Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Chicago offers public-school teachers higher pay if they earn extra college credits. Graham sought a higher salary under this program in July 2015, only to have her application ignored. She tried again in September and was fired on the ground that her application had been backdated, which the Board of Education considered fraud. A hearing officer ordered her reinstated with back pay. Graham alleges the Board did not honor this decision in full, published a declaration that she is a fraudster, and refused to consider her for open positions. Graham sued, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by discriminating against her on account of sex and race and of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by depriving her of pension and health benefits.The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint. The complaint does not identify other employees who received better treatment from the school system but It is enough for a plaintiff to assert that she was treated worse because of protected characteristics. The school system’s plans are exempt from ERISA. Because the state not only funds the charter schools but also approves their establishment and continued existence, it is not appropriate to treat them as private institutions subject to public regulation. View "Graham v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's former employer, a restaurant chain, and to his former manager. The court concluded that, although plaintiff presented a prima facie case that the restaurant discriminated and retaliated against him, he failed to offer persuasive evidence that the restaurant's proffered, permissible reasons for his termination were a pretext for unlawful action. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his employer's reasons for firing him—lying and preparing a dish incorrectly—constitute pretextual reasons to cover over racial discrimination and retaliation. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of bad faith or malice to support his tortious interference claim. View "Jones v. Gulf Coast Restaurant Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, PRIDE, a non-profit that employs individuals with disabilities, hired Johnson, an African-American. Johnson endured repeated race-based harassment by his fellow PRIDE employee Palomares. Johnson’s colleague corroborated that Palomares used racially offensive language and generally treated non-Hispanic employees worse than their Hispanic counterparts. Beyond his mistreatment by Palomares, several other workplace incidents occurred that Johnson viewed as harassing. Johnson made multiple complaints regarding Palomares’s harassing behavior and was told, “you’ve just got to be tough and keep going.” Ultimately, Johnson angrily confronted Palomares at PRIDE’s worksite. Johnson was written up and told to “follow instructions and remain respectful.” Johnson interviewed for a supervisory carpentry position. PRIDE selected a Hispanic individual for the position, who, unlike Johnson, had supervisory experience. Johnson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. PRIDE’s Human Resources Director, acknowledged that Johnson reported that Palomares had been harassing him but PRIDE ultimately “did not find that any harassment.” Later that month, PRIDE called Johnson to discuss problems with his attendance. Johnson said coming into work was “too stressful,” declared that he was resigning, and walked out.The district court dismissed Johnson’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 alleging discrimination based on race and retaliation when he complained about the discrimination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. Summary judgment for the employer was proper as to most of Johnson’s claims, but the court erred in its ruling on Johnson’s hostile work environment claim. View "Johnson v. PRIDE Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the employer violated the Nebraska Equal Pay Act and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act by giving her male counterparts better pay despite her stronger work performance.The court concluded that the facts presented were insufficient to establish plaintiff's prima face case under the Nebraska Equal Pay Act because nothing in the record suggests that her position required her to take on the additional duties and responsibilities of her higher-ranked coworkers. Because plaintiff's evidence was insufficient either to establish her prima facie case under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act or to show that the employer's reasons for the pay disparity were pretextual, the district court properly granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. View "Perry v. Zoetis LLC" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion seeking to recover reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses from Montgomery County. Plaintiff's case stems from her action against the county for failure to reasonably accommodate her disability. The district court held that plaintiff is not eligible for such an award because she is not a "prevailing party" under 29 U.S.C. 794a(b).In this case, plaintiff won a jury verdict that found the county liable for discrimination and entitled plaintiff to equitable relief—at least until the county capitulated by transferring her to a call center called MC 311. The court thought that this case is more like Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), and concluded that plaintiff is not a prevailing party because she catalyzed the county to change its behavior by filing a lawsuit; rather, she is a prevailing party because she proved her claim to a jury before the county capitulated by transferring her to MC 311. The court noted that its holding is narrow, and that it would be unjust to hold that plaintiff did not prevail simply because the county's timely capitulation rendered unnecessary equitable relief that she would have otherwise been entitled to. