Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeal and its award of costs on appeal, holding that a claim for failure to promote brought under the harassment provision of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov. Code 12940, subd. (j), 12960, accrues, and thus the statute of limitations begins to run, at the point when an employee knows or reasonably should know of the employer's allegedly unlawful refusal to promote the employee.Plaintiff alleged that her employer passed her over for promotions because she refused to have sex with the company's executive vice-president, Michael Kelso. The trial court granted summary judgment for Kelso, finding no triable issue of fact as to Kelso's statute of limitations defense. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Kelso and two other defendants and awarded costs on appeal to all three defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff's employer offered a promotion to someone else and she accepted it; and (2) the court of appeal erred in awarding costs on appeal to Defendants without first finding that Plaintiff's underlying claim was objectively groundless. View "Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated by his former employer for violating company policies prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace, he filed suit alleging that the stated basis for his termination was pretext and that the real reason he was fired was age discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).Although on a Rule 12(c) motion the district court should not have weighed the plausibility of competing allegations in the movant's pleading or considered evidence extrinsic to the non-movant's pleading, the court affirmed the district court's judgment because plaintiff's complaint failed to plead that either his age or protected speech was a but-for cause of his termination. Likewise, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails for similar reasons. View "Lively v. WAFRA Investment Advisory Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a tenured professor, filed suit against MSCU, the University, and five University employees, under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, claiming various discrimination and retaliation counts. Plaintiff's complaint stemmed from a series of decisions made between 2013 and 2016 about faculty class schedules, resource allocation, and participation in certain programs. Plaintiff, a Black man born in Nigeria, claimed the individual defendants made these adverse decisions against him because of his race and national origin. Plaintiff also claimed the individual defendants retaliated against him for an earlier lawsuit against the University, and for reporting a University employee's alleged discriminatory conduct.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's freestanding section 1981 claims, concluding that he was barred from asserting section 1981 retaliation claims against state actors. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's section 1983 claims, concluding that plaintiff failed to provide direct evidence of retaliation and thus failed to establish causation. View "Onyiah v. St. Cloud State University" on Justia Law

Chatman, an African-American, worked as an instructor assistant, 1988-1996. From 1997-2009, she worked as a school library assistant. In 2009, the Board of Education informed her that it was eliminating her position. Chatman learned that the Board had replaced Chatman (age 62) with a younger, non-African American employee in the same role. Chatman filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC and then sued in Illinois state court. The Board settled. In addition to a monetary payment, the district was to arrange for interviews for open positions for which Chatman was qualified. Chatman began identifying available positions but did not receive any job offer. She filed a new charge with the EEOC and later filed suit, alleging violations of Title VII’s anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions, and violation of the anti-discrimination provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, finding certain claims barred by the statute of limitations, and, regarding other positions, that Chatman could not establish that she was qualified for the positions, nor could she establish that the Board’s nondiscriminatory reasons for not offering her the positions were pretextual for discrimination. Chatman could not establish that she was denied a job because of her prior protected activity. View "Chatman v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Dondero served as the Lower Milford Township Chief of Police from 2006-2016. Dondero’s relationship with the Township Supervisors was rocky. While on duty in 2015, Dondero, then the only active member of the police department, suffered temporary “serious and debilitating injuries” from entering a burning building. While incapacitated, Dondero received disability benefits under Pennsylvania’s Heart and Lung Act (HLA). He went more than two months without contacting his boss, Koplin. In 2016, Koplin requested updated medical documents to verify his continued qualification for HLA benefits. Weeks later, citing financial concerns, the Supervisors passed a resolution to disband the Township police department. From the date of Dondero’s injury through the elimination of the police department (more than nine months) the Pennsylvania State Police provided Township residents full-time police coverage at no extra cost to the Township taxpayers.Dondero filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation, violations of substantive and procedural due process, unlawful conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, municipal liability based on discriminatory Township policies, and a violation of the Pennsylvania state constitution. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Township on all counts. No pre-termination hearing was required when the Township eliminated its police department and Dondero’s other claims lack merit. View "Dondero v. Lower Milford Township" on Justia Law

