Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Bianchi was elected as McHenry County, Illinois State’s Attorney and embarked on reforms. In 2006, a secretary resigned and took sensitive documents with her. Working with an Assistant State’s Attorney, whom Bianchi had demoted, the secretary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s opponent in the next election. Bianchi learned of the theft and persuaded a judge to appoint a special prosecutor. The secretary was charged with several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer tampering. Bianchi’s opponent and other political enemies obtained the appointment of another special prosecutor, to investigate Bianchi. A grand jury was convened. Bianchi and three colleagues were indicted on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted. Bianchi and his colleagues sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the court-appointed special prosecutor (Tonigan), the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor (McQueen) and Quest, a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and its investigators. They claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment and political retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Tonigan settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal as to McQueen and the investigators, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity foreclose the federal constitutional claims. View "Bianchi v. McQueen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the Westboro Baptist Church, filed suit in 2006 against Missouri state and state officials after the Missouri General Assembly enacted statewide restrictions on pickets and protests near funerals and funeral processions. In 2014, Missouri appealed the statute at issue while plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion remained pending in district court. In this appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse judgments on her due process claim as well as the court's award of attorneys' fees. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the due process claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss her claim as moot. In regard to the attorneys' fees, the court concluded that the district court's 2/14th calculation was an abuse of discretion because its arithmetically simplistic fee calculation did not accurately reflect her degree of success of her interrelated claims. Moreover, even if the court accepted the district court's basic mathematical approach, its 2/14th calculation is inaccurate because it did not address whether it counted consent judgments, mooted claims, and dismissed claims as prevailing, neutral, or unsuccessful claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's award of attorneys' fees. View "Phelps-Roper v. Koster" on Justia Law

In 2007 Pickett, a nursing home housekeeper, filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that residents sexually harassed her and that Sheridan fired her for complaining. Sheridan won summary judgment on the harassment claim, but Pickett was awarded $65,000 on the retaliation claim, which was affirmed. Pickett sought attorney’s fees for work done by her attorney, Rossiello, his associates, and paralegals, but did not request prejudgment interest. The court determined that Rossiello’s market rate was $400 per hour and that 175 hours of 225 hours submitted were proper, excluding hours it found duplicative and hours accumulated while Rossiello was suspended from practice. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit found that the court improperly calculated the rate and erred in declining to award fees to outside counsel. On remand, Pickett sought fees for the life of the case and requested prejudgment interest. Considering his disciplinary history, experience, and prior fee awards, the court ordered payment for the hours approved before Pickett II at $425 per hour, rather than the $540-620 requested; approved the time requested for work on Pickett II, less the time spent on administrative tasks; awarded prejudgment interest as to the Pickett II fees; and determined that the claim to fees for the work done on remand had been waived.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "DPickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr." on Justia Law

Under federal law, a court has discretion to “allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee” in a civil rights lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Supreme Court has interpreted section 1988 to permit a prevailing defendant to recover fees only if “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that it was not bound by that interpretation and awarded attorney’s fees under section 1988 to a prevailing defendant without first determining that “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” The fee award rested solely on that court's interpretation of federal law; the court explicitly refused to award fees under state law. The Supreme Court reversed. Section 1988 is a federal statute; once the Supreme Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law. If state courts were permitted to disregard the Court’s rulings on federal law, “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states." View "James v. Boise" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was awarded nominal damages on three of his four as-applied claims in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit to invalidate aspects of Laguna Beach's ordinances prohibiting the use of sound-amplification devices on public sidewalks. Plaintiff then moved for attorneys' fees. The district court concluded that plaintiff was a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but denied attorneys' fees pursuant to Farrar v. Hobby. Farrar held that a prevailing party who seeks a large compensatory award but receives only nominal damages may not be entitled to fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying fees under California law. However, under federal law, the court held that because plaintiff's lawsuit achieved its future-oriented goals and plaintiff never attempted to secure compensatory damages under section 1983, the Farrar exception does not apply. Consequently, the district court erred by not considering plaintiff's entitlement to fees under the standard framework. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Klein v. City of Laguna Beach" on Justia Law

Six years after a San Jose police officer testified falsely against plaintiff during a preliminary hearing, the city agreed to pay plaintiff $150,000 and not to oppose any motion plaintiff might bring for a declaration of factual innocence of the criminal charges brought against him. The parties agreed that plaintiff’s counsel could seek an award of costs incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988. Plaintiff sought $1,448,397 in attorney fees and $75,255 in costs, based on “2,419.9 compensable attorney hours … utilizing reasonable hourly billing rates roughly 20% below established market rates[,] i.e[.,] ranging from $425 to $650 per hour,” plus $102,998.75, added for “fees-on-fees work.” Plaintiff also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount “to account for the significant risk counsel has taken in litigating this hotly[ ]contested matter on a wholly contingent basis, with little prospect of settlement until the eve of trial.” The court awarded compensation of $436,807.50, declined to apply the 1.5 multiplier, and awarded costs of $23,935.07. The court of appeals remanded, finding the lower court’s reasoning inadequate. View "Kerkeles v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking attorneys' fees after she proved in an administrative hearing that a school district had violated her child’s right to a free appropriate public education by repeatedly placing him in isolation during school hours. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying section 1415(i)(2)(B)’s limitations period to this action for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA by a party that prevailed at the administrative level. Because the statute contains no limitations period for such actions, the district court should have borrowed one from state law. The court held that the limitations period for such an action does not begin to run until the time for seeking judicial review of the underlying administrative decision passes, and that plaintiff’s action was timely under any limitations period that could be borrowed. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Over 25 years ago, a representative of a class of homeless persons, filed a lawsuit against the City of Miami under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement. In this appeal, plaintiff, on behalf of a class, seeks attorney fees for opposing modifications proposed by the City of Miami to such an agreement. The court affirmed the district court's denial of fees given that modification proceedings do not trigger an award of attorneys’ fees under the agreement. In this case, the parties’ agreement limited future attorneys’ fees to enforcement proceedings. View "Peery v. City of Miami" on Justia Law