Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the DEA terminated Darek and Lisa Kitlinski's employment based on their refusal to participate in an internal investigation into their own allegations of misconduct by the DEA, the Kitlinskis alleged that the DEA terminated Darek in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), and that the DEA terminated Lisa in retaliation for her support of Darek’s USERRA claims against the DEA. The Kitlinskis also claim that the DEA retaliated against them for their prior protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DEA, concluding that the Kitlinskis offer no evidence that Darek's military service or his prior USERRA-protected activity was a motivating factor in his termination. Furthermore, even assuming that Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1981), applies here, the court has little difficulty concluding that the DEA's interest in ensuring its employees' full participation in internal investigations outweighs any interest Lisa had in promoting USERRA's nondiscriminatory purpose. The court also concluded that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the DEA terminated the Kitlinskis' employment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The court explained that the Kitlinskis offer no evidence showing that the DEA terminated their employment for any reason other than their conduct during the OPR investigation. The court rejected the Kitlinskis' remaining claims. View "Kitlinski v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Gamble, an African-American, began working for FCA in 2015 and received a copy of FCA’s policy concerning sexual harassment, which could result in termination. Months later, two female employees complained that Gamble had sexually harassed them. After interviewing witnesses, Pollard, a human resources manager, concluded that Gamble had violated FCA’s policy and issued a warning. He acknowledged the warning and attended remedial training but disputed the harassing nature of his comments. In 2017, Gamble’s supervisor reported that he had witnessed Gamble acting inappropriately toward a female. Pollard initiated another investigation. Another woman complained that Gamble had also acted inappropriately toward her. Gamble was terminated.He filed suit, alleging discriminations based on his race, age (63), and disability (having battled cancer), and citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 1981; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C, 12112; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. 621–34.1 The district court granted FCO summary judgment. Gamble had abandoned his ADEA and ADA claims; his section 1981 claim for race discrimination was time-barred by a provision in his employment contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could infer that Gamble was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of his protected class. There was no evidence FCA gave a pretextual reason for firing him. View "Gamble v. Fiat Chrysler Automobiles US LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joan Unrein became legally blind and could no longer drive herself to work, a 120 mile round trip. She asked her employer, Colorado Plains Medical Center, to allow her to work a flexible schedule dependent on her ability to secure rides. The Medical Center permitted this arrangement for a while, but it became a problem because Unrein’s physical presence at the hospital was unpredictable. The flexible schedule arrangement ended in 2016, and was never reinstated. After Unrein was terminated, she sued the Medical Center for failure to accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Medical Center because it concluded Unrein’s accommodation request was unreasonable since a physical presence at the hospital on a set and predictable schedule was an essential job function of her position. Unrein appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Unrein’s physical presence at the hospital on a set and predictable schedule was essential to her job, and the ADA did not require an employer to accommodate employees’ non-work related barriers created by personal lifestyle choices. View "Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to AMR in a Title VII action brought by plaintiff, alleging failure to accommodate his religious requirement, discrimination on the basis of religion, and retaliation for filing a discrimination claim. Plaintiff's action stemmed from AMR's refusal to allow him to work emergency transports with his goatee, which he grew as part of his practice of Rastafarianism.In regard to plaintiff's disparate-treatment claims based on religion, the court concluded that plaintiff forfeited any "convincing mosaic" argument in support of his traditional religious disparate-treatment discrimination claim. Furthermore, plaintiff made no other argument to support that version of his disparate-treatment discrimination claim. In regard to plaintiff's religious-discrimination claim based on AMR's alleged failure to provide plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation of his religious practice of wearing a beard, the court concluded that AMR offered plaintiff a reasonable accommodation by providing him with an opportunity to maintain his beard and to work on the non-emergency-transport side of its operations, for which DeKalb County's facial-hair policy did not apply. The panel explained that his terms and conditions of employment would not have been affected by the accommodation AMR offered. In regard to the retaliation claim, the record indicates that the but-for cause of plaintiff's termination was AMR's belief that he had given an untrue answer on his employment application. Therefore, his retaliation claim necessarily fails. View "Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Services, Inc." on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded on plaintiff's age discrimination and gender discrimination claims, affirming the Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims. Plaintiff sought rehearing, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in her case also undermined the court's Trask-based rejection of her Title VII retaliation claim and that an intervening 11th Circuit decision, Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020), gutted the precedent on which the court had relied in rejecting her hostile work environment claim.The Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in plaintiff's case undermined Trask v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016), to the point