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Brooks, an African American police officer, made statements on multiple occasions complaining that his employer, the Kankakee, Illinois, favored white officers. The City issued a reprimand letter, ordering Brooks to stop making such statements and warning him that he faced discipline up to and including termination should he engage in further public disparagement. Brooks filed a complaint, alleging that Kankakee had retaliated against him, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), by failing to promote him and by issuing to him a reprimand letter after he had engaged in protected activity. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Brooks attempted to introduce a new claim alleging that the City’s promotional policies had a disparate impact on minority officers.The district court dismissed Brooks’s disparate impact claim and granted the City summary judgment on his failure-to-promote retaliation claim. The court denied summary judgment on Brooks’s retaliation-by-reprimand claim, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Brooks’s statements constituted protected activity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of the City. The jury was entitled to conclude that each of Brooks’s statements included varying degrees of factual falsehoods. While the district court instructed the jury to find more than legally required (three acts of retaliation), a proper jury instruction would not have made a difference in the outcome. View "Brooks v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's discriminatory discharge and failure to accommodate claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) against his former employer.In regard to plaintiff's disability-discrimination claim, the court concluded that the employer articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for his termination and plaintiff failed to establish a factual dispute as to pretext where the record is replete with evidence concerning his deficient performance, none of which was related to his disability or his period of leave. In regard to plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim, the court concluded that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that plaintiff's performance issues were linked to his disability, and the record simply does not support that an accommodation would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of his position. View "Vinh v. Express Scripts Services Co." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff in her employment discrimination action. Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. 1983. DHS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). After plaintiff did not file a response, the district court granted DHS's motion.The court concluded that plaintiff's arguments unrelated to the grounds on which her claims were dismissed are waived. The court also concluded that plaintiff cannot proceed with a Rehabilitation Act claim as it is precluded by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA); the district court properly determined that plaintiff's section 1983 claim is preempted by Title VII; and, because plaintiff failed to name the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as a defendant, the district court had no alternative but to dismiss the case for lack of a proper party defendant. View "Kaswatuka v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, the Sheriff of Broward County, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Sheriff retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights by suspending him with pay pending an investigation into his conduct.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered an adverse employment action. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against the Sheriff only five days after he was suspended with pay in accordance with the governing collective bargaining agreement. The court agreed with the district court that a five-day suspension with pay does not constitute adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The court explained that such a temporally-limited suspension pending an investigation into alleged misconduct would not deter a reasonable person from exercising his First Amendment rights. View "Bell v. Sheriff of Broward County" on Justia Law

In June 2020, weeks after George Floyd was killed at the hands of a Minneapolis Police Officer, the New Jersey Attorney General issued two Directives calling for the release of the names of law enforcement officers who commit disciplinary violations that result in the imposition of “major discipline” -- termination, demotion, or a suspension of more than five days. A summary of the misconduct and the sanction imposed also had to be disclosed. In this appeal, the issues presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court came from challenges brought against the Directives by five groups representing state and local officers. The Appellate Division found that the Directives did not violate constitutional guarantees of due process or equal protection. The court also rejected claims that the Directives violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and that they impaired appellants’ right to contract and violate their constitutional right to collective negotiations. Finally, the appellate court concluded the Directives were not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or against public policy. The Supreme Court found the Directives were consistent with legislative policies and rested on a reasonable basis. The Court did not find merit in the bulk of the remaining challenges, except for one that required "more careful attention:" Officers subjected to major discipline for the past twenty years said they were promised that their names would not be released, and that they relied on that promise in resolving disciplinary accusations. Essentially they asked the State to stand by promises they claimed were made throughout the prior twenty years. Resolution of that issue will require judicial review to decide if the elements of the doctrine of promissory estoppel were met. The identities of officers subject to major discipline since the Directives were issued in June 2020 could be disclosed; going forward, future disciplinary sanctions could be disclosed in the same manner. View "In re Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive Nos. 2020-5 and 2020-6" on Justia Law