Logan, an African American man, was a Chicago Aviation Security Officer. In 2015, he applied for a promotion. He was not selected but was placed on a “Pre-Qualified Candidates” list for future vacancies. Two sergeant positions became available. Logan was second on the list. The city informed him that a city policy made internal candidates ineligible for promotion if they had been suspended for more than seven days in the previous 12 months. Logan had been suspended for more than seven days in the previous year.Logan alleges that he was wrongfully singled out for discipline. After his suspension, Logan complained about being bullied at work and about “discrimination against black officers.” After he filed a grievance, an arbitrator concluded that while Logan committed misconduct sufficient to warrant discipline, the length of his suspension was excessive. The arbitrator ordered Logan's promotion with back pay and benefits.Logan then filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of his race and gender and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Other than the fact that Logan is a member of a protected class, there is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that his race caused him to be disciplined. Logan failed to show that his belief that he was opposing an unlawful employment practice was objectively reasonable. View "Logan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's suit brought against Defendant, his employer, asserting claims of age-based discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Puerto Rico's statutory analog, holding that this Court will not adopt any version of the single filing rule that would excuse the procedural failings associated with Plaintiff's suit.In moving to dismiss the complaint, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff neglected to first file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. Plaintiff argued in response that the district court should adopt and apply the "single filing rule," otherwise known as the "piggyback rule," which would allow him to vicariously satisfy his exhaustion obligation by relying upon a timely-filed administrative complaint against his employer made by a similarly-situated plaintiff. The district court declined to adopt the single filing rule, dismissed Plaintiff's ADEA claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Puerto Rico law claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly dismissed the complaint. View "Perez-Abreu v. Metropol Hato Rey LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Union Pacific in Missouri state court, alleging age discrimination, constructive discharge, and hostile work environment claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Plaintiff also filed suit against Missouri resident Foster B. McDaniel, claiming that McDaniel aided and abetted Union Pacific in its discriminatory acts. After Union Pacific removed to federal court, the district court granted McDaniel's motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff's motion to remand. The district court later granted Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in dismissing McDaniel on the basis of fraudulent joinder because plaintiff's complaint failed to make a colorable claim that McDaniel directly oversaw or was actively involved in discrimination. The court also concluded that the district court did nor err in determining plaintiff did not administratively exhaust his constructive discharge claim. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting Union Pacific summary judgment on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim because plaintiff failed to establish age-related harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish the existence of a hostile work environment. View "Henson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. The City asked the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, but the trial court concluded that an appeal to the HR Commission was unnecessary. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury found for plaintiff and awarded him about $4 million, including $2 million in past noneconomic damages and $1.5 million in future noneconomic damages. The trial court subsequently denied the City's motion for a new trial.The Court of Appeal concluded that the involvement of plaintiff's direct superior in the underlying dispute, on one hand, and his expected role in deciding plaintiff's appeal, on the other, violated the requirements of due process and therefore excused plaintiff from proceeding with his administrative appeal. The court also found no reversible evidentiary error by the trial court. However, the court agreed with the City that the $3.5 million noneconomic damages award -- comprising $2 million in past and $1.5 million in future noneconomic damages -- was so excessive as to suggest it resulted from passion or prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the awards for past and future noneconomic damages and remanded for a new trial on these issues, unless plaintiff accepts a reduction of the awards to $1 million and $100,000, respectively. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Briley v. City of West Covina" on Justia Law

Doe is transgender and began presenting publicly as a woman while working for the city, which was supportive of her plans to transition and need for time off. During her transition, an unknown city employee left Doe vulgar items and harassing messages that commented on her transgender identity and stated that people such as Doe should be put to death. Doe reported these incidents. The city asked employees to provide handwriting samples, which were examined for comparison; told employees that the city had a zero-tolerance harassment policy that could result in termination; and interviewed employees in an attempt to identify the harasser. The city eventually notified the police and installed a lock on Doe’s office and cameras. Dissatisfied with that response, Doe contacted a reporter. Doe claims that after her complaints, her supervisor “nit-picked” her work, and she was denied a promotion.Doe sued the city under Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, alleging that the city subjected her to a hostile work environment and then retaliated against her. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. Detroit responded reasonably to Doe’s complaints and the record does not support any causal connection between Doe’s complaints and her failure to receive a promotion. View "Doe v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law