Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Selig on her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of retaliation under the FMLA where a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff suffered retaliation for intending to use FMLA leave in the future. In this case, there are a number of factual disputes that are material to plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim and thus summary judgment was not appropriate. However, the court affirmed in all other respects, holding that plaintiff is not disabled under the ADA and that plaintiff has not identified any evidence that she was terminated as a result of Selig's failure to give her notice of her FMLA rights. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Munoz v. Selig Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the New York City Department of Education and a school principal in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging a claim of First Amendment retaliation and Title VII claims of a sex-based hostile work environment and retaliation.The court concluded that plaintiff's speech consisted of grievances about employment disputes that are not matters of public concern, and therefore his speech was not protected against retaliation by the First Amendment. Even if some of plaintiff's speech were so protected, the court concluded that the district court still would have been correct to grant qualified immunity to the principal. Furthermore, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's Monell claim against the Department of Education fails because the principal was not a policymaker, and thus plaintiff cannot identify any municipal policy that allegedly caused a constitutional violation. The court also concluded that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiff's Title VII claims. The court explained that plaintiff's sex-based hostile work environment claim fails because the principal's actions were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of plaintiff's employment. Finally, the retaliation claim also fails because there is insufficient evidence of a causal link between plaintiff's protected activity and the alleged retaliatory acts. View "Agosto v. New York City Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment denying plaintiff's request for leave to amend and granting Aerospace's motion for summary judgment, in an action alleging that plaintiff was selected for a company-wide reduction in force (RIF) because of his age.The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. In this case, plaintiff's original and first amended DFEH complaints cannot support class and disparate impact theories of recovery, and thus the new allegations in his second amended DFEH complaint are untimely. As a result, plaintiff cannot show he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his proposed class and disparate impact claims. The court also held that the trial court did not err in granting Aerospace's motion for summary judgment where the trial court properly sustained Aerospace's objections to certain exhibits and plaintiff failed to create a triable issue of fact to withstand summary judgment. Aerospace submitted evidence showing it instituted the company-wide RIF after learning it faced potentially severe cuts to its funding, and plaintiff failed to offer substantial evidence showing that Aerospace's reasons were untrue or pretextual. View "Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp." on Justia Law

Vargas began working as a mail carrier in 2005. Mail carriers must be able to carry up to 35 pounds in their shoulder bags. Vargas’s route also required shuttling mail and equipment weighing up to 75 pounds between the post office and a satellite location. Vargas sustained an on-the-job foot injury in 2008. He was diagnosed with plantar fasciitis, received treatment, submitted a successful workers’ compensation claim, and continued working. In 2011, Vargas filed an EEO complaint, raising miscellaneous workplace grievances and alleging race- and disability-related discrimination. He withdrew this complaint. Vargas’s plantar fasciitis subsequently flared up. His doctor placed him on work restrictions, March 1-22, prohibiting him from carrying more than 15 pounds. On March 14, Vargas returned to work from a vacation; he wanted his route restructured to eliminate carrying heavy loads. His superiors did not oblige and he applied for workers’ compensation. He also made daily requests for “light duty” but there was no light duty work available, so he took paid sick leave.Vargas, who is Hispanic, sued, alleging disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, with retaliation and racial discrimination claims under Title VII. Vargas still works for the Postal Service. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claims. Vargas could not perform the only job available to him, with or without reasonable accommodation, and there is no evidence he was treated differently because of his race or suffered unlawful workplace retaliation. View "Vargas v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court denying the plea to the jurisdiction filed by Defendant, a governmental employer, and dismissed Plaintiff's age-discrimination claim for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act did not waive Defendant's sovereign immunity from this suit.Plaintiff sued for age discrimination. Defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court denied the plea, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to submit legally sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; and (2) because the legislature has not waived governmental immunity in the absence of such evidence, Plaintiff's age-discrimination claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center-El Paso v. Flores" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Lowe's for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that Lowe's had forced him out of his director-level job even though, with reasonable accommodations for him after his knee surgery, he could still perform its essential functions. Plaintiff also alleged that Lowe's violated the ADA when it refused to reassign him to another director-level position, and that Lowe's discriminated against him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Lowe's, holding that no reasonable jury could find that working over eight hours each day was anything less than an essential function of the Market Director of Stores (MDS) position; plaintiff could no longer perform the essential functions of his job without reasonable accommodation; and no reasonable accommodation, consistent with plaintiff's doctor's orders, would have allowed him to perform his job's essential functions. Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that Lowe's violated his rights under the ADA by failing to reassign him to another vacant and comparable position where the record demonstrates that Lowe's extended reasonable accommodations to plaintiff, acting at every stage to ensure that his disability did not unfairly compromise his equality of opportunity at Lowe's. Finally, plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case under the ADEA where he was not able to perform the essential functions of his MDS job with our without reasonable accommodations. View "Elledge v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC" on Justia Law

