Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against her former boss, the St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff, for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and for retaliatory discharge under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the sheriff's proffered reason for firing plaintiff -- sleeping on the job -- is pretext for Title VII race discrimination and FMLA retaliation. In regard to plaintiff's Title VII claim, the court explained that plaintiff has produced substantial evidence of pretext based on disparate treatment. In this case, the sheriff treated plaintiff worse than a similarly situated white male who also was caught sleeping on the job. In regard to the FMLA claim, the court explained that the record reflects that "sleeping on the job" is not an infraction that results in termination, the sheriff tolerated "sleeping on the job" by at least one other dispatch supervisor, and the sheriff could not recall any dispatcher that he had ever fired for this reason. Furthermore, when combined with the discredited reason of "sleeping on the job," the near-immediate temporal proximity of the discharge to the protected activity leaves no room to doubt that plaintiff has carried her summary-judgment burden of producing substantial evidence that the sheriff would not have fired her but for her FMLA-protected activity. View "Watkins v. Tregre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed with Andersen from 2000-2018, was terminated for violating lock-out, tag-out (LOTO) safety procedures. After plaintiff filed suit against Andersen, he voluntarily dismissed four of his eight claims and the district court granted summary judgment on the remaining four claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that Andersen did not violate the Minnesota Whistleblower Act by terminating his employment in retaliation for his previous sexual harassment and falsified documentation complaint. The court explained that plaintiff failed to show causation between the protected activity and his discharge, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate. The court also concluded that plaintiff was unable to establish the causal link necessary for a prima facia case of retaliation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim under the Family Medical Leave Act also failed for lack of causation. View "Lissick v. Andersen Corp." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the VA in an action brought by plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging race discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and a hostile work environment she experienced during her employment at the Kansas City VA.Applying the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's claims failed at the first step because she did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, or constructive discharge. In this case, many of the events plaintiff presents as adverse employment actions—the decision not to "board" the Coding Document Improvement Program (CDI) position, inadequate training on CDI duties, assignment of additional coding work, her performance review, and the written counseling—are not adverse employment actions for purposes of Title VII. View "Watson v. McDonough" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from CRC through its "no-fault" attendance policy, she filed suit alleging that her termination violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CRC and dismissal of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim where the undisputed evidence established that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her position. In this case, many of plaintiff's duties as the sole office assistant required her physical presence at the office and she admitted that her absences burdened co-workers by detracting from the time they could spend on their own duties. Furthermore, because plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, her failure-to-accommodate claim necessarily fails. In regard to plaintiff's retaliation claim under the ADA, the court concluded that she failed to present sufficient evidence of the required but-for causal connection.In regard to plaintiff's FMLA claims, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal because CRC did not deny plaintiff FMLA leave to which she was entitled because it was justified in assessing unexcused absence points. In regard to the FMLA discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between her requests for FMLA leave and her termination. Even assuming that plaintiff made a prima facie case of discrimination, the court concluded that CRC had a legitimate, non-discriminatory ground for termination that was not pretextual. View "Evans v. Cooperative Response Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the City of Newport News, alleging that it failed to accommodate his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff alleged that the City concluded that he could not perform the essential functions of his job as a detective and then offered him the options of either retiring early or accepting reassignment to a civilian position he did not want. Plaintiff reluctantly retired.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that it is generally inappropriate for an employer to unilaterally reassign a disabled employee to a position the employee does not want when another reasonable accommodation exists that would allow the disabled employee to remain in their current, preferred position. The court clarified that it did not hold that an employer can never reassign an employee when there exists a reasonable accommodation that will keep the employee in their current and preferred position. This broad question was not before the court. Nor should this opinion be read in any way to restrict the ability of employers and employees to agree to a voluntary transfer. Rather, the court simply reiterated that reassignment is strongly disfavored when an employee can still do their current job with the assistance of a reasonable accommodation, and that reassignment should therefore be held "in reserve for unusual circumstances." View "Wirtes v. City of Newport News" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against GoJet for violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) after GoJet terminated him following his Diabetes Type II diagnosis. The jury found in plaintiff's favor and the district court granted him back pay, liquidated damages, and front pay. GoJet appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of GoJet's motion to dismiss, holding that the arbitration provisions in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) did not clearly, unmistakably, or explicitly state that plaintiff's FMLA claims could only be brought in arbitration. The court rejected GoJet's arguments that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. In regard to damages, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating damages based on minimum hours at GoJet because it plausibly could have found that plaintiff would have worked the minimum number of hours from his termination date onward. However, the court held that the district court erred when it calculated front pay based on two different values for how much work the court expected plaintiff to work at GoJet and SkyWest. