Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was denied tenure as an assistant professor of Legal Studies at the University of Mississippi, he filed suit against several university officials in their individual capacities, alleging that they violated his substantive due process rights when they evaluated his eligibility for tenure in an arbitrary and capricious manner. A jury subsequently awarded plaintiff over $200,000 in damages for lost wages and past and future pain and suffering.The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the district court erred when it denied defendants' motions for qualified immunity and concluded that plaintiff had a clearly established property interest. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the language in his contract that allegedly guaranteed him a "fair process of tenure review" gave rise to a clearly-established property right. View "Wigginton v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment entered in favor of Rand in an action brought by plaintiff, a former employee, alleging that Rand unlawfully fired her for taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The court affirmed and agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Rand's justification for the termination was false and merely a pretext for retaliation. In this case, Rand presented a lawful explanation for firing plaintiff: performance problems. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a former employee's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. View "Fry v. Rand Construction Corp." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Koss in an action brought by plaintiff, a former employee, alleging that Koss terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints about pay discrimination based on sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA).The court held that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. In this case, plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence as to the question of whether there was no basis in fact for Koss's proffered reason for her termination: there was lack of work at the project. The court also held that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether a retaliatory reason more likely motivated the manager's decision to terminate her. View "Yearns v. Koss Construction Co." on Justia Law

The DC Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination against Cushman & Wakefield's Chief Executive Officer of the Americas for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the fiduciary shield doctrine.The court held that the fiduciary shield doctrine lacks any basis in either the Due Process Clause or the transacting-business prong of the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, D.C.CODE 13-423(a)(1). The court also held that the district court's dismissal erroneously denied plaintiff's request in the alternative for limited jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, on remand, the district court may either (i) determine on the current record that defendant's suit-related contacts (made in his capacity as CEO of the Americas and otherwise) satisfy the minimum-contacts standard, or (ii) grant jurisdictional discovery to permit development of the record on defendant's contacts with the District of Columbia. View "Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the railroad under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging that the railroad discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and her use of FMLA leave when it terminated her. The railroad maintains that plaintiff was terminated as part of a reduction in force (RIF) without discriminatory intent.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the railroad, holding that the affidavits that the district court relied on were not sham affidavits; plaintiff failed to present any evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that her gender was a contributing factor in her termination; the RIF was legitimate and plaintiff failed to demonstrate evidence showing that her gender was a contributing factor in her termination; and thus the district court properly granted the railroad summary judgment on plaintiff's MHRA gender-discrimination claim. Because plaintiff does not offer any direct evidence that the railroad terminated her in the RIF for exercising her FMLA rights, the court analyzed her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. In this case, the railroad proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff and she failed to show that the stated reason was a pretext for FMLA discrimination. View "Button v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination and retaliation.Regardless of whether the "transitory and minor" nature of the impairment was part of plaintiff's prima facie case or an affirmative defense to her claim of "regarded as" disability discrimination, the court held that the school district is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's "regarded as" disability-based discrimination claim. In this case, there are no facts in dispute regarding the transitory and minor nature of the perceived impairment from plaintiff's lap band surgery. Although the court held that the district court erred in its determination that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she failed to present sufficient evidence of a causal connection, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the school district on the retaliation claim because plaintiff failed to meet her summary judgment burden of pointing to evidence demonstrating that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the school district for its actions were pretextual. The school district proffered that plaintiff was removed from coaching basketball because it was the school district's understanding that she did not like coaching basketball and did not want to do so. View "Lyons v. Katy Independent School District" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to UPS in an action brought by plaintiff for retaliation and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The court held that plaintiff's retaliation claim failed because he cannot link protected conduct with his demotion. In this case, plaintiff concedes that his supervisor and his supervisor's supervisor did not know about the statements plaintiff made on two different occasions. The court also held that plaintiff's race discrimination claim failed at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework because UPS provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the action: plaintiff was failing to perform his duties. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS's explanation for his demotion was pretext for discrimination. View "Williams v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

The Sheriff's Office appealed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on First Amendment wrongful-discharge claims brought by former Deputy Sheriffs Timothy Bruce and Robert Curtis. Bruce and Curtis's complaints alleged that Cole, the newly elected sheriff, discharged them for political reasons in violation of their First Amendment rights.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity, holding that political loyalty is an appropriate requirement for the job of deputy sheriff under Missouri law because of the closeness and cooperation required between sheriffs and their deputies in fulfilling overlapping duties. In this case, Cole did not violate Bruce and Curtis's constitutional rights. Consequently, the county is also entitled to summary judgment on the claims against it. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Curtis v. Christian County" on Justia Law

Purtue, a Dodge Correctional Institution officer, reported that inmate Reddick had thrown an empty box from his cell, hitting her. Reddick was taken to segregation. A video recording showed the box flying out of Reddick’s cell but the box didn’t fly toward Purtue nor strike her. Work Rule 6 prohibits correctional officers from falsifying records or knowingly giving false information to prison authorities. Reddick stated that he and Purtue had quarreled earlier and that he threw the box out of frustration but purposefully directed it away from Purtue. Purtue reiterated that the box had hit her. After watching the video, Purtue agreed that the box had not hit her but maintained that something else hit her. The investigators doubted that story because on the video Purtue did not react. The warden decided to skip progressive discipline and immediately terminate Purtue’s employment. Executive Directive #2 classifies “[l]ying or providing false information” as “Serious Acts of Misconduct” that may result in termination. Other officials agreed with that recommendation. A memorandum identified comparators for Purtue—one man and two women—all of whom were fired for lying or falsifying records.Purtue filed suit, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The investigation accurately summarized Purtue’s conduct. Purtue’s expert testimony was speculative and offered nothing more than his opinion that termination was unwise but not necessarily pretextual. Although there were gender disparities in a statistical report, those disparities revealed little about Purtue's dismissal. View "Purtue v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Three employers each fired a long-time employee for being homosexual or transgender. Each employee sued, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1). The Eleventh Circuit held that the suit could be dismissed. The Second and Sixth Circuits allowed the claims to proceed.The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the employees. An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex regardless of whether other factors besides the plaintiff's sex contributed to the decision or whether the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group. Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex. It is irrelevant what an employer or others might call the discriminatory practice; that another factor, such as the plaintiff’s attraction to the same sex or presentation as a different sex from that assigned at birth, might play an important role in the employer’s decision; or that an employer could refuse to hire a gay or transgender individual without learning that person’s sex. The Court rejected arguments that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex and that a stricter causation test should apply because the policies at issue have the same adverse consequences for men and women. Legislative history has no bearing where no ambiguity exists about how Title VII’s terms apply to the facts. View "Bostock v. Clayton County" on Justia Law