Calderone, a Chicago police communications operator, was off duty, driving her car when another motorist, Garcia, threw a drink into Calderone’s vehicle, then pulled to the side of the road. Calderone stopped behind Garcia’s car. The women exited their cars and argued. Garcia returned to her vehicle and tried to drive away. Calderone blocked Garcia’s exit. Garcia again got out of her vehicle, grabbed Calderone by the hair, and threw her to the ground. Calderone then shot Garcia with her handgun, which she was legally permitted to carry. The bullet lacerated Garcia's vital organs; she was hospitalized for several months.Calderone was indicted for attempted murder. The city administratively charged her with violations of Personnel Rules and, after a hearing, fired Calderone. Calderone asserts the city did not respond to her claim that the discharge was in self-defense. An Illinois state court acquitted Calderone of attempted murder based on self-defense. The city subsequently reinstated Calderone and held a hearing to determine her back pay.Calderone sued, arguing that her termination deprived her of her Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, that the city deprived her of property and liberty rights without due process, and that the Personnel Rules were vague. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Even if Calderone has a constitutional right to discharge her firearm in self-defense, qualified immunity shielded her supervisors from suit because precedent has not clearly established that right. View "Calderone v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Sandefur, a Cook County corrections officer, suffers from spinal disk desiccation and osteoarthritis in his knees. In 2011, Sandefur received a handicapped parking placard from the Illinois Secretary of State. His application asserted that he could not walk without an assistive device and that the impairment was permanent. In 2015, at age 55, Sandefur was accepted to the Police Academy. An instructor noticed the handicapped parking placard in Sandefur’s car. Sandefur said it was there for his wife. When another officer asked about the placard, Sandefur said that it was his wife’s but that he also used it. Wanting to confirm that Sandefur was medically cleared to participate in the Academy’s physical training, Academy officials met with Sandefur, who stated that he was not requesting any accommodations in the Academy. During a formal investigation, Sandefur’s explanations did not improve or become consistent. An investigator concluded that Sandefur had demonstrated an “inability to provide truthful responses to basic questions.” The Sheriff’s Office dismissed Sandefur from the Academy. He returned to his corrections job.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Sandefur’s suit, which alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and his due process rights. The Sheriff’s Office dismissed Sandefur based on its honest belief that he had lied about his disability, not because he had a disability. There is no evidence that anyone involved in the investigation or dismissal harbored any unlawful animus. View "Sandefur v. Dart" on Justia Law

Williamson County District Attorney Helper told other officials that she distrusted Fairview Police officers Stockdale and Dunning and that she would not “take their cases.” Helper wrote to the city manager (Collins): “per our discussion, this Office has concerns about reports initiated/investigated solely by” Dunning or Stockdale and that defense counsel would be entitled to a copy of an earlier investigation report concerning the officers. Helper stated, “[w]ithout independent corroboration from another law enforcement officer and/or independent witness, the[ir] testimony . . . may be impeached.” Collins disputed Helper’s assessment but Helper refused to back down. Collins fired the officers, explaining the email provided the “sole reason.”Stockdale and Dunning sued. They settled their claims against the city, leaving a First Amendment claim and state law claims against Helper. The district court denied Helper’s claim of absolute immunity and her claim for qualified immunity from the federal First Amendment retaliation claim. It also denied her summary judgment with respect to state law claims for official oppression and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Because Helper’s actions were not closely tied to the judicial process, absolute immunity does not apply; because her conduct did not violate any clearly established law, qualified immunity protects her. View "Stockdale v. Helper" on Justia Law

Four female employees, including plaintiff, filed suit alleging hostile work environment claims. The jury awarded plaintiff a total of $400,000 on her claims against defendants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The County then filed motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59(b). The district court then sua sponte denied the motions based on the restrictions established by Rule 6(b)(2) on extending time for filing such motions. The Second Circuit vacated the denial order and remanded. On remand, the district court found that plaintiff "constructively waived" her objection to the timeliness of the County's motions and entered orders reducing plaintiff's Title VII award to $75,000 and overturning the jury verdict in her favor on her section 1983 claim for want of evidence of an unlawful municipal custom or practice under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Both plaintiff and the County appealed.The Second Circuit held that plaintiff forfeited her right to object to the untimeliness of the County's post-trial motions by failing to raise the issue contemporaneously with the district court's grant of the extension. The court further rejected the County's position that plaintiff's acceptance of remittitur on her Title VII claims forecloses her appeal of the judgment insofar as it relates to her section 1983 claim. On the merits, the court affirmed the judgment in plaintiff's favor on her Title VII claim and rejected the County's cross-appeal seeking judgment in its favor on that claim as a matter of law. In regard to the section 1983 claim, the court concluded that the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for the County, because the jury had a reasonable basis for its finding of sufficient municipal involvement to support its award to plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Legg v. Ulster County" on Justia Law