asserting that some of the judge’s comments in opinions and conferences in the related cases raise questions about his impartiality, moved for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a). The judge declined. Milwaukee sought a writ of mandamus. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion. The five challenged statements were made during the course of litigation; “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep‐seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Judge Stadtmueller is presiding over several of these cases. It is not surprising that he might draw conclusions about the nature of the issue or problem. He is expected to look for and consider common threads and possible systemic problems to manage the cases effectively and decide them fairly. Even considering all the challenged statements together, nothing reasonably suggests deep-seated antagonism. View "City of Milwaukee v. Stadtmueller" on Justia Law

Convent filed suit in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, seeking to appeal a resolution that the North Little Rock City Council passed declaring Convent's property a nuisance and condemning the property. In the same complaint, Convent asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code 16-123-101, and a common law claim of trespass. The defendants removed the case to federal district court based on the federal claims and then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court did not grant the motion, but found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Convent's claims based on Convent's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies; the court remanded the case to state court. Convent sought costs, fees, and expenses incurred due to “improper removal." The district court rejected the motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal of this action to federal court. View "Convent Corp. v. City of North Little Rock" on Justia Law

Defendant and others were charged with conspiring to distribute and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a). He originally was appointed counsel, but later retained new counsel. Unsatisfied, defendant retained a third attorney, Rozan. Represented by Rozan, defendant pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate levels. Defendant argued that Rozan did not disclose that in 2004 and 2005, Rozan was privately reprimanded by the State Bar of Texas; in 2007, he was publicly reprimanded; and in 2009, while representing defendant on appeal, he was suspended from practice in Texas for five years, effective January 1, 2010. The Texas Supreme Court ordered Rozan to provide written notice of his suspension to every client and to every court officer in every court in which Rozan practiced. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. It was defendant’s responsibility to investigate the disciplinary past of his attorney; the required notification occurred after defendant’s sentencing, and defendant did not show how he was prejudiced by Rozan’s silence. View "Ghost Bear v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, Christeson was convicted of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Christeson’s conviction and sentence and denial of his post-conviction motion for relief. Under the one-year limitations period imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U. S. C. 244(d)(1), Christeson’s federal habeas petition was due on April 10, 2005. Nine months before that deadline, the court appointed attorneys Horwitz and Butts to represent Christeson, 18 U. S. C. 599(a)(2). The attorneys subsequently acknowledged that they failed to meet with Christeson until six weeks after his petition was due. There is no evidence that they communicated with him at all. They finally filed the petition 117 days late. The district court dismissed; the Eighth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Christeson, who has severe cognitive disabilities, relied entirely on his attorneys, and may not have known of the dismissal. About seven years later, the attorneys contacted attorneys Merrigan and Perkovich to discuss Christeson’s case. Christeson’s only hope for merits review was to move under FRCP60(b) to reopen final judgment on the ground that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled. Horwitz and Butts would not file that motion, premised on their own malfeasance. In 2014, Merrigan and Perkovich unsuccessfully moved to substitute counsel. The Eighth Circuit dismissed, reasoning that they were not authorized to file on Christeson’s behalf. The Missouri Supreme Court set an October 29, 2014 execution date. The district court denied a second motion as untimely, stating that Horwitz and Butts had not “abandoned” Christeson, and reasoning that allowing the motion would permit “‘abusive’” delays in capital cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court stayed execution and reversed, stating that the denials contravened its 2012 decision, Martel v. Clair, concerning the “interests of justice” standard, and noting the obvious conflict of interest with respect to the original attorneys. View "Christeson v. Roper" on Justia Law

