Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on his state-law disability-discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as his claims for retaliation and interference under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Plaintiff's claim stemmed from his termination after taking time off of work for open-heart surgery.The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code where there simply is no medical evidence in the record except for plaintiff's own statements that he was qualified to return to work at any point, let alone before his FMLA leave expired; plaintiff failed to establish that he was qualified for either of two positions at work; and there was no other request for accommodations outside of the ability to attend dialysis treatments nor any reasonable explanation to account for the contradictory statements about plaintiff's physical capabilities made in the application for social security benefits. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to support that he engaged in any protected activity under state law that led to retaliation by his employer.In regard to plaintiff's FMLA claims, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not show the prejudice necessary to prevail on an FMLA interference claim. However, in regard to plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim, the adverse employment action occurred approximately one month after plaintiff's FMLA leave expired. The court concluded that a month is close enough in time to create a causal connection. Therefore, the burden shifts to the employer to offer legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse reaction. Although the employer offered three reasons, the court concluded that they have been adequately rebutted for purposes of summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed on all claims except for the FMLA retaliation claim, which it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

During Castilleja's 15 years as Bexar County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) community service officer, he had multiple reprimands and termination warnings. After Castilleja was transferred in 2014, his new manager suspected Castilleja was violating overtime rules. An investigation by Assistant Chief Kelly confirmed Castilleja was routinely taking unapproved overtime and using his work computer to send union-related emails. Castilleja only received counseling and was put on a “performance improvement plan.” Castilleja’s 2015 evaluation rated him “satisfactory” overall but gave him the lowest rating in multiple categories. In 2016, Castilleja was sworn in as president of the Bexar County Probation Officers Association (BCPOA), having served in the union since 2007. Castilleja switched units and other issues came to light, resulting in an audit of Castilleja’s former cases. Brady recommended termination, citing Castilleja’s disregard of “the basic ten[e]ts of case management,” multiple policy violations, plus two instances of conducting union business while at work, and one use of work email to send union-related emails. Meanwhile, the BCPOA issued a no-confidence petition calling for Anderson’s removal. Days later, Anderson heard Castilleja’s appeal. Anderson fired Castilleja.Castilleja and the Union sued Anderson and Brady in their individual and official capacities, claiming that Castilleja was fired in retaliation for union-related speech and association in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims. The evidence established valid reasons for firing Castilleja. View "United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Bless was employed by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 1996-2013. In 2004, Bless earned his law degree and began practicing law in addition to working as a police officer. The Sheriff’s Office requires its employees to request and receive authorization before engaging in secondary employment. In 2004-2008, Bless received the required approval. In 2008, Bless was involved in a collision while on duty. He sustained injuries, was placed on disability leave, and received temporary disability benefits. Shortly after the accident, Bless was elected as a Republican McHenry County Commissioner. Soon after his return to work as a police officer, Bless was transferred to a less desirable shift.Meanwhile, the County discovered that Bless was driving his car while on disability leave although he had a driving restriction. The Office of Professional Review found no records of secondary employment requests for Bless for 2009-2010. Bless claimed that he had submitted those requests. OPR brought filed a complaint with the Merit Board, which found that Bless had engaged in unauthorized secondary employment, violated driving restrictions, and lied to OPR investigators; it directed the Sheriff’s Office to fire Bless. After his termination, Bless filed suit, alleging political retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (the Sheriff is a Democrat) and race discrimination under section 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims on summary judgment. View "Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Missouri resident, filed suit in state court against her former employer, Ferrellgas, a propane supplier, as well as James Ferrell and Pamela Brueckmann, Kansas residents and employees and officers of Ferrellgas. Plaintiff alleged gender discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act against Ferrellgas (Counts I and II), and tort claims against all defendants (Counts IIIVI). After removal to the district court, the district court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration in part.The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in concluding that no language in plaintiff's employment agreement suggested that she consented to arbitrate tort claims arising from actions which predated her employment. The court explained that, though plaintiff's claims are based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions made before and at the time she accepted employment, they are subject to arbitration because they arise out of and relate to the resulting employee agreement and employee relationship. The court also concluded that Ferrell and Brueckmann, officers and agents of Ferrellgas who were not parties to the Employee Agreement, may enforce the arbitration clause. The court concluded that a signatory plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration when she treated signatory and non-signatory defendants as a single unit. In this case, each of plaintiff's tort claims against defendants is a single one that should be referred in its entirety to arbitration. View "Morgan v. Ferrell" on Justia Law

