Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim, procedural due process claim, and equal protection claim against the DOE and UFT for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).In regard to the fair representation claim, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice but clarified that the claim should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has not limited the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. It has defined the requirements of a cause of action under the National Labor Relations Act to extend only to circumstances in which the employer is not a state or a political subdivision of a state. In this case, because plaintiff cannot allege that he worked for an "employer" under the Act, he fails to state a claim against UFT for violating its duty of fair representation, and his complaint is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).In regard to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the DOE, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support the inference that the alleged racial discrimination and First Amendment retaliation resulted from an official custom or policy. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the DOE deviated from New York Education Law 3020-a procedures and this amounted to a constitutional due process violation. Furthermore, plaintiff's argument that the arbitrator was biased fails because due process does not require that pre-termination hearings occur before a neutral adjudicator. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim of discrimination against public school teachers in New York City based on different procedures for selecting disciplinary hearing arbitrators. Finally, to the extent that plaintiff asserts a new equal protection claim on appeal due to treatment of public school employees represented by a different union, that claim is not properly before the court. View "Green v. Department of Education of the City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nicholas Roberts appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants James Winder, Rosie Rivera (solely in her official capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff), and the Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake (“UPD”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on Roberts’ 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims. All of his claims arose from his removal as Range Master-Firearms Instructor (“Range Master”). On March 1, 2017, at Winder’s request, Undersheriff Scott Carver and Chief Deputy Shane Hudson met with Roberts and informed him that the Range Master position was being eliminated. Hudson told Roberts he would be reassigned to patrol duties and his pay would be reduced. On March 9, Roberts, through counsel, sent a letter to Winder objecting to his removal, reassignment, and pay reduction. Winder treated Roberts’ letter as a grievance and rejected the grievance, explaining that the Range Master was subject to transfer under Merit Commission Policy 3140, Range Master was a specialist position, and Roberts’ merit rank was “sergeant.” The UPD Board later ratified Winder’s decision to remove Roberts as Range Master and reassign him to patrol duties as a sergeant. Winder later assigned Todd Griffiths, a merit rank Lieutenant four years younger than Roberts, to oversee the shooting range. Roberts did not appeal his grievance, and instead filed this complaint in the district court. In June 2017, after Roberts initiated this lawsuit, the UPD conducted two investigations of Roberts’ management of the Range. Both investigations described failures in Roberts’ performance as Range Master. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Defendants on Roberts’ declaratory judgment and due process claims, finding that Roberts did not have a property interest in his position as Range Master, and thus his reassignment did not violate due process. Alternatively, the district court held that Roberts waived his due process claims by failing to appeal Winder’s decision to the Merit Commission. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Roberts v. Winder, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claims alleging that his termination violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, holding that there was no merit to Plaintiff's challenges on appeal.On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant on his Title VII retaliation claim, its dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII hostile work environment claims for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and its denial of Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a claim of disability discrimination. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim, its dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, and its denial of Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint. View "Jenkins v. Housing Court Department" on Justia Law

Breiterman was subjected to three disciplinary actions imposed by her employer, the U.S. Capitol Police. She was suspended after commenting to fellow employees that women had to “sleep with someone” to get ahead. She was later placed on administrative leave and ultimately demoted for leaking a picture of an unattended Police firearm to the press. Although Breiterman admitted to this misconduct, she sued the Police, alleging sex discrimination, retaliation in violation of the Congressional Accountability Act, 2 U.S.C. 1301, and unlawful retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment.The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Police. The Police provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for suspending Breiterman, placing her on administrative leave during an investigation into the media leak, and demoting her from a supervisory position; nothing in the record would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that those reasons were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Supervisors are entrusted with greater authority than officers, held to a higher standard, and disciplined more severely than officers for similar violations, so Breiterman’s nonsupervisory comparators are too dissimilar to draw any inference of discriminatory treatment. Even assuming some procedural deviation occurred, the deviations were not so irregular as to indicate unlawful discrimination. View "Breiterman v. United States Capitol Police" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court dismissing this complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendant, his former employers, violated the antidiscrimination statutes by denying his application for employment following the completion of his criminal sentence. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Supreme Court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff adequately alleged a violation of the antidiscrimination statutes. View "Sassi v. Mobile Life Support Services, Inc." on Justia Law

