Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Bank on plaintiff's claim of gender harassment under Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. Plaintiff, a former employee of the Bank, alleged that a bank customer stalked and harassed her in her workplace and that the Bank failed to take effective action to address the harassment.The panel held that to establish sex discrimination under a hostile work environment theory, a plaintiff must show she was subjected to sex-based harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment, and that her employer is liable for this hostile work environment. Because the panel concluded that a trier of fact could find that the harassment altered the conditions of plaintiff's employment and created an abusive working environment, it turned to the question of the Bank's liability. In this case, there is more than enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the sufficiency of the Bank's response. Because a jury reasonably could conclude that the Bank ratified or acquiesced in the customer's harassment, the panel held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Christian v. Umpqua Bank" on Justia Law

The District appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, a former employee of the District, on her Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims. Plaintiff's claims were based on the District's alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodations for and/or engage in an interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations for two injuries, each of which was sufficient to render plaintiff disabled for the purposes of FEHA.The Court of Appeal agreed with the District that a Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) plaintiff must prove an available reasonable accommodation. The court also concluded that the evidence presented is sufficient to establish only that a reasonable accommodation of plaintiff's wrist injury, not her shoulder injury, was available. In this case, the jury did not indicate whether it relied on the District's response to one or both of these disabilities in reaching its verdict, and the record does not permit the court to make such a determination. Therefore, the court reversed with instructions that the trial court conduct a new trial on plaintiff's failure to accommodate and interactive process claims based solely on the District's handling of her wrist injury. The court also concluded that the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar such claims, because they seek recovery for a harm that is distinct from the harms for which the Workers' Compensation Act provides a remedy. To the extent plaintiff prevails on limited retrial, the trial court must reassess attorney fees. View "Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District" on Justia Law

Dassault hired Gipson in 2004; he was promoted in 2006. In 2011, Gipson received a poor evaluation from his supervisor. Gipson complained to HR about his supervisor. Later, Gipson and his supervisor had an argument which ended with security escorting Gipson to HR. Gipson filed an EEOC charge but did not sue. Dassault assigned Gipson a different supervisor. In 2012, Gipson reported to HR a racially offensive email sent by a colleague. The sender was suspended. In 2013, Gipson’s team leader resigned. Gipson assumed some team leader duties. Dassault claims that Gipson was not given “personnel/ supervisor responsibilities.” In 2014, Dassault promoted Gipson to senior manufacturing engineer. Months later Dassault posted an open team leader position. Gipson applied but HR responded that he was not qualified because he had not served as a senior manufacturing engineer for at least 12 months. His application was never forwarded to the decision-makers. Another African-American was selected for the promotion.Gipson claimed that he did not receive the promotion because of his race and because he filed a 2011 EEOC complaint. Dassault later terminated Gipson’s employment as part of a reduction in force. Gipson contends that two Caucasian senior manufacturing engineers, who he alleges had less seniority than him, were offered voluntary demotions in lieu of termination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Dassault on claims under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. View "Gipson v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's disability discrimination suit against the United States Patent and Trademark Office and its director, holding that the district court did not err.The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that Plaintiff waived his discrimination claim in a settlement agreement that allowed him to resign from his job instead of being terminated. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding that his allegation of an unenforceable waiver was implausible. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the agreement was void because he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to it. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court properly concluded that the waiver was binding. View "Perez-Tolentino v. Iancu" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Denver Health and Hospital Authority hired Brent Houchin as an Employee Relations Specialist and promoted him to Employee Relations Manager. Throughout Houchin’s time at Denver Health, his supervisor consistently rated his performance as “successful” and “exceptional.” In an employee relations matter concerning the suspected diversion of controlled substances, a former in-house lawyer for Denver Health advised that using an employee’s medical records from off-duty medical care in connection with an internal investigation would violate the privacy requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Houchin objected to this interpretation of HIPAA because he (1) felt that it prevented him from investigating suspected employee diversions of controlled substances and (2) believed that HIPAA permitted the use of such employee information to detect health care fraud and abuse. This disagreement in interpretation would come into play when Houchin's employment was terminated, based on two alleged HIPAA violations relating to an investigation. Following his termination, Houchin appeared to have commenced Denver Health’s “Concern Resolution” process to address what he believed to be the discriminatory circumstances of his termination. Houchin then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on his sexual orientation and retaliation for using Denver Health’s “Concern Resolution” process to address such discrimination. The Civil Rights Division ultimately issued a Notice of Right to Sue, and Houchin filed a complaint against Denver Health. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA") and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA"). Denver Health moved to dismiss Houchin’s complaint, arguing, among other things, that Houchin’s discrimination and retaliation claims under CADA lie in tort and were therefore barred by the CGIA. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) claims for compensatory relief under CADA were not claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA and therefore public entities were not immune from CADA claims under the CGIA; (2) “the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), included political subdivisions of the state. The appellate court's judgment dismissing Houchin's claims was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Denver Health v. Houchin" on Justia Law

