Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Ostrowski worked for the Lake County Sheriff’s Department before a workplace injury left him permanently disabled. He now receives a monthly pension payment from the County. Lake County’s disability pension plan does not provide cost-of-living increases, while its pension plan for non-disabled retirees does. Ostrowski filed suit, arguing that the difference between the plans violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court held that Ostrowski’s suit was barred by a 2017 waiver that he signed while settling a “reasonable accommodation” claim against Lake County. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Ostrowski’s claims were not barred by the waiver, but failed on the merits; the court noted a general exclusion in the agreement for matters affecting Ostrowski’s pension. Retired and other former workers are not protected by Title I of the ADA and Ostrowski forfeited his arguments with respect to the Rehabilitation Act. Ostrowski’s Equal Protection claim qualified only for rational basis review. Lake County has a legitimate interest in providing pension plans that meet the differing needs of distinct groups; the cost-of-living adjustment is one of several relevant differences in the plans. The court reversed an award of fees and costs. View "Ostrowski v. Lake County, Indiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that her former employer violated the ADA by failing to accommodate her disability and instead terminating her from her human resources job after she underwent a bone biopsy surgery on her right shoulder and arm. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to plead a “disability” because she did not adequately allege that she had “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.” The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s employment discrimination action. The court concluded that Plaintiff pleaded facts plausibly establishing that she had a physical impairment both during an immediate post-surgical period and during an extension period in which her surgeon concluded that her injuries had not sufficiently healed to permit her to return to work. The court also found that the activities that Plaintiff pleaded she was unable to perform qualified as “major life activities,” which included caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, lifting, and working. Finally, the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited her ability to perform at least one major life activity. View "KAREN SHIELDS V. CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the Acting Secretary of the Navy (the “Navy”) on her employment retaliation claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. Sec 621, (“ADEA”). The district court awarded judgment after concluding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust certain claims because they were not raised in her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge. It also rejected her remaining retaliation claims.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the Acting Secretary of the Navy (“the Navy”). The court first reasoned that Plaintiff’s claims are without merit because she is procedurally barred from pursuing her claims of exclusion from the CPI Team and the Navy’s alleged failure to promote her because she did not raise them at the administrative level.   Further, even if Plaintiff had administratively exhausted her CPI Team and failure-to-promote claims, the court held it would reach the same result because she failed to plead them in her Amended Complaint.  Third, the district court also correctly determined that Plaintiff’s remaining retaliation claim was unsustainable because there is no direct evidence of retaliation as part of her lateral realignment.  Finally, Plaintiff points to only one alleged comment over six years, which did not amount to evidence of “recurring retaliatory animus.” View "Cathy Walton v. Thomas Harker" on Justia Law

Boshaw, an openly gay man, began working as a server at Midland in May 2018. In discussing a possible promotion, Boshaw’s supervisor suggested he “needed to change [his] appearance and kind of just act a little more masculine” and to remove his Facebook relationship status. Boshaw changed his hairstyle and deleted his Facebook relationship status but did not otherwise hide his sexual orientation. Boshaw was rapidly promoted three times, becoming front-of-house operations manager. Meanwhile, Boshaw reposted his relationship status and used hashtags referencing his sexual orientation. Boshaw had a cordial relationship with his supervisor, who persuaded Boshaw not to accept an offer from another restaurant. Boshaw’s employment record was not spotless.” After other incidents, Boshaw missed a mandatory meeting and did not show up to work that evening. Midland fired Boshaw due to his “absence and failure to notify management” and “other issues.”Boshaw filed an EEOC complaint, then sued, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), and civil rights conspiracy under the ELCRA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Boshaw’s rapid rise shows that Midland did not delay or deny his promotions because of sex discrimination. Even if Boshaw had made a prima facie showing of retaliatory termination, he cannot show that Midland’s reasons for his termination were pretextual. Boshaw alleged only “isolated incidents,” which are not enough to state a hostile work environment claim. View "Boshaw v. Midland Brewing Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Federal Public Defender, was subject to sexual harassment by a supervisor. After attempting to pursue her administrative remedies, Plaintiff claimed she was constructively discharged and resigned. Plaintiff then filed claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, as well as under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985(3) and 1986, against various executive and judicial officers. