Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this vaccination dispute, the First Circuit denied the motion brought by Appellants seeking an injunction pending appeal, holding that Appellants were not entitled to the injunction.Appellants, eight employees of Mass General Brigham, Inc. (MGB), challenged MGB's application of its mandatory vaccination policy to them individually. The policy was issued in June 2021 requiring all MGB employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualified for a medical or religious exemption. After Appellants' requests for exemptions were denied and they still refused to get vaccinated, MGB placed them on unpaid leave. Appellants sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, arguing that MGB unlawfully denied their individual exemption requests. The district court denied Appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction, which would have required Appellants' reinstatement from unpaid leave status. The First Circuit denied Appellants' motion for injunction pending appeal, holding that adequate legal remedies foreclosed injunctive relief. View "Together Employees v. Mass General Brigham Inc." on Justia Law

Fried worked as a manicurist, 2005-2017. Fried complained about female manicurists receiving most of the appointments and that other male manicurists also complained. In 2017, Fried became frustrated and threw a pencil at a computer because customers were requesting female manicurists more often than male manicurists. His manager disciplined him and commented that he might want to find other work. He alleges that his coworkers and customers made harassing comments and that he was told to finish a pedicure for a male customer who had solicited him for sex. Fried filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile environment.The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment against Fried. A reasonable factfinder could decide that Fried’s employer created a hostile work environment. An employer can create a hostile work environment by failing to take immediate and corrective action in response to a coworker’s or third party’s sexual harassment or racial discrimination that the employer knew or should have known about. While comments made by a manager and coworkers on two occasions were insufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim, an employer’s response to unwelcome sexual advances toward an employee can independently create a hostile work environment. Fried’s manager failed to take immediate corrective action and also directed Fried to return to the customer and complete his pedicure. The district court should reconsider the cumulative effect of the coworkers’ comments. View "Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

After a steady buildup of performance problems, Sweet lost her job as a customer service representative in the Bargersville, Indiana clerk-treasurer’s office. Months before she was fired, Sweet criticized Longstreet, the elected clerk-treasurer, for reconnecting the utility service of a delinquent customer who was Longstreet’s wealthy business partner. Arguing that she was fired for vocalizing her opposition to the reconnection, she sued Longstreet and the town alleging retaliation in violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Sweet cited “suspicious timing” in the form of a five-month gap between her criticism and the termination of her employment; an ambiguous affidavit from a fellow employee; and the fact that her former employer offered several reasons for her termination rather than a single, consistent explanation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Even if Sweet’s criticism of Longstreet was constitutionally protected, she lacks sufficient evidence to support an inference that it was a motivating factor in the termination of her employment. The evidence, considered as a whole, indicates that Sweet was fired for multiple reasons, including “her long documented history of deficient performance, failure to improve on requested areas, incidences of bullying and repeated mistakes.” View "Sweet v. Town of Bargersville" on Justia Law

In 2014, Dr. DiCocco, then 67, accepted a job as a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) psychiatrist. As a condition of her hiring, DiCocco, like all new BOP employees, had to pass the Physical Abilities Test, which requires dragging a 75-pound dummy at least 694 feet for three minutes, climbing a ladder to retrieve an object within seven seconds, completing an obstacle course in 58 seconds, running a quarter-mile and handcuffing someone within two minutes and 35 seconds, and climbing three flights of stairs in 45 seconds while wearing a 20-pound weight belt. DiCocco took the test and failed. Under BOP policy, she could retake the test within 24 hours, but she declined. She was informed that unless she resigned, her BOP employment would be terminated. She resigned. After exhausting her administrative remedies, DiCocco filed suit, alleging disparate-impact theories of sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. 621–634.The Fourth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of the complaint. In finding that DiCocco’s resignation did not constitute an “adverse employment action.” the district court inappropriately intertwined its standing analysis with the merits. DiCocco alleged that she suffered financial and job-related injuries that are fairly traceable to the government’s action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. The age discrimination claim was properly dismissed because the ADEA provision applicable to federal-sector employees does not provide a disparate-impact cause of action. View "DiCocco v. Garland" on Justia Law