California’s AB 5 codified the “ABC test” for ascertaining whether workers are classified as employees or independent contractors. The ABC test permits businesses to classify workers as independent contractors only if they meet certain conditions. If a business cannot make that showing, its workers are deemed employees, and the business must comply with specific requirements and state and federal labor laws. AB5 and its amendments, California Labor Code 2778, establishes certain occupational exemptions. Freelance writers, photographers, and others received a narrower exemption than offered to certain other professionals. The Association sued, asserting that AB5 effectuates content-based preferences for certain kinds of speech, burdens journalism, and burdens the right to film matters of public interest.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Section 2778 regulates economic activity rather than speech. It does not, on its face, limit what someone can or cannot communicate. Nor does it restrict when, where, or how someone can speak. The statute is aimed at the employment relationship—a traditional sphere of state regulation. Although the ABC classification may impose greater costs on hiring entities, which could mean fewer overall job opportunities for certain workers, such an indirect impact on speech does not necessarily rise to the level of a First Amendment violation. The court rejected an assertion that the law singled out the press as an institution and was not generally applicable. The legislature’s occupational distinctions were rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. View "American Society of Journalists and Authors, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Specht, employed as a New York City fire marshal, alleged that after he refused to file a false report concerning the circumstances of a fire he was investigating and publicly discussed misconduct on the part of his supervisors, he was the subject of retaliation. The fire had resulted in serious damage to a building where a motion picture was being filmed and the death of a firefighter. Sprecht had reported a tentative conclusion that the fire was caused by the movie crew. He was reassigned after he refused to comply with instructions to report a faulty boiler as the cause. Specht sued, alleging First Amendment retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and other claims. The district court dismissed the suit.The Second Circuit reversed in part Specht alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim but failed to state a New York State Civil Service Law claim or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Sprecht’s report to the Department of Investigation, his meeting with the District Attorney’s office, and his communications with local press touched on matters of public concern. Specht’s refusal to file a false report and his complaints to outside agencies constituted speech as a citizen, rather than only as a public employee. View "Specht v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Ballou filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Police Chief McElvain discriminated against her because of her gender by intentionally subjecting her to internal affairs investigations to preclude her eligibility for promotion and then declining to promote her to sergeant even though she was the most qualified candidate.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of McElvain’s qualified immunity summary judgment motion. Ballou sufficiently alleged unconstitutional sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and established a prima facie claim for disparate treatment. McElvain’s articulated reasons for not promoting Ballou were pretextual. The court rejected, as “profoundly mistaken,” McElvain’s argument that to state an equal protection claim, proof of discriminatory animus alone was insufficient. The existence of a comparator is not a prerequisite to stating a disparate treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on Circuit precedent, any reasonable officer would recognize that discriminatorily conducting an investigation to stall a promotion is unconstitutional. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether McElvain was entitled to qualified immunity on the Equal Protection claim that she suffered retaliation for opposing sex discrimination. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on Ballou’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Ballou’s speech opposing sex discrimination in the workplace was inherently speech on a matter of public concern, protected by the First Amendment. View "Ballou v. McElvain" on Justia Law

The Department filed suit against M&N, alleging numerous causes of action stemming from defendants' operation of a business that purchased retail installment sales contracts from used car dealerships where defendants used a formula that considered the gender of the car purchaser in deciding how much to pay for the contracts. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department on the first and second causes of action, which alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 51) and Civil Code section 51.5, and assessed over $6 million in statutory damages pursuant to Civil Code section 52, subdivision (a). The trial court dismissed the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, which alleged violations of Government Code section 12940, subdivisions (i) and (k) of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in dismissing the fifth cause of action and otherwise affirmed the trial court's judgment. In the fifth cause of action, the Department alleged that M&N "knowingly compelled and coerced its employees to engage in practices that violated" FEHA and Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5, in violation of section 12940, subdivision (i). The court held that employees who are coerced by their employer to violate Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5 are "aggrieved" within the meaning of section 12965, subdivision (a) and have standing to sue their employer pursuant to section 12940, subdivision (i). Therefore, the employees of M&N who were coerced by M&N into violating Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5 could be individually liable for sex discrimination. The court explained that these employees would necessarily be "aggrieved" by their employer's unlawful employment practice as their personal interests would be affected by their employer's misconduct. Therefore, the Department was authorized to file a civil action on behalf of these employees and the trial court erred by dismissing the fifth cause of action. View "Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. M&N Financing Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging discrimination based on age and sex, holding that Appellant's complaint was untimely filed.Following Respondent's termination of Appellant, Appellant sent a letter of inquiry to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and filed a charge of discrimination. After the limitation period for Appellant's potential claims against Respondent expired the Legislature amended Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.430, providing employees an additional ninety days to file a claim after receiving a letter giving them the right to sue. Appellant subsequently filed this complaint, alleging discrimination. The district court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that Appellant's claims expired under the former version of Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.430 and that the Legislature's amendments to that statute did not revive the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly determined that the amendment did not revive Appellant's untimely claims; and (2) Appellant failed to establish the requirements for equitable tolling. View "Salloum v. Boyd Gaming Corp." on Justia Law