Timothy Williams began working at the El Paso County, Colorado Sheriff’s Office in 2002 and, after multiple promotions over the course of his career, reached the rank of lieutenant. In March 2016, Sheriff Bill Elder ordered a mandatory survey requesting, among other things, retirement eligibility dates from all employees. Williams, who then would have been eligible for full retirement benefits June 1, 2018, completed this survey and reported that he expected to retire within the next five years. Thereafter, Williams was assigned to a team that conducted investigations into alleged misconduct by personnel in his office. Apparently, Sheriff Elder was unhappy with Williams’s investigation and the sanctions that Williams recommended, and he confronted Williams in a meeting about it. This lead to a demotion to senior deputy, which carried a significant change in rank, pay, and duties that resulted in substantial adverse retirement benefit consequences for Williams. To avoid these consequences, Williams retired the following day, ultimately to be replaced by a younger and purportedly less qualified employee. Williams thereafter filed age discrimination and retaliation charges El Paso County Sheriff’s Office with the Colorado Civil Rights Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA") and the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA"). As applied to this case, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) claims for compensatory relief under CADA were not claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA and therefore public entities were not immune from CADA claims under the CGIA; (2) “the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), included political subdivisions of the state and thus political subdivisions were not immune from claims for compensatory damages based on intentional unfair or discriminatory employment practices; and (3) front pay was equitable and not compensatory in nature under CADA, and age discrimination and retaliation claims seeking front pay did not lie and could not lie in tort for CGIA purposes. View "Elder v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims premised on the denial of a name-clearing hearing in violation of procedural due process. The court held that the alleged violative nature of defendant's conduct was not clearly established as unconstitutional. In this case, the law was not clearly established that plaintiff's request "to speak with" defendant constituted a request for a name-clearing hearing in the context of the court's "stigma-plus-infringement" test, such that denying the request would amount to a procedural-due-process violation. View "Cunningham v. Castloo" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 (ADA), and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4, holding that the material facts did not raise a reasonable inference of employment discrimination under state or federal law.After Defendant was terminated from his employment he filed an employment and retaliation complaint under the ADA and Chapter 151B. The district court determined that the undisputed material facts did not raise a reasonable inference that Defendant discriminated or retaliated against Plaintiff because of his disability. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his claims. View "Brader v. Biogen Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Court that Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-703(2) did not violate Appellant's right to equal protection by denying an impairment award to a worker with a Class 1 impairment who has suffered no wage loss, holding that the statute passes rational basis muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution.Section 39-71-703(2) allows impairment awards for claimants without actual wage loss only if they have a Class 2 or higher impairment rating. Appellant, who was designated as Class 1 and was denied an impairment award, challenged the statute, arguing that it violated her constitutional right to equal protection because other workers with different injuries but the same whole-person impairment percentage would receive the award. The WCC denied the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in its determination that section 39-71-703(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "Hensley v. Montana State Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the unions she was affiliated with, as well as a maritime association, for sexual harassment under federal employment law, arguing that defendant's conduct created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff also filed suit against defendant himself for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Texas state law. The district court entered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor on the IIED claim and plaintiff ultimately prevailed at trial against the other defendants.The Fifth Circuit first held that a party's failure to file a motion to set aside a default judgment in the district court does not prevent the party from appealing that judgment to the court. On the merits, the court vacated the default judgment on the IIED claim, concluding that plaintiff could not pursue an IIED against defendant in light of the other statutory remedies available to plaintiff. The court explained that a plaintiff generally cannot sustain an IIED claim if the plaintiff could have brought a sexual harassment claim premised on the same facts. In this case, the gravamen of plaintiff's IIED claim is for sexual harassment; plaintiff used defendant's conduct as a basis for her Title VII claims against the other defendants; plaintiff ultimately prevailed on those claims against the union; and the availability of those statutory remedies on the same facts forecloses her IIED claims against defendant. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Stelly v. Duriso" on Justia Law