Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims that sought to hold Michael Bloomberg vicariously liable for Nicholas Ferris's offending conduct, holding that Bloomberg was not an "employer" within the meaning of the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL).Plaintiff brought this action against her employer Bloomberg L.P., her supervisor Ferris, and Michael Bloomberg, bringing several claims arising from her alleged discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual abuse. At issue was whether Bloomberg, in addition to Bloomberg L.P., could be held vicariously liable based on his status as owner and officer of the company. Supreme Court denied Bloomberg's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the causes of action against Bloomberg. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to allege that Bloomberg was her employer for purposes of liability under the City HRL. View "Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in state court against Amber Pharmacy and others, alleging claims of discrimination, retaliation, demotion and a hostile work environment. After removal to federal court, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all but a portion of plaintiff's Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) claim.In regard to plaintiff's claim of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Eighth Circuit assumed that plaintiff established a prima facie case, but that defendants articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating plaintiff's position and demoting her: the need to restructure the financial department to put a stronger emphasis on accounting and more effectively implement the new operating system. The court concluded that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient and did not satisfy her burden of showing age was a motivating factor in defendants' decision to restructure. The court also concluded that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's federal claims under Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).Given the similarities between the federal and state ADEA claim, the court concluded that it was appropriate for the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and grant summary judgment on the Nebraska ADEA claim. Because plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was neither novel nor complex, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would not offend principles of comity and fairness. The court concluded that the district court erred in splitting plaintiff's claim that her employer retaliated against her for reporting Medicaid and HIPPA issues and for filing charges with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission. The court vacated the district court's order on the NFEPA claim with instructions to remand the claim in its entirety to state court so that Nebraska courts may resolve the novel questions of state law. View "Starkey v. Amber Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court upholding a hearing officer's conclusion that Montana State University-North (MSU-N) retaliated against Dr. Randy Bachmeier for reporting and pursuing a claim of sexual harassment against his supervisor, holding that the district court erred in reinstating the hearing officer's first decision as the final agency decision in this matter.The hearing officer's original order concluded that Bachmeier failed to demonstrate that his supervisor sexually harassed him but that MSU-N retaliated against Bachmeier. The HRC rejected the hearing officer's conclusion that Bachmeier was discriminated against, upheld the hearing officer's retaliation conclusion, and remanded the case. The hearing officer issued a second decision concluding that Bachmeier had been sexually harassed. The Montana Human Rights Commission (HRC) then issued a final agency decision reducing the damages award for sexual harassment but leaving untouched the retaliation award. The district court voided the hearing officer's second decision and remanded with instructions to reinstate the hearing officer's first decision as the final agency decision. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion by concluding that the HRC did not have the authority to modify the hearing officer's first decision; and (2) correctly upheld the hearing officer's retaliation conclusion. View "Montana State University-Northern v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

On September 28, 2018, Cheli, a computer system administrative assistant for the District, since 2014, was taken into a meeting with about 25 minutes’ notice. The District’s superintendent and Director of Computer Services terminated Cheli because a female student had alleged that Cheli had sexually harassed her three weeks prior. Cheli denied the allegations. The Board retroactively memorialized Cheli’s termination on October 9, 2018. Cheli never received notice of the Board meeting and did not receive written notice of the charges or the evidence against him but received a notice of termination via certified mail stating that “[t]he basis or grounds for discharge include incompetence.” That notice informed Cheli that he could request the written report. The District did not provide the report upon Cheli’s request.A collective bargaining agreement governed Cheli’s employment and provides for discipline for reasonable cause. An employee is entitled to a conference, attended by a representative of his choice, and a written explanation for the discipline. The District’s Policy Manual, however, contains a provision titled “Employment At-Will.”Cheli sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the defendants violated his procedural due process rights. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The collective bargaining agreement established that Cheli could not be terminated except “for reasonable cause,” which created a protected property interest for which he was entitled to due process View "Cheli v. Taylorville Community School District" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the University as barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff's action involved employment discrimination and retaliation claims, and he sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The court held that Texas A&M is an agency of the State of Texas, so a suit against the former is a suit against the latter. Furthermore, neither of the two exceptions to sovereign immunity apply in these circumstances. In this case, Congress did not abrogate the State's sovereign immunity, and the State did not knowingly and plainly waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit. View "Sullivan v. Texas A&M University System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of race- and gender-based discrimination under Title VII and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of her action for failure to state a claim, because plaintiff was not an "employee" of the firm she sought to sue. The court explained that plaintiff was a partner and equal owner of the firm, not an employee, and thus she is not within the scope of Title VII's coverage.In regard to plaintiff's section 1981 claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to plead specific factual allegations tending to corroborate her claim of eligibility for leave. In this case, plaintiff declined to indicate the nature of the medical conditions or events that allegedly qualified her for leave, despite being the individual best-positioned to do so. Furthermore, even if plaintiff's qualification for leave was assumed, plaintiff failed to allege that her race was the but-for cause of the Board's denial of her leave application as required by the Supreme Court's recent holding in Comcast Corporation v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009 (2020). As to plaintiff's one factually-specific, non-conclusory allegation of racially-motivated conduct, she failed to allege any facts linking it to the Board vote denying her short-term leave. View "Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A." on Justia Law