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded on this issue for the district court to apply a uniform hourly figure to calculate expected earnings at GoJet and SkyWest for the purposes of front pay. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff waived his argument regarding the district court's front pay calculations based on post-trial evidence and his argument regarding the correct methodology for calculating damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to all other issues on appeal. View "Cloutier v. GoJet Airlines, LLC" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the University in an action alleging retaliation claims against the University under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In this case, plaintiff alleged that the University unlawfully retaliated against him for declining requests to implement age-discriminatory policies against older faculty members. Plaintiff alleged that the University did so by removing him as department chair and by denying his application for promotion.In regard to plaintiff's claim that the University violated the ADEA by removing him as department chair, the court concluded that plaintiff's cat's paw theory of liability failed where plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the supervisor proximately caused plaintiff's removal as chair because the decisionmaker drew a conclusion independent of any alleged influence by the supervisor. The court explained that, in his deposition, the decisionmaker explained that he removed plaintiff based on the faculty grievance committee report and the Title IX investigation report, both of which highlighted the toxic and dysfunctional culture within the department. In regard to plaintiff's denial-of-promotion claim, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that this claim is time-barred. View "Sinha v. Bradley University" on Justia Law

Strickland, an African-American Detroit Police Officer since 2008, claims that he has been subjected to race-based harassment throughout his tenure. He cited several incidents, social media posts, and Department reports and having been denied desired shift assignments and training in favor of white officers. A Committee on Race and Equality report concluded that “the department has a growing racial problem” and that African-American officers who complained were retaliated against. On January 22, 2017, off-duty, Strickland pulled into a gas station that, unbeknownst to him, was the site of an active police investigation of a reported incendiary device. He could not see the firetrucks or police cars. When Strickland saw a uniformed sergeant emerge from the fog, he immediately identified himself as an officer but was handcuffed in a way that was extremely tight. A sergeant led him away, belittling him in front of other officers. Strickland was later diagnosed with a bilateral wrist contusion and was suspended for three days without pay. Strickland complained. After an investigation, Strickland was charged with three code of conduct violations.Strickland sued, alleging hostile workplace and illegal retaliation (Title VII), and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming an unlawful search and seizure and excessive force. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the hostile work environment claim but reversed the grant of qualified immunity to one officer on the excessive force claim and summary judgment in favor of the city on the retaliation claim. View "Strickland v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

After the University dismissed plaintiff from its medical residency program, plaintiff filed suit for wrongful termination and alleged that the University discriminated against her based on age and disability, as well as retaliated against her.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the University, concluding that the University established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. In this case, assuming that plaintiff made a prima facie case for age discrimination, the University produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff by explaining that she made an egregious error affecting patient safety despite supervisor and attending efforts. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show evidence of pretext. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the University regarded her as disabled at the time before her termination. View "Canning v. Creighton University" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its previous opinion and substituted the following opinion.These appeals arose from a Title VII action filed by four ultrasound technologists against the Secretary, alleging that their supervisors and coworkers retaliated against them and subjected them to a hostile work environment at the Tampa VA because they engaged in protected EEOC activity. One plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. Because two intervening decisions changed the law applicable to plaintiffs' discrete retaliation claims and retaliatory hostile work environment claims, the court remanded those claims to the district court with the instruction that it analyze the claims consistent with the intervening decisions. Because the intervening decisions did not, in the court's judgment, affect the resolution of the sex-based hostile work environment claim in this case, the court considered that claim alone and affirmed the district court's decision to enter summary judgment for the Secretary.In this case, the court concluded as an initial matter that most of the named co-worker's conduct lacks the necessary sexual or other gender-related connotations to be actionable sex discrimination. The court explained that nothing in the record allows the conclusion that the coworker's conduct had anything to do with plaintiff's sex; the context surrounding the coworker's inappropriate touching of plaintiff shows that the touching was not sex based; and there is no evidence suggesting that the angry looks, harsh words, and silent treatment that the coworker gave plaintiff were influenced by plaintiff's sex. Even if the coworker's conduct was based on plaintiff's sex, her claim would still fail because the conduct is insufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment. View "Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law