This case concerns OSHA's November 5, 2021 Emergency Temporary Standard requiring employees of covered employers to undergo COVID-19 vaccination or take weekly COVID-19 tests and wear a mask.The Fifth Circuit granted petitioners' motion for a stay pending review, holding that the Nken factors favored a stay. The court concluded that petitioners' challenges to the Mandate are likely to succeed on the merits. The court stated that, on the dubious assumption that the Mandate does pass constitutional muster, it is nonetheless fatally flawed on its own terms. The court wrote that the Mandate's strained prescriptions combine to make it the rare government pronouncement that is both overinclusive (applying to employers and employees in virtually all industries and workplaces in America, with little attempt to account for the obvious differences between the risks facing, say, a security guard on a lonely night shift, and a meatpacker working shoulder to shoulder in a cramped warehouse) and underinclusive (purporting to save employees with 99 or more coworkers from a "grave danger" in the workplace, while making no attempt to shield employees with 98 or fewer coworkers from the very same. The court found that promulgation of the Mandate grossly exceeds OSHA's statutory authority and found arguments to the contrary unavailing.The court also concluded that it is clear that denial of petitioners' proposed stay would do them irreparable harm where the Mandate threatens to substantially burden the liberty interests of reluctant individuals, companies, and the States. In contrast, the court stated that a stay will do OSHA no harm whatsoever. Finally, the court concluded that a stay is firmly in the public interest. View "BST Holdings, LLC v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's employment discrimination complaint against Mercy Hospital Rogers, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (ACRA), Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-101 to -108.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff failed to plead that Mercy made any false representations of material fact sufficient to sustain a fraud action; (2) because Plaintiff failed to state an exception to the at-will doctrine, the circuit court properly dismissed Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim; and (3) given the circuit court's lack of factual development on the issue, the Supreme Court cannot determine whether Mercy is a religious organization entitled to the ACRA religious-organization exemption, and therefore, remand was required. View "Jenkins v. Mercy Hospital Rogers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court (1) resolving the parties' summary judgment motions, ruling in favor of Defendant, Plaintiff's former employer, in Plaintiff's wrongful discharge lawsuit; and (2) denying Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint in that case to add an age discrimination claim, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in holding that Defendant's failure to exhaust internal grievance procedures precluded his wrongful discharge case as a matter of law; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding Defendant's age discrimination claim futile and therefore denying his motion for leave to amend the complaint. View "Hathaway v. Zoot Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim and granting summary judgment for Defendants on all remaining counts, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued the City of East Providence, Rhode Island, its School Department, and the School Superintendent, asserting claims arising from what she alleged were unlawful discriminatory employment actions taken against her. The First Circuit resolved all claims in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to plead even a prima facie case of discrimination; and (2) Plaintiff's claim of retaliatory employment discrimination was not supported by admissible evidence that would warrant putting the case to a jury. View "Lima v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Bank, alleging that the Bank violated 42 U.S.C. 1981 by taking retaliatory employment actions against him because he opposed racial discrimination occurring within his department.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant leave to amend his complaint where he failed to offer any grounds as to why his leave should be granted or how deficiencies in his complaint could be corrected. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1981 when it concluded that he did not engage in a protected activity. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concluded that plaintiff has successfully pleaded facts that could support a reasonable belief. In this case, plaintiff alleged that he overheard a supervisor state that "he intended to terminate four (4) African American employees." The court explained that a supervisor's considering of the race of an employee when deciding to terminate that employee is an unlawful employment practice. Furthermore, after plaintiff gave a statement to a human resources investigator, he alleges that the company began to retaliate against him by denying his loans, giving him multiple warnings, sending him to unnecessary training, and ultimately terminating him. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Scott v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

Appellant Jessica Adams worked for C3 Pipeline Construction, Inc. (“C3”) on a pipeline construction crew. C3 subcontracted with Alpha Crude Connector, LLC (“Alpha Crude” or “ACC”) on an ACC pipeline system in New Mexico and Texas. Adams alleged that three C3 workers sexually harassed her while they were working on this project in New Mexico. She sued C3 and Plains Defendants, Alpha Crude’s corporate successors, under federal and New Mexico law. When Plains Defendants answered the complaint, they moved for summary judgment, attaching their Master Service Agreement (“MSA”) with C3 and affidavits from managers stating that Plains Defendants did not “employ” C3’s workers. Adams opposed the motion, moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to take discovery on her alleged “employment” relationship with Plains Defendants, and argued for the first time that Plains Defendants should have been liable for breaching their duty to keep her safe on their premises. The district court granted summary judgment to Plains Defendants, denied Adams’s Rule 56(d) motion, and construed her premises liability argument as a motion to amend her complaint and denied it as futile. That same day, the district court ordered Adams to serve a summons and the complaint on C3, which she did. When C3 did not answer the complaint, the court entered a default judgment against C3 and ordered it to pay Adams $20,050,000. Within 30 days of that order, Adams appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Plains Defendants. After its review, the Tenth Circuit: (1) denied Plains Defendants’ motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely; (2) affirmed the district court’s summary judgment and Rule 56(d) rulings; and (3) vacated its denial of Adams’s motion to amend and remanded for further proceedings. View "Adams v. C3 Pipeline Construction, et al." on Justia Law