Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a temporary employee on a construction job suffered a diabetic attack at work. Six days later, the plaintiff was terminated along with several others. After exhausting her administrative remedies, the plaintiff sued her employer in the Eastern District of Texas, bringing claims for damages under the ADA, alleging she had been discriminated against due to her diabetes.The circuit court found that the evidence was that plaintiff was terminated immediately after an event that highlighted her ADA-protected disability. The court reasoned proximity of her diabetic episode on the job and her termination was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case that she was included in the group to be terminated for ADA violative reasons. The court further found that plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination and show that a fact question exists as to whether that explanation is pretextual. Thus, the plaintiff established the elements of her prima facie case and she has also presented “substantial evidence” that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory rationale for her inclusion in the reduction in force was pretextual. An issue of material fact remains regarding whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her disability by including her in the reduction of force. View "Gosby v. Apache Industrial" on Justia Law

Indiana legislators, lobbyists, and legislative staff enjoy a party on the day the legislature adjourns for the year. The March 2018 celebration was held at AJ’s Lounge in Indianapolis. Hill, the state’s Attorney General, appeared at the party and made passes at several women, moving from verbal to physical harassment, including groping. A special prosecutor concluded that criminal charges were inappropriate. The Indiana Supreme Court suspended Hill’s law license for 30 days, a punishment mitigated by his long, previously unblemished record. His bid for renomination failed. His term as Attorney General ended in January 2021.Women legislative employees filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, other statutes, and Indiana’s common law. The district judge dismissed all claims against Hill without prejudice to their renewal in state court and dismissed all claims against Indiana, ruling that it is not the plaintiffs’ employer. Claims against the House and Senate remain pending in the district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals. Indiana cannot be treated as the plaintiffs’ “employer” under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), e–2(a). They were hired, and are supervised, by the House or Senate, which holds the sole power to discipline, fire, or reward them. The statute requires people to sue their own employers, so it is irrelevant whether the state employs the Attorney General. View "DaSilva v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Employer's motion for a new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict following a jury trial on Employee's claims of sex and gender identity discrimination and dismissing Employee's claims against a third-party administrator on summary judgment, holding that the court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's denial of Employer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissed the jury's verdict as to Employee's sex discrimination claims, holding that the district court erred in submitting the sex discrimination claim to the jury; (2) affirmed the jury's verdicts as to employee's gender identity discrimination claims; (3) affirmed the jury's damages award in favor of Employee in the full amounts that the jury entered; and (4) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Employer. View "Vroegh v. Iowa Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Reives, who is Black, worked for the Illinois State Police (ISP) from 1989 until he retired in 2018. In 2016, he had been suspended for 60 days for violating internal rules of conduct prohibiting false statements in connection with his employment. The same year, Reives’s supervisors downgraded his ratings on his performance evaluation, leading him to receive a lower ranking on a list of officers certified for promotion. Reives sued, alleging that these two incidents constituted race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ISP. When a plaintiff alleges that an employer disciplined him more harshly than his comparator, the most relevant similarities are those between the employees’ alleged misconduct, performance standards, and disciplining supervisor. Reives and his comparator, Kim, engaged in different misconduct and were punished for violating different rules. Reives cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Reives’s claim also fails under a more straightforward evaluation of the evidence. Reives was still certified for promotion in 2016 and did not explain how his lower ranking affected his promotion prospects. View "Reives v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in this civil rights action brought by plaintiff against his prior employer with one exception: the court reversed as to the hostile work environment claim. The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently severe, can give rise to a viable Title VII claim. In this case, the incident plaintiff has pleaded, that his supervisor directly called him a racial epithet containing the n-word in front of his fellow employees, states an actionable claim of hostile work environment. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Woods v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its prior opinion, denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed the district court' s order denying qualified immunity to Police Chief James McElvain on plaintiff's First Amendment and Equal Protection disparate treatment claim. The panel stated that McElvain was profoundly mistaken in arguing that to state an equal protection claim, proof of discriminatory animus alone was insufficient, and plaintiff must show that defendants treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. Rather, the panel held that the existence of a comparator is not a prerequisite to stating a disparate treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, plaintiff established a prima facie claim for disparate treatment and the record supported the conclusion that McElvain's articulated reasons for not promoting Ballou were pretextual.In regard to McElvain's argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim that she was retaliated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel cannot discern from the district court's order whether it has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to resolve that question, and thus the panel remanded to the district court to clarify its ruling. Finally, the panel concluded that plaintiff's speech opposing sex discrimination in the workplace was inherently speech on a matter of public concern and was clearly protected by the First Amendment. View "Ballou v. McElvain" on Justia Law

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law

See is a law-enforcement officer for the Illinois Gaming Board, which often hires State Police officers. As a union representative, See expressed concern that the Board’s promotion policies gave State Police employees unfair advantages. See then began to exhibit signs of paranoia. He complained to Board management that his supervisor was spreading malicious rumors about him to intimidate and scare him. He said that his wife was “seriously afraid” that the State Police would harm them. Management became concerned about his mental stability and placed him on administrative leave pending an examination of his fitness for duty. A few weeks later See passed the examination and returned to work.See filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), section 12112, by requiring him to undergo a medical examination without a job-related justification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if See established a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendants offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing him on leave and requiring a fitness-for-duty examination: they were genuinely concerned about his mental health. See presented no evidence that this reason was pretextual. See is an armed law enforcement officer, so the possibility of mental instability posed a serious public-safety concern the examination was job-related and consistent with business necessity. View "See v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, his former employer, and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that Defendant terminated his employment because of his age and because he received a liver transplant, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging disability discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant and dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence on the record did not support either Plaintiff's ADA claim or his ADEA claim. View "Lahens v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the predominant relationship between a medical resident and a hospital residency program is an employee-employer relationship, and so the rule of academic deference does not apply to the jury's determination whether the resident was terminated for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons. In this case, plaintiff presented credible evidence of gender discrimination and retaliation by SMMC, and there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the erroneous jury instruction, she would have obtained a more favorable verdict. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Khoiny v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law