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims based on her failure to state a claim and Defendant's sovereign immunity.The panel held that Plaintiff's Due Process claim sufficiently plead a deprivation of her property interests, but failed to plead a deprivation of her liberty interest. The panel also held Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim adequately plead sex discrimination; however, her claims under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985(3) and 1986 failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finally, the court determined that Plaintiff could only pursue back-pay benefits from all Defendant's named in their official capacity and that all Defendant's named in their individual capacity were entitled to dismissal under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Thus, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Caryn Strickland v. US" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendants due to Plaintiff's having failed to comply with her discovery obligations, which had earlier been the subject of a conditional order of dismissal, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging that Defendants had discriminated against her in retaliation for her whistleblowing activities and that she was entitled to relief under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act. Ultimately, the hearing justice granted Defendants' motion for final judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff had, over a five-year period, repeatedly failed to comply with her discovery obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice acted within her discretion in ordering the entry of final judgment. View "Boss v. Chamberland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer, the Maryland Military Department, and related entities, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court dismissed Holloway’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim and reversed the dismissal of his unlawful termination and retaliation claims. The court reasoned that to state a claim for unlawful termination, a Title VII plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that his employer discharged him because of his race. Here, Plaintiff alleged facts crucial to raise the inference of a Title VII violation “above a speculative level.”   Next, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. The court held that Plaintiff’s claim passes muster at the pleading stage.   However, the court held that Plaintiff failed to state a claim that he was subject to an abusive or hostile work environment based on his race or protected activity. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that one episode of yelling and pounding the table is sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish an abusive environment. View "Charles Holloway v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified by the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking to clarify the application of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) when the plaintiff's employing entity does not meet the WVHRA definition of "employer," as set out in W. Va. Code 5-11-3(d).Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against her former employer alleging violations of the WVHRA and other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court and moved for dismissal of the WVHRA claim on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to allege that Defendant satisfied the numerosity portion of the WVHRA definition of "employer." The district court denied the motion. Thereafter, the court ordered that a question of law be certified. The Supreme Court answered that an entity that does not meet the WVHRA's definition of employer may not be potentially liable to its own employee as a "person," as defined in W. Va. Code 5-11-3(a), for an alleged violation of W. Va. Code 5-11-9(7). View "Pajak v. Under Armour, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) against the Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund (“Administrators”), alleging gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant and Plaintiff appealed arguing that the district court’s ruling was erroneous.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Administrators. Plaintiff argued that the district court improperly required her to demonstrate that her proffered comparators were strictly identical. The court found that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not present evidence that any male physician shared characteristics that would render them similarly situated. Further, even if Plaintiff established a prima facie case, her claim would not succeed because she did not rebut Defendant’s non-discriminatory reasons for declining to renew her contract.   The court further affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could not establish that her protected conduct was the “but for” reason for the alleged adverse employment action.   Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. The court found that although Plaintiff endured severe treatment by her supervisor, she did not establish that the treatment was based on her gender. View "Saketkoo v. Admin Tulane Educ" on Justia Law

Christopher Ross, a former prosecutor with the Riverside County District Attorney’s office (DA’s Office), sued the County of Riverside for whistleblower retaliation and disability discrimination after the DA’s Office allegedly demoted him and refused to accommodate medical issues in response to Ross raising concerns that the DA’s Office was prosecuting an innocent man for murder. During a deposition, the former district attorney who preceded then-District Attorney Paul Zellerbach, Rodric Pacheco, testified about a conversation he had with the district attorney who succeeded Zellerbach, Mike Hestrin. Pacheco testified that he and Hestrin shared the view that Zellerbach was one of the most unethical attorneys they had encountered as prosecutors. Ross subpoenaed Hestrin for a deposition about his communications with the unidentified County lawyers, as well as regarding advice Hestrin provided to Ross in Hestrin’s capacity as an official in the prosecutors’ union in which Ross was a member. The County moved to quash the subpoena, which the trial court granted. The trial court found Hestrin’s alleged communications with the unidentified County lawyers were irrelevant to Ross’s retaliation and discrimination claims, and that Ross could obtain evidence regarding his union rights from other sources. Ross sought a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to enter a new order denying it. The Court of Appeal denied the petition as it related to evidence concerning Hestrin’s role counseling Ross regarding his union rights. The Court granted the petition as it related to alleged requests by the unidentified County lawyers that Hestrin alter his testimony regarding Zellerbach’s ethical character. “[A]lthough we agree with the trial court that the testimony is irrelevant to the merits of Ross’s substantive claims against the County, the testimony is relevant to Zellerbach’s credibility, and he will likely be a material trial witness. Testimony showing the unidentified County lawyers attempted to suppress or alter a witness’s testimony about the credibility of a material witness is also relevant to show the County’s consciousness of guilt.” View "Ross v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law