Chicago offers public-school teachers higher pay if they earn extra college credits. Graham sought a higher salary under this program in July 2015, only to have her application ignored. She tried again in September and was fired on the ground that her application had been backdated, which the Board of Education considered fraud. A hearing officer ordered her reinstated with back pay. Graham alleges the Board did not honor this decision in full, published a declaration that she is a fraudster, and refused to consider her for open positions. Graham sued, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by discriminating against her on account of sex and race and of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by depriving her of pension and health benefits.The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint. The complaint does not identify other employees who received better treatment from the school system but It is enough for a plaintiff to assert that she was treated worse because of protected characteristics. The school system’s plans are exempt from ERISA. Because the state not only funds the charter schools but also approves their establishment and continued existence, it is not appropriate to treat them as private institutions subject to public regulation. View "Graham v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's former employer, a restaurant chain, and to his former manager. The court concluded that, although plaintiff presented a prima facie case that the restaurant discriminated and retaliated against him, he failed to offer persuasive evidence that the restaurant's proffered, permissible reasons for his termination were a pretext for unlawful action. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his employer's reasons for firing him—lying and preparing a dish incorrectly—constitute pretextual reasons to cover over racial discrimination and retaliation. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of bad faith or malice to support his tortious interference claim. View "Jones v. Gulf Coast Restaurant Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, PRIDE, a non-profit that employs individuals with disabilities, hired Johnson, an African-American. Johnson endured repeated race-based harassment by his fellow PRIDE employee Palomares. Johnson’s colleague corroborated that Palomares used racially offensive language and generally treated non-Hispanic employees worse than their Hispanic counterparts. Beyond his mistreatment by Palomares, several other workplace incidents occurred that Johnson viewed as harassing. Johnson made multiple complaints regarding Palomares’s harassing behavior and was told, “you’ve just got to be tough and keep going.” Ultimately, Johnson angrily confronted Palomares at PRIDE’s worksite. Johnson was written up and told to “follow instructions and remain respectful.” Johnson interviewed for a supervisory carpentry position. PRIDE selected a Hispanic individual for the position, who, unlike Johnson, had supervisory experience. Johnson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. PRIDE’s Human Resources Director, acknowledged that Johnson reported that Palomares had been harassing him but PRIDE ultimately “did not find that any harassment.” Later that month, PRIDE called Johnson to discuss problems with his attendance. Johnson said coming into work was “too stressful,” declared that he was resigning, and walked out.The district court dismissed Johnson’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 alleging discrimination based on race and retaliation when he complained about the discrimination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. Summary judgment for the employer was proper as to most of Johnson’s claims, but the court erred in its ruling on Johnson’s hostile work environment claim. View "Johnson v. PRIDE Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the employer violated the Nebraska Equal Pay Act and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act by giving her male counterparts better pay despite her stronger work performance.The court concluded that the facts presented were insufficient to establish plaintiff's prima face case under the Nebraska Equal Pay Act because nothing in the record suggests that her position required her to take on the additional duties and responsibilities of her higher-ranked coworkers. Because plaintiff's evidence was insufficient either to establish her prima facie case under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act or to show that the employer's reasons for the pay disparity were pretextual, the district court properly granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. View "Perry v. Zoetis LLC" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion seeking to recover reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses from Montgomery County. Plaintiff's case stems from her action against the county for failure to reasonably accommodate her disability. The district court held that plaintiff is not eligible for such an award because she is not a "prevailing party" under 29 U.S.C. 794a(b).In this case, plaintiff won a jury verdict that found the county liable for discrimination and entitled plaintiff to equitable relief—at least until the county capitulated by transferring her to a call center called MC 311. The court thought that this case is more like Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), and concluded that plaintiff is not a prevailing party because she catalyzed the county to change its behavior by filing a lawsuit; rather, she is a prevailing party because she proved her claim to a jury before the county capitulated by transferring her to MC 311. The court noted that its holding is narrow, and that it would be unjust to hold that plaintiff did not prevail simply because the county's timely capitulation rendered unnecessary equitable relief that she would have otherwise been entitled to. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Brooks, an African American police officer, made statements on multiple occasions complaining that his employer, the Kankakee, Illinois, favored white officers. The City issued a reprimand letter, ordering Brooks to stop making such statements and warning him that he faced discipline up to and including termination should he engage in further public disparagement. Brooks filed a complaint, alleging that Kankakee had retaliated against him, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), by failing to promote him and by issuing to him a reprimand letter after he had engaged in protected activity. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Brooks attempted to introduce a new claim alleging that the City’s promotional policies had a disparate impact on minority officers.The district court dismissed Brooks’s disparate impact claim and granted the City summary judgment on his failure-to-promote retaliation claim. The court denied summary judgment on Brooks’s retaliation-by-reprimand claim, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Brooks’s statements constituted protected activity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of the City. The jury was entitled to conclude that each of Brooks’s statements included varying degrees of factual falsehoods. While the district court instructed the jury to find more than legally required (three acts of retaliation), a proper jury instruction would not have made a difference in the outcome. View "Brooks v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law