Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Timothy Williams began working at the El Paso County, Colorado Sheriff’s Office in 2002 and, after multiple promotions over the course of his career, reached the rank of lieutenant. In March 2016, Sheriff Bill Elder ordered a mandatory survey requesting, among other things, retirement eligibility dates from all employees. Williams, who then would have been eligible for full retirement benefits June 1, 2018, completed this survey and reported that he expected to retire within the next five years. Thereafter, Williams was assigned to a team that conducted investigations into alleged misconduct by personnel in his office. Apparently, Sheriff Elder was unhappy with Williams’s investigation and the sanctions that Williams recommended, and he confronted Williams in a meeting about it. This lead to a demotion to senior deputy, which carried a significant change in rank, pay, and duties that resulted in substantial adverse retirement benefit consequences for Williams. To avoid these consequences, Williams retired the following day, ultimately to be replaced by a younger and purportedly less qualified employee. Williams thereafter filed age discrimination and retaliation charges El Paso County Sheriff’s Office with the Colorado Civil Rights Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA") and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA"). As applied to this case, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) claims for compensatory relief under CADA were not claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA and therefore public entities were not immune from CADA claims under the CGIA; (2) “the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), included political subdivisions of the state and thus political subdivisions were not immune from claims for compensatory damages based on intentional unfair or discriminatory employment practices; and (3) front pay was equitable and not compensatory in nature under CADA, and age discrimination and retaliation claims seeking front pay did not lie and could not lie in tort for CGIA purposes. View "Elder v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims premised on the denial of a name-clearing hearing in violation of procedural due process. The court held that the alleged violative nature of defendant's conduct was not clearly established as unconstitutional. In this case, the law was not clearly established that plaintiff's request "to speak with" defendant constituted a request for a name-clearing hearing in the context of the court's "stigma-plus-infringement" test, such that denying the request would amount to a procedural-due-process violation. View "Cunningham v. Castloo" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 (ADA), and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4, holding that the material facts did not raise a reasonable inference of employment discrimination under state or federal law.After Defendant was terminated from his employment he filed an employment and retaliation complaint under the ADA and Chapter 151B. The district court determined that the undisputed material facts did not raise a reasonable inference that Defendant discriminated or retaliated against Plaintiff because of his disability. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his claims. View "Brader v. Biogen Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Court that Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-703(2) did not violate Appellant's right to equal protection by denying an impairment award to a worker with a Class 1 impairment who has suffered no wage loss, holding that the statute passes rational basis muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution.Section 39-71-703(2) allows impairment awards for claimants without actual wage loss only if they have a Class 2 or higher impairment rating. Appellant, who was designated as Class 1 and was denied an impairment award, challenged the statute, arguing that it violated her constitutional right to equal protection because other workers with different injuries but the same whole-person impairment percentage would receive the award. The WCC denied the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in its determination that section 39-71-703(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "Hensley v. Montana State Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the unions she was affiliated with, as well as a maritime association, for sexual harassment under federal employment law, arguing that defendant's conduct created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff also filed suit against defendant himself for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Texas state law. The district court entered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor on the IIED claim and plaintiff ultimately prevailed at trial against the other defendants.The Fifth Circuit first held that a party's failure to file a motion to set aside a default judgment in the district court does not prevent the party from appealing that judgment to the court. On the merits, the court vacated the default judgment on the IIED claim, concluding that plaintiff could not pursue an IIED against defendant in light of the other statutory remedies available to plaintiff. The court explained that a plaintiff generally cannot sustain an IIED claim if the plaintiff could have brought a sexual harassment claim premised on the same facts. In this case, the gravamen of plaintiff's IIED claim is for sexual harassment; plaintiff used defendant's conduct as a basis for her Title VII claims against the other defendants; plaintiff ultimately prevailed on those claims against the union; and the availability of those statutory remedies on the same facts forecloses her IIED claims against defendant. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Stelly v. Duriso" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA), failed to compensate her for past workplace injuries, holding that the trial justice properly dismissed the complaint.The trial justice found that the superior court did not have jurisdiction over certain claims because they were committed to the Workers' Compensation Court, that Plaintiff did not properly articulate other claims, and that the complaint failed adequately to inform Defendant of the nature of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims on appeal were without merit. View "Barnes v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Knudtson worked for Trempealeau County for over 45 years. She eventually became a paralegal/office manager in the District Attorney’s Office. When his friend, the Jackson County District Attorney, died, McMahon, the Trempealeau County District Attorney, closed his office for a day and encouraged his staff to attend the funeral. Knudtson refused to attend because she wanted to complete work at the office. McMahon offered Knudtson three choices: work from home, attend the funeral, or take a vacation day. The disagreement became a bitter dispute. The County placed Knudtson on paid leave. Knudtson declined another position at the same pay grade. The County had no other available position and terminated her employment.Knudtson filed suit, citing the Establishment Clause because the funeral took place at a church and involved a religious service. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Knudtson acknowledged that when she stated that she did not want to attend the funeral, she did not know that it would be a religious service; her decision not to attend had nothing to do with its religious nature. Organizing a delegation from a public office to attend a funeral normally raises no implication that the government, or any officials, endorse the deceased person's religion. View "Knudtson v. Trempealeau County" on Justia Law

Williams, a Chicago school social worker, suffers from depression, anxiety, and chronic sinusitis. For the 2013–14 school year, Williams received an evaluation score that placed him in the “developing” category, and was given a Professional Development Plan. Social workers' hours depend on the school they are serving on a particular day. The Board denied Williams's first accommodation request, for consistent work hours. During the 2014–15 school year, Williams was cited for interrupting a teacher, failing to read a student’s individual educational plan before a meeting, speaking inappropriately about his personal life, making personal calls during school hours, and failing to report to work. Williams was twice denied titles that may be awarded to “proficient” social workers. Williams filed a discrimination charge and another accommodation request, seeking a consistent start time, a reduced caseload, and assignment to a single school. The Board denied these requests but assigned him to schools with 7:45 a.m. start times. Williams's third accommodation request sought a private office, dedicated equipment, and exemption from evaluations. The Board supplied Williams with HEPA filters, computer monitors, and access to a private meeting space; it denied his other requests. Williams was not selected for special assessment teams because he did not have the “proficient” rating and was not bilingual. He filed his second charge of discrimination.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, rejecting claims that the Board discriminated against Williams because of his disability and gender, failed to accommodate his disability, and retaliated against him for filing discrimination claims. View "Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, UMC, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Plaintiff claimed that she and several other elderly employees were fired and replaced by younger respiratory therapists, whom UMC paid at a lower rate. Both parties agreed that plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of age discrimination and that UMC articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for her termination.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of UMC, holding that plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute over the veracity of UMC's proffered reasons for plaintiff's discharge. In this case, UMC's articulated reasons for plaintiff's termination were her poor performance and demonstrated lack of effort to change her behavior. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create doubt as to whether this reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. View "Salazar v. Lubbock County Hospital District" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissing Plaintiff's claim that she was fired from her position because of her age, holding that Plaintiff's claims were without merit.After she was discharged, Plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). Plaintiff also asserted a number of supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law. At trial, once Plaintiff rested, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not contradict the law of the case doctrine when it excluded certain evidence at trial; (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence at trial; and (3) did not err in entering judgment as a matter of law. View "Daumont-Colon v. Coop de Ahorro y Cred Caguas" on Justia Law