Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Robertson brought claims against DHS and two DHS employees, Mattke and Evan, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging retaliation for complaining of discrimination in the workplace. The district court dismissed the claims against Evans and Mattke because Title VII authorizes suit only against an employer as an entity, not against individuals, then granted summary judgment, holding that Robertson’s retaliation claim against DHS for failing to promote her to a director position failed because she could not prove a “but-for” causal link between her protected activity (reporting discrimination) and DHS’s decision not to promote her. With respect to her second retaliation claim, alleging that DHS continued the retaliation against her through Evans, the court held that Robertson failed to establish that she suffered an adverse action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. With respect to her failure-to-promote claim, DHS provided a nonretaliatory reason for choosing another candidate. Robertson failed to submit evidence that DHS’s reason was pretextual. Robertson failed to “identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions” in DHS’s stated reason for hiring Evans over her “that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence.” With respect to her claim that DHS continued the retaliation through Evans, Robertson has failed to show that she suffered a materially adverse action. View "Robertson v. Wisconsin Department of Health Services" on Justia Law

Philadelphia enacted an ordinance to address the disparity in the pay of women and minorities: the “Inquiry Provision” prohibits an employer from asking about a prospective employee’s wage history and the “Reliance Provision” prohibits an employer from relying on wage history in setting or negotiating a prospective employee’s wage. The Chamber of Commerce filed suit, alleging that both provisions infringed on the freedom of speech of the Chamber and its members. The Chamber concedes that the pay gap exists and that the city has a substantial governmental interest in addressing it but argues that the city passed the Ordinance “with only the barest of legislative records” and did not present sufficient evidence to establish that the Ordinance would satisfy the city’s objective.. The district court agreed that the Inquiry Provision violated the First Amendment speech rights of employers and invalidated it but concluded that the Reliance Provision did not impact speech.The Third Circuit reversed in part. The district court’s analysis applied a much higher standard than required. The Supreme Court has not demanded legislative certainty or empirical proof that legislation would achieve the stated interest even when applying strict scrutiny. Courts need only determine whether the legislature “has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” The Supreme Court has even “permitted litigants to justify [analogous] speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’” View "Greater Philadelphia Chamber Commerce v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's summary judgment award in favor of his former employer in an action alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), impairment and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At issue on appeal was plaintiff's ADA claim.The Second Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 did not alter or erode its well‐settled understanding that the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. In this case, because plaintiff did not attempt to show that his work-induced impairment substantially limited his ability to work in a class or broad range of jobs, the court held that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff has a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. View "Woolf v. Strada" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's claims of sex discrimination and retaliation on summary judgment and declining Plaintiff's request to alter or amend that ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.This complaint stemmed from Plaintiff's unsuccessful pursuit of tenure within Harvard University's Anthropology Department. Plaintiff alleged that Harvard denied her tenure on the basis of sex discrimination and retaliation for engaging in protected conduct in violation of several state and federal antidiscrimination laws. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's claims on summary judgment and then denied Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding that Plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing Harvard's stated reason for denying tenure was merely pretext for discrimination; (2) because Plaintiff could not establish a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment decision, her retaliation claims failed; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion. View "Theidon v. Harvard University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the county, alleging that the reasons for his termination were racial discrimination and unlawful retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court must reevaluate plaintiff's comparators evidence under the new standard that the court announced in Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc), which was decided after the district court ruled this case. Therefore, the court vacated in part and remanded for reconsideration.The court affirmed the district court's judgment that, in the absence of valid comparators, plaintiff failed to establish a retaliation claim regarding (1) the actions of Lieutenant Ricelli in 2013, (2) the discipline he suffered from Captain White in 2015, and (3) Director Patterson's decision to terminate him in 2015. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that barred plaintiff from deposing the Miami-Dade County mayor regarding plaintiff's section 1983 claim. View "Johnson v. Miami Dade County" on Justia Law

Brome started with the California Highway Patrol in 1996; he transferred offices twice. Other officers subjected Brome, who was openly gay, to derogatory comments; singled him out for pranks; and refused to provide him with backup assistance. Brome filed administrative complaints, including with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The incidents continued. Brome won the Solano Area Officer of the Year Award in 2013, but the Patrol never displayed his photograph, in a break from office practice. Through 2014, Brome complained to his superiors. The problems continued and Brome feared for his life during enforcement stops, experienced headaches, muscle pain, stomach issues, anxiety, and stress, and became suicidal. Brome went on medical leave and filed a successful workers’ compensation claim. He took industrial disability retirement.The court dismissed his claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code 12900), as untimely, rejecting Brome’s claim that he was constructively discharged. The court of appeal reversed. The filing of the workers’ compensation claim could equitably toll the one-year deadline for filing his discrimination claim; equitable tolling would not prejudice the Patrol. After years of harassment, Brome was struggling to recover; although 11 months elapsed, Brome can meet the good faith requirement. While it is not the only possible conclusion, there is enough evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the Patrol knowingly permitted the conditions and should have known that a reasonable employee would resign. View "Brome v. California Highway Patrol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white male of Chilean origin, filed suit under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that WMATA failed to promote him on the basis of age and national origin and later retaliated against him for complaining of such discrimination by continuing to deny him promotions.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that WMATA was entitled to sovereign immunity from the ADEA claims; affirmed the grant of summary judgment on all Title VII claims not exhausted via the 2014 Charge of Discrimination; and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the Title VII claims arising out of the 2014 EEOC charge. The court held that plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that WMATA's nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory rationale for denying plaintiff a promotion in Fall 2013 was pretext for discrimination or retaliation. View "Oviedo v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Duquesne petitioned for review of the Board's decision and order requiring the school to bargain with a union representing the school's adjunct facility. Duquesne argued that its religious mission places it beyond the Board's jurisdiction.The DC Circuit granted the petition for review, agreeing with the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals which have held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)—read in light of the Religion Clauses—does not allow the Board to exercise jurisdiction over religious schools and their teachers in a series of cases over the past several decades. The court held that Pacific Lutheran University, 361 N.L.R.B. 1404 (2014), runs afoul of the court's decisions in University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and Carroll Coll. v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2009), which continue to govern the reach of the Board's jurisdiction under the NLRA in cases involving religious schools and their faculty members or teachers. Therefore, the court held that the Board has no jurisdiction in this case and the court need not address the remaining arguments. View "Duquesne University of the Holy Spirit v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff's Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, and relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over his claims under Puerto Rico law, holding that a reasonable jury could not find pretext discrimination and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise continued supplemental jurisdiction.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was fired on account of his age. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to put forth evidence that he was complying with the legitimate job performance expectations for his position and therefore failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) assuming that Plaintiff established a prima facie case, Plaintiff failed to show that his poor performance reviews were pretextual; and (2) while retention was an option, the district court did not exceed the boundary of its discretion in declining to exercise continued supplemental jurisdiction. View "Santana-Vargas v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to the Administrator of the United States General Services Administration (GSA) and dismissing the discrimination and retaliation claim brought by Plaintiff, a former employee of that agency, holding that summary judgment was properly granted on Plaintiff's claims.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the GSA on Plaintiff's sex discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the GSA on Plaintiff's age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.; and (3) Plaintiff's retaliation claims under Title VII and the ADEA also lacked merit. View "Paul v. Murphy" on Justia Law