Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings in an action brought by plaintiff against Wal-Mart Stores under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Texas law. Plaintiff, a pharmacist and black man from Cameroon, West Africa, alleged that Wal-Mart intentionally subjected and/or allowed him to be subjected to discrimination based on race, color, and national origin, illegal harassment, and a hostile work environment. Plaintiff also alleged that Wal-Mart retaliated against him for complaining about discrimination and asserting his rights.The court concluded that the district court did not reversibly err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim where it is not evident that a triable dispute exists relative to whether Wal-Mart remained aware that plaintiff suffered continued harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury and in refusing to provide the specific Cat's Paw instructions that plaintiff requested. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on the retaliation claim under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981; the court rejected challenges to the jury verdict form; and the court rejected claims challenging the punitive damages award and claims of evidentiary errors. View "Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC" on Justia Law

Simpson unsuccessfully applied to work as a Correctional Officer at the Cook County Department of Corrections four times in 2014-2017. Simpson believed the hiring practices underlying those rejections violated his rights—and those of other unsuccessful Black applicants—under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). Invoking disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, Simpson’s class action complaint alleged that, through the use of a five-step hiring process for correctional officers, the Department both intended to discriminate against Black applicants and succeeded in producing that result. The district court denied Simpson’s motion for class certification, finding that none of his proposed classes—a general class of all unsuccessful applicants and five subclasses of candidates dismissed at each step of the hiring process—satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirement that they present “questions of law or fact common to the class.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s analysis apparently merged Simpson’s disparate impact claims with his disparate treatment claims for intentional discrimination. While disparate treatment claims may require a more searching commonality inquiry, disparate impact claims most often will not: the common questions are whether the challenged policy has in fact disparately impacted the plaintiff class and, if so, whether that disparate impact is justified by business necessity. The court did not clearly delineate its reasoning for declining to certify three of Simpson’s disparate impact subclasses. View "Simpson v. Dart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the summary judgment entered in the superior court in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and discharge, holding that there was no error.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, her former employer, violated the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 26 831-840; the Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 5, 4551-4634; and Me. Rev. Stat. 26 570. The court granted Defendant summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment in favor of Defendant was appropriate; and (2) the court did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) because Defendant's electronic service did not violate Plaintiff's right to due process. View "Handlin v. Broadreach Public Relations, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court entering summary judgment against the political discrimination claims brought by Plaintiffs, former Automobile Accident Compensation Administration (AACA) employees, against Defendants, the AACA and its former executive director, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiffs were laid off pursuant to an agency-wide, facially-neutral layoff plan based on seniority. Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of their rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with violations of Puerto Rico law. The district court adopted Puerto Rico court decisions concluding that it was the Board of Directors, and not the Executive Director, that was responsible for the layoff plan, and then granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs were barred from arguing in this litigation that the executive director was responsible for the layoff plan. View "Diaz-Baez v. Alicea-Vasallo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Patricia Crowe appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to defendant Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC (Appalachian), on Crowe’s claim that Appalachian violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and RSA chapter 354-A by refusing to accommodate her sciatica. Crowe worked at Appalachian as an assembler, which required her to have the ability to bend, lift and turn freely. After a trip to the emergency room, Crowe returned to work and informed her supervisor she had been diagnosed with sciatica. Crowe requested the ability to sit until her pain subsided and she could resume standing. Appalachian requested a doctor’s note explaining her condition; she obliged with the emergency room discharge instructions that stated, “NO LIFTING, BENDING OR STOOPING FOR 1 WEEK.” After reviewing the discharge instructions, Appalachian sent Crowe home until she was released to work by her doctor. On June 1, 2017, after Crowe missed work for eight days without providing an update on her condition, Appalachian determined that she had voluntarily quit. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appalachian on the ground that Crowe had not established she was a “qualified individual” under the ADA or RSA chapter 354-A. On appeal, Crowe argued that she could have performed the essential functions of her job if Appalachian had not sent her home and, instead, continued to allow her to sit as requested. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that an employer, did not need to provide futile or ineffective accommodations. "Once Crowe was on leave, Appalachian was entitled to rely on the doctor’s evaluation that Crowe was unable to return to work. ... although a request for leave can, in some circumstances, trigger an employer’s obligation to make reasonable accommodations under the ADA, Crowe’s doctor’s inquiry about the availability of FMLA was not such a request." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly determined that Appalachian was entitled to summary judgment on Crowe’s ADA and RSA chapter 354-A claims. View "Crowe v. Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jamie Herrmann appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation (“the City”) on her claims for failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Herrmann began working for the City in 2002 and successfully held different positions in the Salt Lake City Justice courts for nine years. Starting in 2011, Herrmann began working as an in-court clerk, which required her to spend more time in court than her previous positions. Herrmann was diagnosed with PTSD, stemming from a nearly decade-long abusive marriage. Her presence in the courtroom during domestic violence cases frequently triggered her anxiety, causing severe migraines that could last for several days at a time and resulting in a significant downturn in her productivity. Herrmann raised three claims under the ADA: (1) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (2) disability discrimination, and (3) retaliation. The Tenth Circuit found Herrmann presented some evidence supporting a conclusion that she could not be accommodated within her existing position. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that Herrmann did not meet her prima facie case. As the district court did not address the other elements of Herrmann’s prima facie case the City challenged, judgment was reversed and the case remanded to provide the district court with that opportunity. View "Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corporation" on Justia Law

