Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the USTA discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and discriminatorily interfered with his employment contract with AJ Squared Security, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, by rejecting his temporary assignment as a security guard for the 2016 U.S. Open.The Second Circuit concurred with the district court that plaintiff has failed to state any claim for relief under Title VII or section 1981. The court concluded that plaintiff did not plausibly allege the existence of an employer-employee relationship necessary to sustain his Title VII claims. Furthermore, plaintiff did not allege any facts to support his claim under section 1981 that, but for his race, the USTA would not have interfered with his employment contract. However, because plaintiff—represented by court-appointed counsel for the first time on appeal—has indicated that he can plead further allegations of a "joint employer" relationship, and because he has plausibly alleged that the USTA rejected his assignment in retaliation for his protected activities against a USTA subcontractor, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and remanded with instructions that plaintiff be permitted to amend his complaint as to that claim. The court affirmed as to the Title VII and section 1981 claims. View "Felder v. United States Tennis Association" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging race discrimination after defendant terminated plaintiff. The court concluded that the district court properly found that plaintiff failed to show that defendant engaged in race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, in the alternative, plaintiff provided a convincing mosaic of discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment at this stage. In this case, plaintiff has met his burden of showing factual disputes that should be decided by a jury—a jury whose role it is to weigh conflicting evidence and make any necessary credibility determinations. Therefore, the court remanded for further consideration. View "Jenkins v. Nell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race in refusing to hire another teacher in the drama department to assist him with tech work in connection with his staging of student performances or, alternatively, in refusing to provide him with additional compensation for the tech work that he performs. Plaintiff also alleged that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race when compensating him for his "extra-duty" work in connection with other events at the high school.The Fourth Circuit concluded that plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that the school board's failure to pay him a Theater Technical Director Supplement constituted race-based employment discrimination. While the court agreed that it was error for the district court to consult the School of the Arts' website in determining whether the complaint properly alleged that the School of the Arts was an appropriate comparator, the court concluded that the error was harmless. The court also concluded that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for plaintiff on his discrimination claim based on the denial of assistance. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff did not provide a valid comparator for purposes of supporting this racial discrimination claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a portion of the complaint for failing to state a claim. In regard to the remaining claims, the court granted the school board's motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to present sufficient evidence to support his claims. View "Tabb v. Board of Education of the Durham Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of First Care in an action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that First Care unlawfully terminated them from their positions at an assisted-living facility. First Care claimed that plaintiffs were terminated because, as mandatory reporters, they had failed to immediately report observed abuse.The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege a claim of retaliation under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(1)(c) where they have failed to identify any demand by First Care to engage in an unlawful action. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1104(1) failed because plaintiffs ultimately failed to identify a similarly situated comparator. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue for trial regarding the district court's exclusion of investigator notes and reports on hearsay grounds. View "Walker v. First Care Management Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's federal and Massachusetts state law employment discrimination claims, holding that that court erred in granting summary judgment as to several of Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant, an online home furnishings company with a principal place of business in Massachusetts, sued Defendant bringing claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4.1, 4.4, and 4.4A. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all claims. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's state and federal claims for failing to remedy sexual harassment; and (2) erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Forsythe v. Wayfair, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant United Airlines (“United”) appealed a district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), and its motion for new trial. A jury found that United discriminated against two flight attendants, Plaintiffs-Appellees Jeanne Stroup and Ruben Lee by terminating them because of their ages in willful violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). United filed its motions with the district court, contending, among other things, that the jury’s verdict was based on legally insufficient evidence and the court erred in admitting Plaintiffs’ testimony about their emotional distress. The district court denied the motions. United contended: (1) the district court erred in denying its JMOL motion because (a) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that United discriminated against Plaintiffs because of their ages in violation of the ADEA, and (b) similarly, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that United acted willfully in committing any ADEA violation; and (2) the court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it admitted Plaintiffs’ allegedly irrelevant and highly prejudicial emotional distress testimony. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find that, not only did United violate the ADEA by discriminating against Plaintiffs, but it did so willfully. Furthermore, the Court determined the district court did not err by admitting the challenged emotional distress testimony. View "Stroup, et al. v. United Airlines" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court rejecting the jury's advisory verdict in this case, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Plaintiff, a former intelligence specialist, sued his former employer, the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Puerto Rico pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging discriminatory retaliation and constructive discharge resulting from a hostile work environment. After a jury returned a verdict on liability for retaliation and awarding the statutory maximum in damages, the district court charged the jury to return an advisory verdict on the issue of damages for constructive discharge. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff as to that issue, and thereafter, Plaintiff sought a judgment of front and back pay. The district court rejected the jury's advisory verdict, concluding that the verdict was not supported by the evidence, that Plaintiff was not constructively discharged, and that Plaintiff was not entitled to front or back pay. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff waived his objection to the district court's decision to submit the constructive discharge issue to an advisory jury; and (2) the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous. View "Reyes-Caparros v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Brookline, Massachusetts on Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Brookline violated his equal protection rights in terminating his employment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's evidence failed to establish that the Town's proffered reasons for failing to accommodate and then dismissing Plaintiff were a pretext for race discrimination. View "Fincher v. Town of Brookline" on Justia Law

Appellant Jeffrey Booth, then an installation service manager for Appellee Home Depot, U.S.A., noticed at a job site that a customer was being charged for window wraps that were not needed. Booth phoned and emailed his supervisor about the perceived overcharge. The next day, Appellee began an investigation of Booth for an email he sent ten days earlier critiquing a colleague's work performance. After a one-day investigation of the allegation in the email, and two days after the overcharge report, Appellant Booth was terminated. Booth sued Home Depot in Oklahoma state court claiming wrongful termination under Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (1989), alleging his job performance was good and that the email investigation was only a pretext for the real reason for termination -- his reporting of the overcharging of customers to his supervisor. Home Depot removed the Oklahoma County case to the federal district court under diversity jurisdiction. In his amended federal complaint, Booth claimed that the overcharging of customers violated the Oklahoma Home Repair Fraud Act and/or the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. Home Depot did not dispute that, if overcharging occurred, it would violate those acts. Home Depot argued that the violation of the statutes did not articulate a clear mandate of Oklahoma public policy sufficient to support a Burk tort. The federal district court agreed with Home Depot that the statutes did not articulate a clear public policy and dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Booth then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which then certified a question about the statutes to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Supreme Court responded: the OHRFA and the OCPA protect specific individual consumers against fraud with criminal and civil remedies for those individual victims. "The Court will not expand our public policy exceptions to include protection from economic harm. Without a clear mandate from the Legislature, the Acts do not qualify as an established public policy." View "Booth v. Home Depot, U.S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Tiffany Litzsinger worked for the Adams County Coroner’s Office from 2013 until she was terminated in 2018. During her time there, Litzsinger suffered from anxiety and depression, both of which worsened in the months leading up to her termination. After an anxiety episode, Adams County granted Litzsinger temporary leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). When Litzsinger returned from her FMLA leave, the Coroner placed Litzsinger on probation for myriad violations of workplace policies. Shortly after Litzsinger’s probation began, the Coroner terminated Litzsinger for violating the terms of her probation. Litzsinger sued the Coroner’s Office under the FMLA and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming the Coroner terminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under both statutes. The district court granted summary judgment for the Coroner’s Office because Litzsinger failed to demonstrate that the Coroner’s reason for terminating her was pretextual. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding a rational jury could not find that the Coroner’s proffered reason for firing Litzsinger was pretextual. View "Litzsinger v. Adams County Coroner's Office" on Justia Law