of abrogation and that the standard that the Court articulated there now controls cases arising under Title VII's nearly identical text. The court also held that Monaghan clarified the court's law governing what the court called "retaliatory-hostile-work-environment" claims, and that the standard for such claims is, as the court said there, the less onerous "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker" test articulated in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), and Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008), rather than the more stringent "severe or pervasive" test found in Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims and remanded for the district court to consider those claims under the proper standards. View "Babb v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination claims under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act as well as retaliation and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff was employed by the school district as principal of a middle school until the school district concluded that plaintiff had violated several district policies and voted not to renew her contract.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district. In regard to plaintiff's state-law discrimination claims, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination where she failed to show either that she was replaced by someone outside her protected class or treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals who were outside her protected class. The court also concluded that plaintiff's sex discrimination claim failed where the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff was not replaced by someone outside her protected class and she failed to raise a dispute of fact to show that she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated individuals. The court further concluded that plaintiff's age discrimination claim failed where the school district rebutted the presumption of discrimination by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its nonrenewal of plaintiff's contract. In this case, the school district's investigation found, among other things, that plaintiff engaged in impermissible fundraising activities and worked on an outside film project during her working hours. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to present evidence that the school district's stated reasons were pretextual. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's due process claim where she failed to establish that she has a protected liberty interest. View "Ross v. Judson Independent School District" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Novo Nordisk Inc. and dismissing Plaintiffs' age discrimination claims, holding that the district court did not err.During a global reorganization, Novo Nordisk terminated Plaintiffs from their jobs based in Puerto Rico and did not select Plaintiffs for post-reorganization positions. Plaintiffs brought this complaint alleging that Novo Nordisk violated Puerto Rico's statutes prohibiting age discrimination in employment and penalizing termination without just cause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Novo Nordisk on all of Plaintiffs' claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted. View "Puig Martinez v. Novo Nordisk Inc." on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Nelson responded to a report of an armed robbery in a high-crime area; she alleges that the radio dispatcher ignored her repeated emergency calls for information and assistance. Shift sergeant Bucki was responsible for listening to the radio transmissions and contacting the dispatcher if that person failed to respond. Nelson alleges that Bucki did not intervene when the dispatcher ignored her requests for help. Bucki later denied wrongdoing and refused to investigate why the dispatcher ignored Nelson. In her incident report, Nelson complained about the dispatcher’s failure to respond; months later, she discovered that Sergeant Boffo had edited the report to remove her complaints. Nelson developed PTSD, which she alleges was aggravated by the stress of learning that Boffo had edited her report. She has been unable to work, but remains employed by the police department and receives disability benefits. Nelson filed charges of race and sex discrimination with the EEOC and Illinois Department of Human Rights.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of her substantive due process rights by failing to protect her from danger and her procedural due process rights by causing her PTSD and depriving her of a property interest in her job. There was no conscience-shocking abuse of government power nor any affirmative action on by Bucki. View "Nelson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

These appeals arose from a Title VII action filed by four ultrasound technologists against the Secretary, alleging that their supervisors and coworkers retaliated against them and subjected them to a hostile work environment at the Tampa VA because they engaged in protected EEOC activity. One plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's entry of summary judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' discrete retaliation claims. Likewise, the court reached the same conclusion about the one employee's sex-based hostile work environment claim. However, after summary judgment was entered in this case, Monaghan v. Worldpay U.S. Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2020), clarified that retaliatory hostile work environment claims are not governed by the "severe or pervasive" standard applied by the district court here. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order as to that claim and directed the district court to analyze the claim in light of Monaghan. View "Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality Coast, alleging that the company's decision not to hire him was the result of race and gender discrimination and a violation of the Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act (DJOA). A jury returned a defense verdict on the discrimination claims and the trial court found that plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the DJOA because he was a supervisory employee.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff is a supervisory employee for DJOA purposes; there was no error in giving the modified business judgment rule instruction at trial; and the trial court's costs award is not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Jones v. Quality Coast, Inc." on Justia Law