After being fired from the CTA, Miller and McGuire (both Caucasian) sued their former employer, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal (42 U.S.C 1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and Illinois state law. Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Despite receiving two extensions, however, Miller and McGuire failed to respond. Finding no persuasive excuse for this failure, the district court denied their third extension and took up the motion without a responsive pleading. The court concluded that the undisputed evidence did not support the claims and granted CTA summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an extension, and evidence of basic elements of a retaliation claim was lacking. Miller and McGuire could not avoid summary judgment based on the suspicious timing of their discharges alone unless, “[a]t minimum,” they first produced evidence supporting a reasonable inference that Bonds (a CTA officer) knew of their EEO complaints. They did not. Undisputed evidence showed that CTA had legitimate (nonracial) reasons for terminating Miller and McGuire’s employment and these reasons were not pretextual. View "Miller v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Department's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Louisiana has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In this case, plaintiff filed suit for disability discrimination under the Act after he was terminated from his job of nearly twenty-four years based on his medical problems. The court also denied plaintiff's request to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, concluding that this case does not present a genuinely unsettled matter of Louisiana law and thus certification is not appropriate. View "Fletcher v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging retaliation, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against plaintiff's former employer, Workforce Development and the state of Iowa, as well as against certain former supervisors and coworkers. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from her termination as an ALJ based on allegations that she fraudulently filed insurance enrollment forms and had deliberately falsified her daughter's marital status. Plaintiff alleged that her termination was based on retaliation for her testimony before the Oversight Committee and that the insurance fraud investigation constituted a mere pretext.In regard to the whistleblower retaliation claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that she was suspended or terminated in reprisal for her testimony. In regard to the defamation claim, the court concluded that Defendant Wahlert was entitled to summary judgment with respect to her allegedly defamatory testimony to the Oversight Committee where her testimony and related actions were within the scope of her employment. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to establish any constitutional violation as to the First Amendment retaliation claim; defendants' conduct was not sufficiently egregious to satisfy the outrageousness prong of the Iowa tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim based on the Iowa Constitution's free speech clause. View "Ackerman v. Iowa" on Justia Law

Davis, a former Congressman, mayoral candidate, candidate for governor of Alabama, and federal prosecutor, is Black. In 2016, he became Executive Director of LSA, a non-profit law firm serving low-income Alabamians. Davis experienced problems with some of his subordinates and colleagues; some complained to LSA’s Executive Committee. On August 18, 2017, as Davis left work, he was informed that the Executive Committee had voted to suspend him with pay pending an investigation of those complaints. A “Suspension Letter” cited spending decisions outside the approved budget, failure to follow LSA's hiring policies and procedures, creating new initiatives without Board approval, and creating a hostile work environment for some LSA employees. LSA posted a security guard in front of its building and hired Mowery, an Alabama political consultant, to handle public relations related to Davis’s suspension. Mowery had handled one of Davis’s failed political campaigns until their relationship soured; Mowery had worked for the campaign of Davis’s opponent in another race.Days later, Davis notified the Board of his resignation. He filed suit, alleging race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and under Title VII, and defamation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Being placed on paid leave was not an adverse employment action and Davis did not raise a fact issue on his constructive discharge claim. LSA’s disclosures to Mowery did not constitute “publication”—an essential element of defamation. View "Davis v. Legal Services Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law