When LaSpina began working for the Scranton Public Library, all Library employees were exclusively represented in collective bargaining by Local 668. No employee had to join the Union; an employee could join and pay full membership dues or decline to join and pay a lesser nonmember “fair-share fee.” LaSpina joined the Union. In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in "Janus," that compelling nonmembers to pay fair-share fees violates their First Amendment associational rights. LaSpina resigned from the Union and sued, seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, including a refund of the portion of the dues she paid the Union equal to the nonmembers’ fair-share fees, and a refund of membership dues deducted from her paycheck after she resigned.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. LaSpina had no standing to seek a refund of any portion of the dues she made prior to Janus because she cannot tie the payment of those dues to the Union’s unconstitutional deduction of fair-share fees from nonmembers. If LaSpina is due a refund of monies that were deducted from her wages after she resigned, the claim is not a federal one. LaSpina’s claim that the Union may not collect any dues from an employee until that employee knowingly and freely waives their constitutional right to resign from membership and withhold payments is moot as LaSpina no longer is a Union member. View "LaSpina v. SEIU Pennsylvania State Council" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Omni, alleging (1) pay discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Texas Labor Code, and the Equal Pay Act; (2) promotional discrimination under Title VII and the Texas Labor Code; and (3) retaliation for filing a charge with the EEOC and for taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Title VII, the Texas Labor Code, and the Equal Pay Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Omni.In regard to the pay discrimination claims as it pertains to the three men who previously held the same position as plaintiff yet were paid more, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. Rather, plaintiff showed that she held the same position as two other employees did, at the same hotel, just a few years after they did, and that she was paid less than they were. The court also concluded that Omni failed to set forth a non-discriminatory reason for that pay disparity. Therefore, the court reversed in part and remanded. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim insofar as it relies on other unnamed male food and beverage directors from different Omni hotels, but remanded for a determination of whether plaintiff can establish a prima facie case with respect to those comparators under Title VII and the Texas Labor Code.In regard to the promotional discrimination claims, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Omni because plaintiff withdrew her name from consideration and understood that she would have been given the offer if she reconsidered. In this case, plaintiff was not rejected by Omni. Rather, she rejected the opportunity from Omni. In regard to the retaliation claims, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she could not demonstrate an adverse employment action. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to establish adverse employment action in response to her requesting and taking FMLA leave; plaintiff puts forth no evidence that the deletion of the computer files was in any way motivated by retaliation; and plaintiff's constructive discharge claim failed. View "Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Kubala worked for Trumbull County as a “fiduciary” employee; he was not under civil-service rules and could participate in partisan political activities. Kubala reported to Smith, who holds an elected position. Kubala claims that Smith sexually harassed him and created a hostile work environment related to Kubala’s supposed homosexuality. Kubala told Laukart, the office manager, about Smith’s comments. Laukart replied that Smith could not be controlled. Kubala claims that Kubala running for political office against Smith’s wife and his attendance at certain political functions triggered an adverse employment action. Smith allegedly told Kubala not to attend certain political functions. Kubala testified that Smith’s attorney asked Kubala if he wanted to change his job status to “classified” because he would be “protected.” Kubala interpreted it as a threat of retaliation because the change would end his involvement in local politics. Kubala’s resignation letter stated he was resigning because the work environment was harming his physical and mental health. Kubala was under the care of a physician and a therapist to cope with the harassment and high blood pressure, which Kubala attributed to his harassment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Kubala’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Kubala failed to show that Smith violated his First Amendment rights because the alleged threat is too ambiguous. The district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over Kubala’s state sexual-harassment claim, which shares no common nucleus of operative fact with his constitutional claim. View "Kubala v. Smith" on Justia Law

Kellogg testified that when the Indiana Academy hired her as a teacher in 2006, its director, Dr. Williams, told her that she “didn’t need any more [starting salary, $32,000], because he knew [her] husband worked.” In 2017, Kellogg complained to the Dean of Ball State’s Teacher’s College, which oversees the Academy, that she received less pay than her similarly-situated male colleagues. The Dean responded that “[t]he issue [wa]s salary compression, which means those who [we]re hired after [Kellogg] began at a higher salary.” The Dean also noted that Kellogg’s salary increased by 36.45% during her time at the Academy while her colleagues’ salaries increased by less. In Kellogg’s 2018 lawsuit, the district court granted the Academy summary judgment, reasoning that there were undisputed gender-neutral explanations for Kellogg’s pay.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Williams’s statement contradicts the Academy’s explanations for Kellogg’s pay and puts them in dispute. It does not matter that Williams uttered the statement long ago, outside the statute of limitations period. Under the paycheck accrual rule, Williams’s statement can establish liability because it affected paychecks that Kellogg received within the limitations window. Kellogg can rely on Williams’s statement to put the Academy’s explanations in dispute. View "Kellogg v. Ball State University" on Justia Law