Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) against the Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund (“Administrators”), alleging gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant and Plaintiff appealed arguing that the district court’s ruling was erroneous.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Administrators. Plaintiff argued that the district court improperly required her to demonstrate that her proffered comparators were strictly identical. The court found that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not present evidence that any male physician shared characteristics that would render them similarly situated. Further, even if Plaintiff established a prima facie case, her claim would not succeed because she did not rebut Defendant’s non-discriminatory reasons for declining to renew her contract.   The court further affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could not establish that her protected conduct was the “but for” reason for the alleged adverse employment action.   Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. The court found that although Plaintiff endured severe treatment by her supervisor, she did not establish that the treatment was based on her gender. View "Saketkoo v. Admin Tulane Educ" on Justia Law

Christopher Ross, a former prosecutor with the Riverside County District Attorney’s office (DA’s Office), sued the County of Riverside for whistleblower retaliation and disability discrimination after the DA’s Office allegedly demoted him and refused to accommodate medical issues in response to Ross raising concerns that the DA’s Office was prosecuting an innocent man for murder. During a deposition, the former district attorney who preceded then-District Attorney Paul Zellerbach, Rodric Pacheco, testified about a conversation he had with the district attorney who succeeded Zellerbach, Mike Hestrin. Pacheco testified that he and Hestrin shared the view that Zellerbach was one of the most unethical attorneys they had encountered as prosecutors. Ross subpoenaed Hestrin for a deposition about his communications with the unidentified County lawyers, as well as regarding advice Hestrin provided to Ross in Hestrin’s capacity as an official in the prosecutors’ union in which Ross was a member. The County moved to quash the subpoena, which the trial court granted. The trial court found Hestrin’s alleged communications with the unidentified County lawyers were irrelevant to Ross’s retaliation and discrimination claims, and that Ross could obtain evidence regarding his union rights from other sources. Ross sought a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to enter a new order denying it. The Court of Appeal denied the petition as it related to evidence concerning Hestrin’s role counseling Ross regarding his union rights. The Court granted the petition as it related to alleged requests by the unidentified County lawyers that Hestrin alter his testimony regarding Zellerbach’s ethical character. “[A]lthough we agree with the trial court that the testimony is irrelevant to the merits of Ross’s substantive claims against the County, the testimony is relevant to Zellerbach’s credibility, and he will likely be a material trial witness. Testimony showing the unidentified County lawyers attempted to suppress or alter a witness’s testimony about the credibility of a material witness is also relevant to show the County’s consciousness of guilt.” View "Ross v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Indiana University hired Palmer, who is Black, as a lecturer in Business Marketing in 2010. In 2013, Palmer inquired about his potential for early promotion to senior lecturer. His Department Chair said that it was rare for lecturers to apply for senior lecturer prior to their sixth year and suggested that Palmer wait. Palmer did not apply for early promotion. In 2016, IU promoted Palmer to senior lecturer. Palmer also served as Diversity Coach in the MBA program, for an additional $25,000 per year and a reduced course load; he resigned as Diversity Coach after the 2016–2017 school year. . In 2016, the Marketing Department hired Gildea, who is white, as a new lecturer and as Director of the Business Marketing Academy (BMA). Palmer complained that Gildea’s base salary nearly matched Palmer’s base salary. Palmer earned $98,750; Gildea earned $94,000, with no other lecturer or senior lecturer in their department earning over $90,000. Palmer also complained of discrimination.Palmer filed an EEOC charge, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and subsequently filed suit. Palmer’s failure-to-promote claim is time-barred. His unequal pay claim fails on the merits. Palmer enjoyed higher pay than all of his colleagues, except Gildea, who is not a proper comparator. View "Palmer v. Indiana University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claims his former employer, the Transit Authority of the City of Omaha (“Metro”), discriminated against him based on his disability and retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity. Metro appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not disclose the witness as an expert and it only learned the witness was a LIMHP at her trial deposition. The court reasoned that under Rule 26, non-retained experts are subject to less stringent disclosure requirements than retained experts. Further, the contents of the witness’ testimony were disclosed at the beginning of the case. Plaintiff provided what he thought was accurate information at the time of initial disclosures. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the witness’s testimony because she testified as a treating practitioner only.The court affirmed the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on both the ADA and ADEA claims. Taken together, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s disability was a motivating factor in Metro terminating him. Finally, under the plain language of the ADA, the district court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees. View "John Gruttemeyer v. Transit Authority" on Justia Law

In this action for declaratory judgment the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the superior court denying Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment for Justin Araujo, the complainant in a proceeding before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, holding that the hearing justice erred.Araujo filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that Family Dollar, his employer, had discriminated against him on the basis of an illness. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that included a release. At issue was whether the release unambiguously constituted a waiver by Araujo of his right to pursue all claims he could make against Family Dollar. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Araujo, entering judgment declaring that the release did not cover Araujo's discrimination claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the release unambiguously precluded Araujo from pursuing a discrimination charge with the Commission. View "Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Araujo" on Justia Law