Flora worked as Luzerne County Public Defender from 1980- 2013. He became Chief Public Defender in 2010, maintaining a private practice. His predecessor had tried to secure additional funding by submitting weekly reports concerning excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies. Flora obtained grant funding for representing juveniles, but was not able to obtain additional money for adult offenders. Flora reported that the existing level of resources did not allow the Office to provide constitutionally adequate representation. The County was unresponsive, so Flora refused representation to those not faced with incarceration. In 2012 Flora initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants and sought an injunction to prevent his firing. The state court ordered the County to provide adequate funding and prohibited refusing representation to indigent defendants. While the parties were in mediation, the County approved new positions. The funding litigation followed the “Kids for Cash” scandal. From 2003-2008, about 50% of Luzerne County juvenile offenders appeared in court without counsel. Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent. Federal investigators uncovered that judges had accepted kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention facilities to send unrepresented juveniles to those facilities. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency adjudications. Flora alleges that, in 2013, he learned that 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged and reported the matter. Flora was relieved of his duties. Flora sued, alleging retaliation for his funding lawsuit and for reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that, under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Lane v. Franks, Flora pled facts sufficient to allege that he spoke as a citizen. View "Flora v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against justices of the Arizona Supreme Court challenging the Arizona Supreme Court Rule 34(f) (the AOM Rule). The AOM Rule permits admission on motion to the Arizona Bar for attorneys who are admitted to practice law in states that permit Arizona attorneys to be admitted to the bars of those states on a basis equivalent to Arizona’s AOM Rule, but requires attorneys admitted to practice law in states that do not have such reciprocal admission rules to take the uniform bar exam (UBE) in order to gain admission to the Arizona Bar. The court concluded that although plaintiffs can establish Article III standing based on injuries suffered by Plaintiff Girvin, plaintiffs failed to establish that the AOM Rule is unconstitutional on First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, or Privileges and Immunities Clause grounds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the justices.View "NAAMJP V. Berch" on Justia Law

Holt threw eggs on the Katheiser driveway to frighten Kartheiser and his 6 year old daughter. Represented by counsel, she entered a negotiated guilty plea to resisting a peace officer. The other charge was nol-prossed. She was sentenced to 12 months of probation and was ordered to provide documentation of treatment. The court admonished Holt that the agreement involved a “conviction.” Days later, she filed a pro se motion to vacate, stating that she “was told there would be no conviction” and “never had the chance to testify.” Her counsel was allowed to withdraw. The circuit court granted the motion to withdraw the plea and appointed the public defender. The next day, Holt filed a pro se “Petition to Quash … the police report,” claiming tampering with the record, police brutality, and that her children were missing. After several more incidents, Holt was placed in a mental health center. She filed notice of appeal and a “Demand Letter for Formal Correction,” seeking to “hold Tim Brown accountable for ‘Bearing FALSE Witness’ the 8th Great Commandment and for Defamation.” The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Holt had been found fit to stand trial during the pendency of the appeal so that whether she received effective assistance of counsel during proceedings below was moot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that public interest exception applies to warrant review. Where the evidence clearly indicates that defendant is unfit to stand trial, but a defendant contends that he is fit, counsel is not obligated to argue for a finding of fitness. In doing so, counsel would be violating his duty to the client and suborning a violation of due process.View "People v. Holt" on Justia Law

Attorney Andrew Dwyer and his law firm (collectively, Dwyer) launched a website that published excerpts from judicial opinions by New Jersey judges about Dwyer’s lauded abilities as a lawyer. One of the judges requested that his quoted comments be removed from the website, but Dwyer refused on the ground that the quotation was not false or misleading. As a result of the dispute, the New Jersey Bar’s Committee on Attorney Advertising (Committee) proposed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually adopted, an attorney-conduct guideline that banned advertising with quotes from judges or judicial opinions. The final version of the guideline, however, allowed attorneys to advertise with the full text of judicial opinions. The day before the guideline went into effect Dwyer filed this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the guideline was an unconstitutional restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment for the Committee, concluding that the guideline was not a ban on speech but instead was a disclosure requirement. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the guideline, as applied to Dwyer’s accurate quotes from judicial opinions, violated his First Amendment right to advertise his commercial business. Remanded. View "Dwyer v. Cappell" on Justia Law