The defendant hired the plaintiff as a gardener and required him to sign an employment agreement (“Agreement”), which mandates arbitration of “all disputes between Employee and Company relating, in any manner whatsoever, to the employment or termination” of the employee. Plaintiff sued his employer, and the employer demanded arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the defendant waived the right to arbitrate, that he did not sign the Agreement or signed without informed consent, and the Agreement is unconscionable.On appeal, the court reasoned that arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1281. To declare an agreement unenforceable, a court must find procedural and substantive unconscionability. Here, the court found that defendant had superior bargaining power over the plaintiff. Further, the employer drafted the Agreement and presented it to the plaintiff as a condition of employment on a take-it-or-leave basis. The plaintiff claimed he had no opportunity to review the Agreement and was told the English-language Agreement involved a company change, not that it waived his right to a jury trial. The plaintiff was instructed to sign the Agreement or be fired.The court found that the employer presented the plaintiff with an agreement in a language he cannot read, misrepresented the nature of the document, denied him an opportunity to review it, included unfair and onerous provisions, and chilled his ability to claim civil rights violations. Thus, the court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Nunez v. Cycad Management LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a temporary employee on a construction job suffered a diabetic attack at work. Six days later, the plaintiff was terminated along with several others. After exhausting her administrative remedies, the plaintiff sued her employer in the Eastern District of Texas, bringing claims for damages under the ADA, alleging she had been discriminated against due to her diabetes.The circuit court found that the evidence was that plaintiff was terminated immediately after an event that highlighted her ADA-protected disability. The court reasoned proximity of her diabetic episode on the job and her termination was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case that she was included in the group to be terminated for ADA violative reasons. The court further found that plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination and show that a fact question exists as to whether that explanation is pretextual. Thus, the plaintiff established the elements of her prima facie case and she has also presented “substantial evidence” that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory rationale for her inclusion in the reduction in force was pretextual. An issue of material fact remains regarding whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her disability by including her in the reduction of force. View "Gosby v. Apache Industrial" on Justia Law

Indiana legislators, lobbyists, and legislative staff enjoy a party on the day the legislature adjourns for the year. The March 2018 celebration was held at AJ’s Lounge in Indianapolis. Hill, the state’s Attorney General, appeared at the party and made passes at several women, moving from verbal to physical harassment, including groping. A special prosecutor concluded that criminal charges were inappropriate. The Indiana Supreme Court suspended Hill’s law license for 30 days, a punishment mitigated by his long, previously unblemished record. His bid for renomination failed. His term as Attorney General ended in January 2021.Women legislative employees filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, other statutes, and Indiana’s common law. The district judge dismissed all claims against Hill without prejudice to their renewal in state court and dismissed all claims against Indiana, ruling that it is not the plaintiffs’ employer. Claims against the House and Senate remain pending in the district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals. Indiana cannot be treated as the plaintiffs’ “employer” under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), e–2(a). They were hired, and are supervised, by the House or Senate, which holds the sole power to discipline, fire, or reward them. The statute requires people to sue their own employers, so it is irrelevant whether the state employs the Attorney General. View "DaSilva v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Employer's motion for a new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict following a jury trial on Employee's claims of sex and gender identity discrimination and dismissing Employee's claims against a third-party administrator on summary judgment, holding that the court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's denial of Employer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissed the jury's verdict as to Employee's sex discrimination claims, holding that the district court erred in submitting the sex discrimination claim to the jury; (2) affirmed the jury's verdicts as to employee's gender identity discrimination claims; (3) affirmed the jury's damages award in favor of Employee in the full amounts that the jury entered; and (4) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Employer. View "Vroegh v. Iowa Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Reives, who is Black, worked for the Illinois State Police (ISP) from 1989 until he retired in 2018. In 2016, he had been suspended for 60 days for violating internal rules of conduct prohibiting false statements in connection with his employment. The same year, Reives’s supervisors downgraded his ratings on his performance evaluation, leading him to receive a lower ranking on a list of officers certified for promotion. Reives sued, alleging that these two incidents constituted race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ISP. When a plaintiff alleges that an employer disciplined him more harshly than his comparator, the most relevant similarities are those between the employees’ alleged misconduct, performance standards, and disciplining supervisor. Reives and his comparator, Kim, engaged in different misconduct and were punished for violating different rules. Reives cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Reives’s claim also fails under a more straightforward evaluation of the evidence. Reives was still certified for promotion in 2016 and did not explain how his lower ranking affected his promotion prospects. View "Reives v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law